Public Ignorance and Democratic Technocracy
It is usually thought that the “typical voter’s” well-documented ignorance of public affairs is explained by the low incentive to inform oneself about them, given the high odds against one’s vote making a difference. This theory cannot withstand either logical or empirical scrutiny. A better theory is that citizen-technocrats are unaware that they need much information if they are to make intelligent technocratic decisions, due to a tacit acceptance of a simple-society ontology—according to which social problems are straightforwardly diagnosed and solved by people with good intentions. A politics organized around good intentions, however, is unlikely to recognize unintended consequences, let alone prioritize knowledge of them. The upshot of this chapter, then, in conjunction with Chapter 5, is that we face a Hobson’s choice between rule by well-informed but doctrinaire epistocrats and rule by open-minded but ignorant citizen-technocrats.