Legislative Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-170
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Legislative Power

This chapter explains Article V of the Colorado Constitution, which structures the legislative department. Original Section 1 vested all of the state’s legislative power in the general assembly. The rest of Section 1—added in 1910 and after—established, defined, and modified powers of citizens’ initiative and veto referendum. Section 3 defines the terms of senators and representatives and imposes term limits. Section 32 defines appropriations bills subject to the governor’s line-item veto, and Section 21 protects that veto power. Sections 20, 22a, and 22b require committee consideration of all bills but also prevent committees and caucus positions from killing bills. Sections 44–48.4 define and empower commissions to redistrict congressional and legislative seats.

Executive Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-104
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Term Limits ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
Special Power ◽  
Legal Position ◽  
General Section

This chapter looks at Article IV of the Colorado Constitution, which defines the executive department. By providing for the separate election of the secretary of state, treasurer, and attorney general, Section 1 seems to divide executive branch authority. In practice, this tension has mattered only when the attorney general and governor belonged to different political parties, and the attorney general asserted a legal position opposed by the governor. Section 1 imposes term limits on the state’s elective executives. Section 11 gives the governor the usual veto power followed by Section 12, giving the special power of the line-item veto over appropriations bills. Section 13 has complex provisions for succession if the governor’s office becomes vacant during a term.

The Nicolas Maduro Regime (O.A.S.)

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 226-230
Author(s):  
Christina M. Cerna
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
September 11 ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Armed Attack ◽  
American States ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
Article 5

On September 11, 2019, twelve states parties invoked the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), because they considered the crisis in Venezuela to have a destabilizing impact on the peace and security of the hemisphere. Venezuela was one of the twelve, voting in favor; this was because, on April 9, 2019, the Organization of American States (OAS) formally recognized Juan Guaido's representative, Gustavo Tarre, in lieu of Nicolas Maduro's Ambassador. At the OAS General Assembly in June, Tarre's appointment was approved in a much contested and heated session. The OAS has thirty-five member states and approximately one-third of its membership supported the invocation of the TIAR. The TIAR is the OAS's mutual defense pact; it was last invoked following the events of September 11, 2001. Article 5 of the NATO Charter, calling for collective action in the case of an armed attack on one member, is derived from Article 3 of the TIAR. Following invocation of the TIAR, the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (the OAS equivalent to the UN Security Council, but without veto power) held its 30th meeting in New York City during the UN General Assembly. The result of that meeting was the adoption of the Resolution under consideration here.

scholarly journals Strengthening the role of the General Assembly in appointment of the Secretary General: Necessities and possibilities

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 781-801
Author(s):  
Jelica Gordanić
Keyword(s):  
Security Council ◽  
Working Group ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Secretary General ◽  
Civil Society Organizations ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly

The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Due to the veto power of the permanent members, lack of transparency and the recommendation of only one candidate, the appointment of the Secretary-General is basically a decision of the Security Council. UN member states, civil society organizations and schoolars point out the need for a more active role of the General Assembly during the appointment of the Secretary-General. Formation of the ad hoc working group for the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly raised this problem to a higher level. Current procedure of appointment of the Secretary-General was reasonable at the time of the adoption of the UN Charter. The circumstances of the 21st century require different solutions. The paper aims to show the necessity and possibilities of strengthening the role of the General Assembly in the process of appointment of the Secretary-General and obstacles existing in this regard. The long-term activities of the ad hoc working group for the revitalization of the work of the General Assembly gave positive results in terms of more active role of the General Assembly during the appointment of the Secretary General in 2016. The paper aims to show that the results achieved by the ad hoc working group are not long-term efficient. The most effective solution for strengthening the role of the General Assembly in the appointment of the Secretary-General is the revision of the UN Charter.

scholarly journals With a Little Help from the Opposition? Relaxing Term Limits in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2017

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi ◽  
María Gabriela Almaraz
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Opposition Party ◽  
Constitutional Reforms ◽  
Divide And Rule ◽  
Incumbent Party

How do incumbents manage to relax term limits when they cannot impose their preferences unilaterally? Interpreting constitutional reforms as a bargaining game between a term-limited executive and the opposition, we argue that reforms involving term limits should be more likely when (a) the incumbent party can change the constitution unilaterally, or (b) the opposition is pessimistic about its future electoral prospects; moreover, (c) this second effect should be stronger when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform because this precludes the executive from playing a “divide-and-rule” strategy. We examine these claims with data from the Argentine provinces between 1983 and 2017. In line with expectations, the results show that the probability of initiating a reform is highest when the executive's party controls a supermajority of seats, but falls sharply when a single opposition party has veto power over a reform and this party expects to do well in the next executive election.

scholarly journals The Afghan question in the work of SC & GA of UNO in January, 1980

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Oleksandr L. Kovalkov
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
Un General Assembly ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
The Government

In December, 1979 sub-units of the Soviet Army invaded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, eliminated Hafizullah Amin from power, established the government of Babrak Karmal and occupied the country. These events caused the condemnation of the international community, that were reflected by the statement on the Afghan question in the agenda of the Security Council and the UN General Assembly in January, 1980. The minute-books of SC of the UNO, as well as the UN General Assembly resolutions are the main sources of research of this problem. The discussion of the Afghan question in the UN Security Council lasted from 5 to 7 January, 1980, involving 42 countries. The USSR Representative to the United Nations O. Troyanovskyi and Foreign Minister of DRA Sh. M. Dost tried to persuade all those present that Soviet troops had been brought to Afghanistan at the invitation of a legitimate Afghan government to repulse allegedly externally-aggressive aggression. Herewith they referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 of the Treaty of Friendship, Neighborhood and Cooperation between the USSR and the DPA. Most of the delegations (primarily the US delegation, Pakistan, the Chinese People’s Republic, Great Britain) rejected the arguments of the Soviet and Afghan sides and condemned Soviet aggression and called for the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Afghanistan immediately. The Soviet Union and the DRA were supported only by a few delegations of Soviet satellites (Poland, the GDR, Hungary, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Laos and Vietnam). But during the vote on the anti-Soviet resolution on January 7, 1980, the USSR expected vetoed it. After that, the consideration of the «Afghan question» was postponed to the General Assembly, where 108 countries condemned the Soviet aggression on January, 14 (18 countries abstained, the same number supported the USSR). The discussion of the «Afghan question» at the United Nations Organization in January, 1980 assured that the Soviet Union had suffered a loud defeat in the international arena, its authority was severely undermined. This was also confirmed by the end of the policy of "discharging" and the subsequent eruption of the Cold War in international relations. In addition, the consideration of the Afghan question at the UNO has shown the lack of a mechanism for influencing an aggressor country that has a veto power in the UN Security Council. The USSR was expected to veto the Security Council resolution, and the decisions of the General Assembly were recommendatory. This is particularly relevant in terms of the current UN crisis in deterring the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation, the DPRK, Syria and others like that.

Miscellaneous

2020 ◽  
pp. 343-374
Author(s):  
Richard B. Collins ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle ◽  
Lawrence Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Term Limits ◽  
The State ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
State Lottery ◽  
Legislative Session ◽  
Recreational Marijuana ◽  
Broad Variety

This chapter explores Article XVIII of the Colorado Constitution, titled “Miscellaneous.” As the title indicates, it covers a broad variety of subjects. The article’s original eight sections forbade lotteries and required the general assembly to pass “liberal homestead and exemption laws,” provisions for arbitration of disputes, laws outlawing imports of fake or adulterated liquors, laws to preserve state forests, and measures for publishing laws adopted at each legislative session. Amendments and additions to the article allow and define the state lottery and limited gambling, impose term limits on state officials, try to promote term limits for federal offices, restrict methods of trapping wildlife, and legalize medical and recreational marijuana under complex rules.

The Governor's Veto in Pennsylvania

1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (5) ◽  
pp. 941-946
Author(s):  
M. Nelson McGeary
Keyword(s):  
Primary Sources ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Chief Executives ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Right

The veto power is well known as one of the primary sources of the strength of a governor. Especially in the 38 states which give their chief executives the right to reject items in appropriation bills, the governors have been able to mold legislation to their liking. In a few states, including Pennsylvania, the power to veto items has been expanded to include the authority to reduce any item. Probably in no state in the union has the veto been a more effective club in the hands of the governor than in Pennsylvania. A study of the veto record in Pennsylvania over the past eight years reveals the extent to which the governor's will has prevailed.The constitutional provisions concerning the veto in Pennsylvania are not unlike those in a number of other states. The governor may, within ten days after the passage of a bill by the General Assembly, disapprove it. If he fails to act within that period, the bill, unless approved by the legislature just before adjournment, becomes law without his signature. In addition, he is given the power to veto individual items in appropriation bills. The legislature may override any veto by a two-thirds vote of all the elected members of each house. A bill which is passed during the ten days before the close of the session becomes law unless vetoed by the governor within 30 days after the adjournment.

The Security Council’s First Fifty Years

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (3) ◽  
pp. 506-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic L. Kirgis
Keyword(s):  
United Nations ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
The United Nations ◽  
United Nations Charter ◽  
Made In

The provisions relating to the Security Council in the United Nations Charter of 1995 do not look much different from those in the Charter of 1945. Articles 23 and 27 were amended in 1965 to increase the membership of the Security Council from its original eleven to its present fifteen, with a corresponding change from seven to nine votes for the adoption of resolutions. No change was made in the five permanent members’ veto power over substantive matters. Article 109 was amended in 1968 to increase from seven to nine the number of votes in the Security Council needed to complement a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly for the convening of a Charter review conference. Otherwise, c’est la même chose.

A Tribute to the Late William J. Curran

1996 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-275
Author(s):  
O. Lawrence ◽  
J.D. Gostin
Keyword(s):  
Mental Health ◽  
Health Care ◽  
Mental Illness ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Mental Health Care ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
Legal Medicine ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
International Institute ◽  
University Professor

In the summer of 1979, a group of experts on law, medicine, and ethics assembled in Siracusa, Sicily, under the auspices of the International Commission of Jurists and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Science, to draft guidelines on the rights of persons with mental illness. Sitting across the table from me was a quiet, proud man of distinctive intelligence, William J. Curran, Frances Glessner Lee Professor of Legal Medicine at Harvard University. Professor Curran was one of the principal drafters of those guidelines. Many years later in 1991, after several subsequent re-drafts by United Nations (U.N.) Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes, the text was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care. This was the kind of remarkable achievement in the field of law and medicine that Professor Curran repeated throughout his distinguished career.

The AMA Guides in Pennsylvania “Post-Protz”: Act 111 and Case Law Update

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-19
Author(s):  
Justin D. Beck ◽  
Judge David B. Torrey
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
General Assembly ◽  
Disability Benefits ◽  
Permanent Disability ◽  
Sixth Edition ◽  
Legal Questions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Recent Edition ◽  
Impairment Ratings

Abstract Medical evaluators must understand the context for the impairment assessments they perform. This article exemplifies issues that arise based on the role of impairment ratings and what edition of the AMA Guides to the Impairment of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) is used. This discussion also raises interesting legal questions related to retroactivity, applicability of prior precedent, and delegation. On June 20, 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down its decision, Protz v. WCAB (Derry Area Sch. Dist.), which disallows use of the “most recent edition” of the AMA Guides when determining partial disability entitlement under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act. An attempted solution was passed by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and was signed into law Act 111 on October 24, 2018. Although it affirms that the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, must be used for impairment ratings, the law reduces the threshold for total disability benefits from 50% to 35% impairment. This legislative adjustment benefited injured workers but sparked additional litigation about whether, when, and how the adjustment should be applied (excerpts from the laws and decisions discussed by the authors are included at the end of the article). In using impairment as a threshold for permanent disability benefits, evaluators must distinguish between impairment and disability and determine an appropriate threshold; they also must be aware of the compensation and adjudication process and of the jurisdictions in which they practice.

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