Rescuing the Volitional Excuses from Compatibilism (the “Overshoot” Problem for Compatibilism)
Chapter 9 explores the nature of the volitional excuses and whether such nature can be reconciled with the classical compatibilism explored in the last chapter. The volitional excuses are those excuses whereby the accused does not claim ignorance or mistake about the wrong-making characteristics of his actions; rather, the claim of excuse is founded on the difficulties some actors have in either choosing or doing what they know is the right thing to do. Classical compatibilism has the danger of eliminating all volitional excuses; the chapter aims to reformulate the counterfactual analysis of ability at the heart of classical compatibilism in ways that do not eliminate volitional excuses. The chapter also assays the extent to which contemporary neuroscience might aid in formulating and/or verifying the presence of, the volitional excuses.