Legal Integration and Language Diversity

Author(s):  
C.J.W. Baaij

How is the European Union (EU) to create laws that are uniform in a multitude of languages? Specifically, how is it to attain both legal integration and language diversity simultaneously without the latter compromising the former? The answer lies in the domain of translation. A uniform interpretation and application of EU law begins with the ways in which translators and jurist–linguists of the EU legislative bodies translate the original legislative draft texts into the various language versions. In the EU, law and language are inherently connected. This book critically assess contemporary translation practices in the EU legislative procedure, or “EU Translation,” and proposes an alternative, “source-oriented” approach that promises to better serve the policy objectives of the EU. On the one hand, the EU pursues legal integration, that is, the incremental harmonization and unification of its Member States’ laws, for the purpose of reducing national regulatory differences among Member States. On the other hand, in its commitment to the diversity of European languages, its legislative institutions enact legislative instruments in 24 languages. Contrary to the orthodox view in academic literature and to the current policies of the EU, this book suggests that the English language version should serve as the original and only authentic legislative text and that translation into the other language versions should avoid prioritizing clarity and fluency over syntactic correspondence and employ neologisms for distinctly EU legal concepts.

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 964-983 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Binder

The Commission of the European Union (EU) sees intra-EU bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as incompatible with the overall structure of European Union law. Against this background, certain Member States have started to terminate their treaties. Also, some of the new Member States have, in their role as Respondents in intra-EU BIT arbitrations, asserted inter alia that the intra-EU BITs had been automatically terminated upon their accession to the EU and that BIT provisions were inapplicable because of the operation of EU law. This contribution deals with these questions from a treaty law perspective and examines the alleged conflict between EU law and intra-EU BITs in investment cases as well as the consensual termination of intra-EU BITs, including the sunset clauses incorporated therein. It argues that if intra-EU BITs are already ‘in action’, their protection usually persists. On the other hand, investors enjoy only limited protection when States agree to terminate an intra-EU BIT by consent.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-86
Author(s):  
Dragan Trailovic

The article explores the European Union's approach to human rights issues in China through the processes of bilateral and multilateral dialogue on human rights between the EU and the People's Republic of China, on the one hand. On the other hand, the paper deals with the analysis of the EU's human rights policy in the specific case of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which is examined through normative and political activities of the EU, its institutions and individual member states. Besides, the paper examines China's response to the European Union's human rights approaches, in general, but also when it comes to the specific case of UAR Xinjiang. ?his is done through a review of China's discourse and behaviour within the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue framework, but also at the UN level and within the framework of bilateral relations with individual member states. The paper aims to show whether and how the characteristics of the EU's general approach to human rights in China are reflected in the individual case of Xinjiang. Particular attention shall be given to the differentiation of member states in terms of their approach to human rights issues in China, which is conditioned by the discrepancy between their political values, normative interests and ideational factors, on the one hand, and material factors and economic interests, on the other. Also, the paper aims to show the important features of the different views of the European Union and the Chinese state on the very role of Human Rights Dialogue, as well as their different understandings of the concept of human rights itself. The study concluded that the characteristics of the Union's general approach to human rights in China, as well as the different perceptions of human rights issues between China and the EU, were manifested in the same way in the case of UAR Xinjiang.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


Author(s):  
Tamás Szabados

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gradually undergoing multilevel transformation in the European Union (EU). Hardening of the initially voluntary CSR approach of the EU is progressively taking place in an interaction between the law of the Member States and EU law. Domestic solutions can serve as a model for EU legislation. In this progress, the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, granting considerable flexibility both to companies and the Member States, can indeed be seen as an intermediate stage and it is expected that, under the impact of human rights due diligence requirements recently imposed on companies by Member States, more substantive obligations will also be introduced at an EU level in the future.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 721-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jule Mulder

This article argues that comparative law needs to explore its critical potential when engaging with the European harmonization process and its effects on the law of the Member States. In the first part, the article evaluates existing comparative law methods and their suitability to identify legal and cultural factors that influence the judicial reception of EU harmonized law on a national level. Using EU non-discrimination law as a case study, it questions to what extent traditional methods are suitable to explain differences in the national judicial reception of EU harmonized law, despite the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union to interpret EU law. In doing so, it considers the potential of critical comparative law for the development of a deeper understanding of the national courts' reception of EU harmonized law as a key part of the broader legal harmonization process. In the second part, the article develops an original multi-layered culturally informed method to compare EU harmonized law. The proposal goes beyond the existing methods of comparative law by including critical aspects and stressing the relevance of embedding a general normative framework in any comparative critique. It challenges comparatists to reach deeply into national cultural spheres and to identify key influences on the application of EU rules and EU-national legal ‘hybrids’. The method creates room for multi-layered narratives of comparison aimed at gaining a deeper understanding of the national legal and non-legal cultural background that can hinder or facilitate harmonization processes. This enriched comparative critique can offer new insights into the process of legal harmonization in the EU, particularly by focusing on the point of application rather than the previous phases of creation of EU law and its reception by Member States.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 971-1002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heiko Sauer

Quite unsurprisingly, the CJEU has held that the ECB's OMT program does not violate EU law. In accordance with this holding, I argue in the first part of this note that the OMT program does not transgress the ECB's mandate under the Treaty, which is often interpreted too narrowly, in particular by German legal scholars. Furthermore, I argue that a violation of the prohibition of monetary financing of the member States as enshrined in article 123, para 1 TFEU cannot be inferred from the ECB's announcement of a program, which has never been implemented. In any case, there is clearly no manifest and grave transgression of EU competences which, according to the German Federal Constitutional Court's (FCC)Honeywelldoctrine, is required for an ultra vires finding. The second part of this note shows that the FCC's doctrine regarding transgressions of competences by EU organs (ultra vires review) is not only unconvincing as a matter of principle but also and worse (as on premises we can always reasonably disagree) not consistently applied to the OMT program. The note also objects to the Court's somewhat trendy blending of ultra vires and constitutional identity review of EU law through which it increasingly conceals its approach of applying the so-called constitutional constraints of European integration to the EU organs' conduct. The forthcoming FCC judgment is therefore less important as regards the quite foreseeable finding on the lawfulness of the OMT program but – hopefully – of vital importance as it might embody a more coherent relaunch of the FCC's standards of judicial review with regard to EU law.The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the European Central Bank's (ECB) 2012 announcement of future Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) comes as no surprise. It had not been expected that the CJEU would interpret the European Economic and Monetary Union's (EMU) Treaty provisions the way the FCC had “suggested.” Neither had it seemed conceivable that the CJEU would reject the FCC's request for a preliminary ruling holding that a legally non-binding assessment of the EU action's lawfulness could not be requested under Article 267 TFEU. The judgment had nevertheless been awaited for with tension for two reasons: First, in the vigorous and in part very critical debate about the ECB's competences under the TFEU and its alleged ultra vires action a judgment by the CJEU was necessary to settle the fundamental European law issues at stake. This is all the more important with regard to the ECB's current Expanded Asset Purchase Program (EAPP) as well as its interconnection with the European Stability Mechanism's (ESM) financial assistance programs. The CJEU's holdings on the ECB's competences within the EMU framework are discussed in the first part of this note regarding the distinction between monetary and economic policy (infra section A.I.) and the interpretation of Article 123, paragraph 1 TFEU which prohibits monetary financing of the member States by the ECB (infra section A.II.). Second, it was clear that the judgment would shape the new stage in the changing and sometimes explosive on-off relationship between the CJEU and the FCC, the stage entered into by Karlsruhe's first ever request for a preliminary ruling. The FCC had fortified its ultra vires doctrine and clearly indicated its readiness not to follow the CJEU but to insist on the notorious “last word” of the German Constitution instead. Thus, the second part of this note discusses the constitutional legal premises of the FCC's approach and the procedural and substantial manner in which the FCC tries to scrutinize the ECB's OMT program (infra sections B.I. and B.II.). In this context, possible scenarios for the upcoming judgment (infra section C.I.) and consequences for European multi-level constitutionalism (infra section C.II.) will be discussed.


Author(s):  
Barbara Guastaferro

Article 4 of the Treaty on the European Union is a core provision to understand the ‘federal’ nature of the European Union. It is composed of three paragraphs, any of which tries to strike a balance between the constitutive units of the composite legal order, namely the EU, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other. The first paragraph enshrines the so-called ‘principle of presumed Member States competences’, according to which competences not conferred upon the EU remain to the Member States. The second paragraph requires the EU to respect Member States’ national identities, inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures. The third paragraph enshrines the principle of sincere cooperation. In this respect, all the paragraphs express a sort of ‘federal concern’. Article 4(1) TEU is devoted to the vertical division of competences and strengthens the respect of the principle of conferral, Article 4(2) TEU is devoted to the identities of the Member States of the EU thus protecting diversities in the composite legal order, and Article 4(3) TEU is devoted to loyalty, which, like in many federal or compound legal orders, should inform the cooperation among levels of government.


2020 ◽  
pp. 108-143
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This chapter examines the question of the relations between EU law and domestic law from the point of view of a political theory of the European Union. It is common to see EU law under ‘federalism’ or under a theory of ‘statism’. These two views are outlined at the start of this chapter by examining various arguments made for them. They are both rejected. The chapter defends a rival view, the ‘internationalist’ reading of the EU, according to which it is a branch of the law of nations. A careful look at the EU treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU shows that the EU endorses an internationalist model based on equality and reciprocity. The EU does not replace the relation between citizens and political power. It does not establish a new constitutional law that replaces the national ones. It is a new way of organizing the relations between the various member states whose equality it fully respects. The coherence of European Union law is therefore not provided by uniformity imposed by a single master or constitutional rule, but is given by the political coordination of the laws of the member states achieved under the treaties. Coherence is achieved because the member states have adopted similar, although not identical, constitutional principles.


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