Bill of Rights

Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman

This chapter examines the Colorado Bill of Rights. It focuses on situations in which Colorado rights have significance independent of the federal Bill of Rights. This occurs when a Colorado provision has no federal counterpart or is interpreted to limit state government more strictly than its federal equivalent. An important provision protects privacy against government searches and seizures somewhat more than the federal Fourth Amendment. Others provide protection against retroactive civil laws and provide for condemnation of easements to serve mining and agriculture interests. Explicit provisions protect property rights of alien residents and require owners’ consent to municipal annexations. The chapter also explains Colorado’s unique path to constitutional protection of equal protection of the laws.

Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This epilogue shows that Hague v. CIO had a legacy more complex than its reputation as a speech rights victory for workers and others over dictatorial city boss Frank Hague under the Bill of Rights. The American Civil Liberties Union and renamed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) immediately split over the decision’s ramifications. Moreover, while the ruling enlarged constitutional protection for the right of public assembly to the benefit of Jehovah’s Witnesses, civil rights demonstrators, and others, it did little to enhance picketing and other “labor speech,” or to shield union organizers from police harassment. And while the decision freed the CIO to organize in Jersey City, it did not destroy Mayor Hague, who accommodated CIO unions and was ousted later due to city politics.


2005 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 207-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa

CHIRWA, DANWOOD MZIKENGE, A full loaf is better than half: the constitutional protection of economic, social and cultural rights in Malawi, Journal of African Law, 49, 2 (2005): 207–241The last two decades have seen a new wave of constitution-making in Africa as many countries changed from autocracy to democracy. Malawi followed the trend by adopting a new Constitution in 1994 to mark the end of a 30-year, dictatorial one-party regime. This Constitution breaks with traditional constitutions by recognizing economic, social and cultural rights. However, few of these rights are entrenched in the Bill of Rights as justiciable rights. The rest are enshrined as unenforceable principles of national policy. These provisions and the jurisprudence they have generated thus far are discussed critically. It is argued that while the Malawian Constitution deserves acclaim for recognizing these rights, the model adopted for protecting them fails to give full effect to the notion of the indivisibility of all rights and is not good enough for a poor country, which is also in transition to democracy. Not only was Malawi's choice of this model not preceded by a careful and reasoned examination of the existing models and the local circumstances, it was also made without wide public consultations. The ways, based on the existing constitutional provisions, in which the protection of these rights can be improved are explored.


2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Ely

AbstractThis essay examines the far-reaching attack on individualism and property rights which characterized the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century. Scholars and political figures associated with Progressivism criticized the individualist values of classical liberalism and rejected the traditional notion of limited government espoused by the framers of the Constitution. They expressed great confidence in regulatory agencies, staffed by experts, to effectuate policy. Progressives paved the way for the later triumph of statist ideology with the New Deal in the 1930s.The essay traces the sources of the Progressive antipathy to individual rights to the influence of Bismarck’s program in Imperial Germany and the Social Gospel theology. It gives attention to the views of leading Progressive intellectuals who stressed the perceived need for increased governmental power and governance by an educated elite. The essay also explores the impact of Progressivism on constitutional law, arguing that the rise of “sociological jurisprudence,” with its skepticism about courts and stress on judicial deference to legislative judgments, served to advance the Progressive political agenda. Progressives looked with disfavor on any constitutional doctrine which curtailed governmental authority. The Progressive movement left a lasting legacy of diminished regard for individualism and a jurisprudence which stripped property of muscular constitutional protection.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 287-300
Author(s):  
Christopher Serkin

Gerhart’s book makes real contributions and nicely incorporates doctrinal payoffs. It sells short, however, the distributional concerns embedded in core property doctrines and so does not entirely account for the extent to which positive law can and does diverge from social recognition. It therefore admits constitutional protection for property that is too parsimonious, and that also does not embrace the full complexity of the relationship between property and the State. This short response argues that positive property rights—especially in a modern regulatory state—are inherently redistributive. When the State has a choice between different regulatory strategies for achieving public goals, constitutional limits like the Takings Clause should not rely on formal categories but must instead account explicitly for distributive concerns. At the end of the day, the State is an active, not passive, player in the definition of property rights, a role that comes with both constitutional limitations and requirements.


Author(s):  
John Attanasio

Carolene Products embraced judicial responsibility of ensuring that everyone has a fair say in the formulation of public policy, including the distribution of societal resources. The case discusses protecting the key political rights of speaking and voting. In positioning itself as the referee over politics, the Court assumed the daunting challenge of fashioning a theory of democracy. Key to this has been the weak libertarian paradigm of free speech, which prohibits government censorship of speech. In essence, it requires: “Government generally cannot stop me from saying whatever I want to say.” In contrast, the strong libertarian paradigm of free speech shouts, “I can say whatever I want to say with whatever resources I have to say it.” Despite weakened protection for property rights, this strong libertarian paradigm has dramatically increased constitutional protection for property interests. Preeminently, the campaign finance cases hinge influence over elections, law, public policy, and all of government on wealth.


2021 ◽  
pp. 323-334
Author(s):  
Ružica Kijevčanin ◽  

The State Attorney's Office of the Republic of Serbia was established by the Law on the Attorney General's Office as a state body whose competence is reflected in the performance of the attorney's office function. It represents one segment of the executive function of the state government, which consists in the realization and protection of property rights and interests of the state, through legal representation and counseling of the Republic of Serbia, ie its bodies and organizations. The law leaves the possibility of determining the Attorney General's Office by a sub-legal general act at the level of autonomous provinces, as well as local self-government units. It regulates in detail other key issues such as organization, competencies, control that will be the subject of analysis in future work. The study of the origin and development of this institution pointed out the great importance that belonged to it through time and different state systems. Inspired by the role it played in the state of Serbia, the author devoted himself to interpreting some aspects of this topic.


2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Julie Cassidy

<p>Unlike the constitutions of many nations, such as the United States of America and the Republic of South Africa, the constitutions of the Australian States and Territories and the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1901 (UK) contain no bill of rights. Australia is the only western democracy without a federal bill of rights. The debate regarding the need for a bill of rights necessitates an understanding of what human rights the people of Australia already enjoy. If sufficient protection can be found in existing sources, does Australia really need a federal bill of rights? Opponents of a bill of rights state that we have sufficient protection from arbitrary government intervention in our personal affairs and thus a bill of rights is<br />unnecessary. There are a number of potential sources of human rights in Australia that might provide the suggested existing protection, including the common law, specific domestic legislation, international law and constitutional law. Each of these sources of human rights has, however,<br />important limitations. The focus of this article is on the inadequacy of the Australian constitutions as a source of purported protection. This in turn suggests that an alternative source of rights is needed – a federal bill of rights? In the course of this analysis the author makes suggestions for<br />reform; specifically how a federal bill of rights may address the paucity of constitutional protection.</p>


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-118
Author(s):  
Doris Matu

The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides for the right to property in Article 40. Further, in Article 43 (1)(b), it provides for the right to accessible and adequate housing. The purpose of this article is to show the conflict that arises between the right to property for owners of land and the right to housing of the informal settlers living on these privately owned lands. The main objective is to investigate the concept of illegal forced evictions and the legal framework that surrounds the practices that render such evictions against the principle of human dignity and the right to accessible and adequate housing in the context of informal settlements. The 2010 Constitution states that every person shall enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights to the greatest extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental freedom. This renders important the concern that arises when persons informally settle onto land that they have no legal title to; what is the balance to be maintained between property rights and housing rights as provided for in the Bill of Rights.


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