Normative Implications

Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

This chapter discusses the normative implications of the psychological findings documenting deviations from rationality, with particular focus on fundamental issues that cut across different legal fields. It first outlines the contribution of happiness studies and heuristics-and-biases research to theories of human welfare and the formulation of normative theories. The chapter then focuses on the normative significance of prevailing moral judgments (as studied by moral psychologists) for legal policymaking. Moving on to more pragmatic issues of lawmaking, the chapter examines two major implications of behavioral studies for setting the goals of legal norms: preventing the exploitation of people’s cognitive biases by others, and protecting people from their own fallibility. Finally, turning from goals to means, the discussion highlights the contribution of behavioral studies to the design of disclosure duties and behaviorally informed regulation (nudges).

Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

This chapter surveys the contributions of behavioral studies to the analysis of criminal law and law enforcement. It begins by introducing the key insights of economic analysis of crime control. It then examines the extent to which people’s moral judgments are compatible with the dictates of economic analysis in this sphere—and the associated normative implications. It proceeds to analyze the ramifications of behavioral findings regarding how people perceive probabilities and sanctions for deterrence theory. The chapter e also examines the contribution of research in the area of behavioral ethics to crime control. Finally, it discusses the implications of behavioral research for recidivism.


Author(s):  
Eyal Zamir ◽  
Doron Teichman

Against the background of rational choice theory, this chapter provides an overview of the behavioral sub-disciplines informing behavioral law and economics—including judgment and decision-making studies, parts of social psychology, moral psychology, experimental game theory, and behavioral ethics. The chapter discusses deviations from cognitive and motivational rationality, including studies of people’s moral judgments. It begins with probability assessments and related issues. It critically describes phenomena related to prospect theory, phenomena associated with motivated reasoning and egocentrism, and those related to reference-dependence. It also summarizes studies of bounded willpower. Some attention is given to studies that show that most people do not share the consequentialist outlook that prioritizes the maximization of human welfare over all other values. Finally, the chapter discusses several issues that cut across various phenomena: individual differences in judgment and decision-making; the significance of professional training, experience, and expertise; deciding for others; group decision-making; cultural differences; and debiasing.


Legal Theory ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-346
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson

The concept of law is not a theorist's invention but one that people use every day. Thus one measure of the adequacy of a theory of law is its degree of fidelity to the concept as it is understood by those who use it. That means “saving the truisms” as far as possible. There are important truisms about the law that have an evaluative cast. The theorist has either to say what would make those evaluative truisms true or to defend her choice to dismiss them as false of law or not of the essence of law. Thus the legal theorist must give an account of the truth grounds of the more central evaluative truisms about law. This account is a theory of legitimacy. It will contain framing judgments that state logical relations between descriptive judgments and directly evaluative judgments. Framing judgments are not directly evaluative, nor do they entail directly evaluative judgments, but they are nonetheless moral judgments. Therefore, an adequate theory of law must make (some) moral judgments. This means that an adequate theory of law has to take a stand on certain (but not all) contested issues in political philosophy. Legal theory is thus a branch of political philosophy. Moreover, one cannot be a moral-aim functionalist about legal institutions without compromising one's positivism about legal norms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-513 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark S. Schwartz

To better understand the ethical decision-making process and why individuals fail to act ethically, the aim of this article is to explore what are seen as the key impediments to ethical behavior and their pedagogical implications. Using the ethical decision-making process proposed by Rest as an overarching framework, the article examines the following barriers to ethical decision making: improper framing, which can preclude moral awareness; cognitive biases and psychological tendencies, which can hinder reaching proper moral judgments; and moral rationalizations, which can obstruct moral judgments from being translated into moral intentions or ethical behavior. Next, pedagogical exercises and tools for teaching behavioral ethics and ethical decision making are provided. The article concludes with its implications.


Diametros ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (64) ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Tomasz Żuradzki

Many psychologists have tried to reveal the formation and processing of moral judgments by using a variety of empirical methods: behavioral data, tests of statistical significance, and brain imaging. Meanwhile, some scholars maintain that the new empirical findings of the ways we make moral judgments question the trustworthiness and authority of many intuitive ethical responses. The aim of this special issue is to encourage scholars to rethink how, if at all, it is possible to draw any normative conclusions by discovering the psychological processes underlying moral judgments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Peón ◽  
Manel Antelo

Financial management decisions are made by people, and people, in all instances, are shaped by their behavioral traits. Here we provide extensive insight on the theoretical and empirical analysis made on cognitive biases and their influence on financial decisions. To provide a systematic exposition, we set three broad categories: heuristics and biases, choices (including framing and preferences) and social factors. We then describe the main biases within each category and provide an extensive revision of the main theoretical and empirical developments about their impact on financial decisions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Benjamin Enke ◽  
Uri Gneezy ◽  
Brian Hall ◽  
David Martin ◽  
Vadim Nelidov ◽  
...  

Abstract Despite decades of research on heuristics and biases, evidence on the effect of large incentives on cognitive biases is scant. We test the effect of incentives on four widely documented biases: base-rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking, and intuitive reasoning. In laboratory experiments with 1,236 college students in Nairobi, we implement three incentive levels: no incentives, standard lab payments, and very high incentives. We find that very high stakes increase response times by 40% but improve performance only very mildly or not at all. In none of the tasks do very high stakes come close to de-biasing participants.


2008 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mireille Hildebrandt ◽  

Within science technology and society studies the focus has long been on descriptive microanalyses. Several authors have raised the issue of the normative implications of the findings of research into socio-technical devices and infrastructures, while some claim that material artifacts have moral significance or should even be regarded as moral actors. In this contribution the normative impact of technologies is investigated and compared with the normative impact of legal norms, arguing that a generic concept of normativity is needed that does not depend on the intention of whoever designed either a law or a technology. Furthermore this contribution develops the idea that modern law, which has been mediated by the technologies of the script and the printing press, may need to rearticulate its basic tenets into emerging technologies in order to sustain what has been called the paradox of the 'Rechtsstaat'.


2019 ◽  
pp. 66-104
Author(s):  
R. Jay Wallace

Chapter 2 explored the normative significance of moral rightness for the agent. This chapter, shifts the focus from the agent to those potentially affected by what the agent does. A leading idea here will be that interpersonal morality apparently has normative significance not only for the agent, but for other parties as well, and that it is an important but neglected task for moral theory to make sense of this aspect of it. Moral standards of right and wrong purport to define constraints on agency; but they also purport to provide a basis for interpersonal accountability relations between individuals, articulating what we can expect of each other as each of us pursues our private ends. Disregard of such interpersonal expectations by an agent thus has normative implications for other parties, giving them reason to adjust their attitudes and behavior in response, in the characteristic register of blame.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 1529-1546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Schaich Borg ◽  
Debra Lieberman ◽  
Kent A. Kiehl

Disgust, an emotion related to avoiding harmful substances, has been linked to moral judgments in many behavioral studies. However, the fact that participants report feelings of disgust when thinking about feces and a heinous crime does not necessarily indicate that the same mechanisms mediate these reactions. Humans might instead have separate neural and physiological systems guiding aversive behaviors and judgments across different domains. The present interdisciplinary study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (n = 50) and behavioral assessment to investigate the biological homology of pathogen-related and moral disgust. We provide evidence that pathogen-related and sociomoral acts entrain many common as well as unique brain networks. We also investigated whether morality itself is composed of distinct neural and behavioral subdomains. We provide evidence that, despite their tendency to elicit similar ratings of moral wrongness, incestuous and nonsexual immoral acts entrain dramatically separate, while still overlapping, brain networks. These results (i) provide support for the view that the biological response of disgust is intimately tied to immorality, (ii) demonstrate that there are at least three separate domains of disgust, and (iii) suggest strongly that morality, like disgust, is not a unified psychological or neurological phenomenon.


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