Executive Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Special Power ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
General Section

This chapter looks at Article IV of the Colorado Constitution, which defines the executive department. By providing for the separate election of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general, Section 1 seems to divide executive branch authority. In practice, this tension has mattered only when the attorney general and governor belonged to different political parties, and the attorney general asserted a legal position opposed by the governor. Section 1 imposes term limits on the state’s elective executives. Section 11 gives the governor the usual veto power followed by Section 12, giving the special power of the line-item veto over appropriations bills. Section 13 has complex provisions for succession if the governor’s office becomes vacant during a term.

Part III Structure of State Government, 11 The State Executive Branch

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Williams Robert F
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
State Legislature ◽  
The State ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Executive Agencies ◽  
Executive Officers

This chapter discusses the differences between the state executive branch created by state constitutions and the federal executive. In many states there is a plural or fragmented executive, with more than one state-wide elected official in addition to the governor, such as the attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of education, etc. Such additional executive officers perform constitutional functions separate and apart from the governor's constitutional functions. State executive officials such as the governor do not exercise plenary authority like that of the legislature. Rather, their authority is delegated either in the state constitution or by statute. A governor's use of executive orders is therefore limited to implementing constitutional or statutory powers. The chapter discusses the variety of gubernatorial veto powers, together with the judicial involvement in controversies over the exercise of this power. This judicial involvement is particularly important with respect to the item veto power. Further, some state constitutions create executive agencies, and specify their powers (often including quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers), thereby divesting the state legislature of authority in those subject areas.

scholarly journals POLITICAL PARTIES AND ISLAMIC LAW POSITIVIZATION IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN GOVERNANCE

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 75-86
Author(s):  
Arip Purkon
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Boarding School ◽  
Religious Communities ◽  
Analysis Techniques ◽  
The Reformation ◽  
Aceh Province ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
Religion And State ◽  
Religious Courts

Purpose of the study: This research aims to analyze the existence of Islamic law formalized into Indonesian law in the Reformation Era from 1999 to 2019 and explore whether it is legally stronger or weaker. Also tries to explore what Islamic law fields are formalized into Indonesian national law. Methodology: This research is qualitative research that is doctrinal law research with juridical analysis methods. The main source of research data is the law established between 1999-2019. Data is described systematically and objectively, then analyzed using content analysis techniques. Main Findings: During the Reformation Era 1999-2019, 17 Indonesian national laws contained formal Islamic law. The legal position of Islamic law became stronger in several fields, namely hajj (pilgrimage) and umrah management, management of zakat, implementation of special privileges Aceh Province, endowments (waqf) management, religious courts, state sharia securities, Islamic banking, halal product guarantee, marriage law and the existence of pesantren (Islamic boarding school). Applications of this study: This study is useful as a model example of a relationship between religion and state. Islamic law can be transformed into state law without changing the state principles. This research also provides a solution to Muslims (they are the majority in Indonesia) that Islamic law can be constituted as national law constitutionally and tolerant of other religious communities. Novelty/Originality of this study: The object of research is positivization in contemporary Indonesian governance that has been enacted between 1999-2019. In terms of time, this is very representative and updated.

scholarly journals Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial Oversight of the Executive Branch

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fran Quigley
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Current System ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Bush Administration ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Popular Resistance ◽  
Independent Counsel ◽  
Policy Agendas ◽  
High Level

Fran Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial Oversight of the Executive Branch, 20 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 271 (2010)Allegations of Executive Branch misconduct present an inherent conflict of interest because prosecutorial discretion is invested in a U.S. Attorney General appointed by – and serving at the pleasure of – the President. Various commentators, including Justice Antonin Scalia, Professor Stephen Carter, and the many critics of the former independent counsel statute have posited that checks on executive power provided by the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary, and political pressure will overcome any potential conflicts of interest. This sanguine view of adequate Executive Branch oversight was put to the test when high-level members of the George W. Bush Administration authorized acts of torture. After widespread public disapproval, Congress and the courts responded with efforts to rein in the Administration’s actions. However, the Department of Justice under the Bush Administration not only refused to investigate and prosecute allegations of sanctioning torture, but its attorneys also led the efforts to overcome congressional, judicial, and popular resistance to the Executive Branch conduct – and did so while explicitly acknowledging that the Executive Branch could expect little or no judicial oversight for its actions. Ultimately, the President who sanctioned torture left office, and the voters elected a President who expressed sharply different views on torture. However, the subsequent Administration of President Barack Obama, although affiliated with a different party and on record as opposed to acts of torture sponsored by the previous Administration, has also declined to pursue prosecution of high-level members of the Bush Administration. This most recent development shows that the conflict of interest presented by presidential control over Executive Branch prosecution transcends predictable concerns of self-preservation. The conflict of interest also highlights the natural desire of a sitting President to avoid prosecutions of previous executive officials when such prosecutions would consume political capital needed for the President’s broader legislative and foreign policy agendas. When it comes to controlling Executive Branch criminal conduct, the current structure designed to provide checks and balances comes up empty and thus must be reformed. The most direct and effective reform would be the direct election of the U.S. Attorney General. Even less precise remedies, such as a revived and improved independent counsel or Congress enacting provisions to break up the current monopoly over Executive Branch prosecution, would be significant improvements over the current system, which mocks the principle of equal justice for all.

IZVRŠNA VLAST U VIDOVDANSKOM USTAVU

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Đorđije Blažić ◽  
◽  
Anika Kovačević ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Internal State ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The State ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Political Factor ◽  
Coup D'etat ◽  
Political Situation ◽  
Council Of Ministers

The author analyzes the provisions of the Vidоvdan Constitution which regulate the position and competence of the executive branch. With the Vidovdan Constitution, the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes was proclaimed a constitutional parliamentary and hereditary monarchy in which the King has a central constitutional position and the position of an undisputed holder of executive power. The executive power is made available to the king, which is exercised by the ministers for him, with him and his subordinates. Ministers form the Council of Ministers (Government) and are at the head of certain administrative departments. Although the Constitution proclaimed parliamentarism, there was no classic parliamentary responsibility of ministers before the Assembly. The king was a political factor that enters the field of competence of other holders of power, and thus the division of power provided by the constitution "falls away". The king's power extends to the civil and military field of life of the state, to the external and internal spheres. Although the adoption of the Vidovdan Constitution aimed to create a unified system of organization and division of power, the internal state and political situation in the country, after the adoption of the Constitution, became more complicated and filled with frequent ministerial crises and conflicts of political parties. The King's domination and his frequent "going out" outside the constitutional framework resulted in increasing centralization and, in the end, a coup d'etat and the establishment of King Alexander Karadjordjevic's personal dictatorship.

Eisenhower’s executive privilege and the public interest

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-84
Author(s):  
Kevin M. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Government Information ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
White House ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Creation

This chapter delves into the depths of one of the most important developments within modern American politics, the creation and institutionalization of executive privilege. In facing a fervent Congress in the grips of McCarthyism, Eisenhower issued a letter denying testimony to the Senate for the Army-McCarthy hearings. His letter included a memo from Attorney General Brownell that claimed the president had an inherent constitutional privilege to deny information to Congress or the public if it was in the public interest and for national security. This action institutionalized the Cold War Paradigm in the executive branch and created an extra-constitutional power for the president. Eisenhower issued several executive orders concerning classification and public dissemination of government information, along with the creation of the Office of Strategic Information (OSI) within the Commerce Department to oversee these policies. Eisenhower claimed historic precedent to justify his inherent constitutional power, regardless, it showed a learned response that changed executive power. Congress would respond in 1955 by creating the Special Subcommittee on Government Information chaired by Rep. John Moss, given jurisdiction for oversight on all executive branch information policies and practices. With the issue of freedom of information institutionalized in Congress, a 12-year legislative power struggle would unfold between Congress and the White House ending with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Christina L. Boyd ◽  
Michael J. Nelson ◽  
Ian Ostrander ◽  
Ethan D. Boldt
Keyword(s):  
Local Community ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
High Ranking ◽  
Political Environments ◽  
The U.S

Scholars, politicians, and prosecutors themselves have repeatedly maintained that federal prosecutors have vast independence when carrying out their jobs. Despite this, we argue that federal prosecutors are constrained by the federal and local political environments in which they serve. U.S. Attorneys, the chief federal prosecutors for the 93 federal judicial districts around the country, are selected through a politically driven appointment process and operate within the purview of the Department of Justice, an executive branch agency. Federal prosecutors are led by the U.S. Attorney General, a presidential appointee and high-ranking member of the president’s cabinet. And U.S. Attorneys are invested members of their local community and are likely to be mindful of those preferences when making prosecutorial decisions. As a result, we should expect to find political influence at every stage of a U.S. Attorney’s service. The chapter closes with a preview of the full book.

Legislative Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-170
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Legislative Power

This chapter explains Article V of the Colorado Constitution, which structures the legislative department. Original Section 1 vested all of the state’s legislative power in the general assembly. The rest of Section 1—added in 1910 and after—established, defined, and modified powers of citizens’ initiative and veto referendum. Section 3 defines the terms of senators and representatives and imposes term limits. Section 32 defines appropriations bills subject to the governor’s line-item veto, and Section 21 protects that veto power. Sections 20, 22a, and 22b require committee consideration of all bills but also prevent committees and caucus positions from killing bills. Sections 44–48.4 define and empower commissions to redistrict congressional and legislative seats.

Dominican president will strive to run again

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Dominican Republic ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Electoral Campaign ◽  
Political Factions ◽  
Political Uncertainties ◽  
Ruling Party

Subject Ruling party struggles. Significance The Dominican Republic is enjoying strong economic growth but faces rising political uncertainty. Divisions within the ruling Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) over the Law of Political Parties and candidates for the 2020 presidential election have dominated debates in recent months. On June 7, after more than a year of investigations into the Odebrecht scandal, the Attorney General indicted seven politicians for bribery while controversially exonerating key PLD leaders. Impacts Internationally controversial anti-migration policies are unlikely to soften as political factions vie for public support. The Dominican Republic will remain one of the fastest-growing economies in the region despite political uncertainties. The country’s investment-friendly environment is unlikely to be at risk even during the electoral campaign.

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