The Competing Perspectives of the Religion Clauses

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Howard Gillman ◽  
Erwin Chemerinsky

This chapter describes the recent Supreme Court cases dealing with the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, while also previewing the issues likely to arise in the future. It identifies how for both of these provisions there are two competing philosophies, which are titled “accommodation” and “separation.” “Accommodationists” see little as violating the Establishment Clause but want the Free Exercise Clause to be aggressively used to create an exception to general laws based on religious beliefs. “Separationists” see the Establishment Clause as creating a secular government and reject special exceptions for religion. At this point in American history, there is a political divide: conservatives tend to favor the accommodation approach, while liberals favor the separationist view.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry L. Chambers

If courts are willing to expand religious liberty so that people may be allowed to choose-on the basis of their own religious beliefs-whether certain laws will apply to non-religious entities they create, those courts should take that step very carefully. This Paper explores the issue and pro- ceeds as follows. Part I discusses three recent Supreme Court cases that il- luminate the telescoping and the collectivization of free exercise rights. Part II considers problems that accompany telescoping and collectivizing free exercise rights. Part III suggests how courts should critically evaluate the telescoping and collectivizing of free exercise rights. This Paper con- cludes with a warning about the danger that can accompany insufficient consideration of the telescoping and collectivizing of free exercise rights through entities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
Leslie C. Griffin

The United States is in a religion-friendly mood—or at least its three branches of government are. The Supreme Court is turning away from its Free Exercise Clause analysis that currently holds that every religious person must obey the law. At the same time, the Court is rejecting its old Establishment Clause analysis that the government cannot practice or support religion. The old model of separation of church and state is gone, replaced by an ever-growing unity between church and state. This Article examines how much union of church and state this Court might establish.


Author(s):  
Lucas A. Powe

This chapter examines Supreme Court cases that were filed over the issue of freedom of and from religion in Texas. In 2011, Governor Rick Perry designated April 22–24 as official days of prayer for rain. Periodical subscriptions were exempted from sales tax. Then in a clear example of a preference for religion, the law was changed to exempt only “periodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of that faith.” Texas Monthly paid the tax but sued for a refund. The chapter first considers the Texas Monthly lawsuit before discussing cases involving Alfred Smith and Galen Black, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Thomas Van Orden, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It also analyzes City of Boerne v. Flores involving historic zoning and a case involving prayer at a football game.


Author(s):  
Kevin R. Pregent ◽  
Nathan C. Walker

There is perhaps no better setting that exhibits the perennial tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause than American public schools. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the US Constitution ensures that students may retain their religious beliefs, practices, identities, and rights when they enter public schools. The free exercise principle also protects government employees; however, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prevents teachers and administrators, as agents of the state, from entangling the public school in religious activities or engaging in school speech that advances or endorses religion. This chapter illustrates how these two principles––free exercise of religion and non-establishment of religion––form the concept known as religious freedom. Attempting to strike this balance are public schools, which are required to serve the entire public, whether religious or not. Those within the school—both teachers and students—may be religious and wish to express their religion or to express their critique of or nonaffiliation with religion. This chapter explores different forms of religious expression for both students and teachers and details the unconstitutional nature of laws that seek to target religion for regulation or fail to accommodate religion in public schools.


Author(s):  
Caroline Corbin

Religious surveys are finding greater percentages of Americans who self-identify as secular. At the same time, religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause have become more difficult to obtain. However, religion jurisprudence in the United States has not become more secular for two reasons. First, this greater unwillingness to grant constitutional exemptions reflects a shift in constitutional jurisprudence from “separationism” to “neutrality.” Rather than building a wall between church and state, the Establishment Clause is now interpreted to impose fewer restraints on state-sponsored religion. Second, statutes like the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act and its state counterparts have not only reestablished separationist era levels of protection for religious liberty but increased them. The result is a religion jurisprudence where religion is accommodated more than ever, while the state has more leeway to advance religion. This combination has unfortunate consequences for both secular people and core secular values, such as antidiscrimination.


Author(s):  
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan

This chapter considers the remarkable diversity of American religion from the beginning: the constitutionalizing of religion, the reasons for delayed implementation of the First Amendment religion clauses, the evolution of free exercise and establishment clause doctrine, and the ongoing difficulty of defining religion for US law. What makes US regulation of religion stand out among national legal orders is the dual commitment to federalism and to disestablishment. With a low ‘statism’ and a strong commitment to equality—theological, as well as political—academic expertise has little purchase on the national mind. Religion is what the people say it is. That is a very old story in the US.


Worldview ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 22 (9) ◽  
pp. 46-53
Author(s):  
Harold J. Berman

When the word "law" is juxtaposed with the word "religion," an American lawyer today is apt to think immediately of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution with its double protection against any governmental interference in "the free exercise" of religion on the one hand and against any governmental "establishment" of religion on the other. From the standpoint of contemporary American constitutional law, religion has become the personal and private affair of individual citizens or groups of citizens. Indeed, in recent decades our courts, in interpreting the "free exercise" clause, have gone far toward immunizing individual and group activities from governmental control, whether federal or state, whenever they are considered by the persons engaging in them to be of a religious character; and at the same time, under the "establishment" clause the courts have struck down most forms even of indirect governmental support of religion, whether federal or state.


Author(s):  
Susan Gluck Mezey

Opposition to same-sex marriage in the United States is frequently based on the religious belief that marriage should be reserved for a man and a woman. With most of the attention focused on wedding vendors, the clash between religious liberty and marriage equality has largely manifested itself in efforts by business owners, such as photographers, florists, caterers, and bakers, to deny their services to same-sex couples celebrating their marriages. Citing state antidiscrimination laws, the couples demand the owners treat them as they do their other customers. Owners of public accommodations (privately owned business open to the public) who object to facilitating the weddings of same-sex couples do so typically by asserting their personal religious beliefs as defenses when charged with violating such laws; they argue that they would view their participation (albeit indirect) in wedding ceremonies as endorsing same-sex marriage. As the lawsuits against them began to proliferate, the business owners asked the courts to shield them from liability for violating the laws prohibiting discrimination because of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation. They cited their First Amendment right to the free exercise of their religion and their right not to be compelled to speak, that is, to express a positive message about same-sex marriage. With conflicts between same-sex couples and owners of business establishments arising in a number of states, the focus of the nation’s attention was on a New Mexico photographer, a Washington State florist, and a Colorado baker, each of whom sought an exemption from their state’s antidiscrimination law to enable them to exercise their religious tenets against marriage equality. In these cases, the state human rights commissions and the state appellate courts ruled that the antidiscrimination laws outweighed the rights of the business owners to exercise their religious beliefs against marriage equality by refusing to play a role, no matter how limited, in a same-sex marriage ceremony. In June 2018, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, LTD. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the state’s antidiscrimination law that guaranteed equal treatment for same-sex couples in places of public accommodations but reversed the Commission’s ruling against the Colorado baker. In a narrow decision, the Court held that the Commission infringed on the baker’s First Amendment right to free exercise by uttering comments that, in the Court’s view, demonstrated hostility to his sincerely held religious beliefs. The ruling affirmed that society has a strong interest in protecting gay men and lesbians from harm as they engage in the marketplace as well as in respecting sincerely held religious beliefs.


1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Ignagni

The U.S. Supreme Court, at various times, has changed the constitutional tests it claimed to use in order to settle free exercise of religion disputes. These changes in official doctrine and the manner in which many cases have been decided have left the Supreme Court open to much criticism from legal scholars. This study differs substantially from previous work in this area. It uses a fact-attitudinal model to analyze the cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. Its findings indicate that these decisions are, generally, explainable and predictable.


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