The Created Will

2019 ◽  
pp. 15-58
Author(s):  
Han-luen Kantzer Komline
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Status ◽  
Imago Dei ◽  
The Will

Chapter 1 introduces Augustine’s earliest conception of will, synthesizing his comments in a number of his key anti-Manichean works as well as in two of his early classics, Soliloquies and On Free Will. Augustine’s conception of will in these texts is already both theological and biblically informed, though not in quite the same way as it will be in more mature periods. Augustine elaborates his understanding of will in these early works in light of, and in support of, general principles emerging from scripture as a whole—creation, God’s justice, the analogy between divine and creaturely being as expressed, for example, in the doctrine of the imago dei—whereas later he will rely to a greater extent on specific biblical pericopes. The resulting portrait of will accords it enormous importance, power, and potential for goodness. To speak in Augustine’s own terms, the will is a hinge (cardo) upon which the moral status of each act and the possibility of attaining fellowship with God depend.

Recht und Pflicht – Einschränkungen von Freiheit?

2021 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-113
Author(s):  
Klaus Vieweg
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The State ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Right To Life ◽  
Emergency Situations ◽  
The Will ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

Abstract Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens.

Locke and the Nature of Political Authority

2015 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shannon Hoff
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Capacity To Consent ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Will

AbstractThis paper aims to illuminate the ongoing significance of Locke's political philosophy. It argues that the legitimacy of political authority lies, according to Locke, in the extent to which it collaborates with individuals so as to allow them to be themselves more effectively, and in its answerability to the consent such individuals should thereby give it. The first section discusses how the free will inevitably asserts its authority; the second shows the inevitability of the will's incorporation of authority as a kind of prosthesis, which in turn transforms the operation of the will; and the third treats the issue of consent, arguing that Locke is less interested in explicit acts of consent than in the norm of consent, in answerability to which structures of authority should be shaped so as to honor the beings whose capacity to consent is definitive for them.

scholarly journals Edwards on the Incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will

Sententiae ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-45
Author(s):  
Oleh Bondar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Jonathan Edwards ◽  
Divine Foreknowledge ◽  
The Past ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Theological Fatalism ◽  
Nelson Pike ◽  
Necessity Of The Past

In the book “Freedom of the Will”, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) put forward a strong ar-gument for theological fatalism. This argument, I suppose, can be considered as the universal basis for discussion between Fatalists and Anti-Fatalists in the 20th century, especially in the context of the most powerful argument for fatalism, introduced by Nelson Pike. The argument of Edwards rests upon the following principles: (a) if something has been the case in the past, it has been the case necessarily (Necessity of the past); (b) if God knows something (say A), it is not the case that ~A is possible (Infallibility of God`s knowledge). Hence, Edwards infers that if God had foreknowledge that A, then A is necessary, and it is not the case that someone could voluntarily choose ~A. The article argues that (i) the Edwards` inference Kgp → □p rests upon the modal fallacy; (ii) the inference „God had a knowledge that p will happen, therefore „God had a knowledge that p will happen” is the proposition about the past, and hence, the necessarily true proposition“ is ambiguous; thus, it is not the case that this proposition necessarily entails the impossibility of ~p; (iii) it is not the case that p, being known by God, turns out to be necessary. Thus, we can avoid the inference of Edwards that if Kgp is a fact of the past, then we cannot freely choose ~p. It has also been shown that the main provisions of the argument of Edwards remain significant in the context of contemporary debates about free will and foreknowledge (Theories of soft facts, Anti-Ockhamism, theories of temporal modal asymmetry, „Timeless solution”). Additionally, I introduce a new challenge for fatalism – argument from Brouwerian axiom.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Susanne Bobzien
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Continuum Theory ◽  
Second Century ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
Moral Accountability ◽  
The Will ◽  
Main Component ◽  
Autonomous Agency ◽  
Hellenistic Philosophy

The cluster of problems around freedom, determinism, and moral responsibility is one of those themes in philosophy that are fascinating in both their complexity and their seemingly direct relevance to human life. Historians of ideas often assume that in Western philosophy this cluster of problems was the subject of an ongoing discourse from antiquity to the present day. This is, however, an illusion. Much of my research on ancient theories of determinism and freedom is devoted to showing that what commonly counts as this problem cluster today (often labelled as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’) is noticeably distinct from the issues that the ancients discussed—at least prior to the second century CE. It is true that one main component of the ancient discussion concerned the question of how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with either our ability to do otherwise or a human faculty of a free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human autonomous agency and its compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood—nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. All these questions were discussed without reference to freedom to do otherwise or a faculty of the will—at least in Classical and Hellenistic philosophy. This volume of essays considers all of these questions to some extent....

Frankfurt and the Problem of Self-Control

2020 ◽  
pp. 421-433
Author(s):  
Ryan Cummings ◽  
Adina L. Roskies
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Structural Account ◽  
The Will

Frankfurt’s compatibilist account of free will considers an individual to be free when her first- and second-order volitions align. This structural account of the will, this chapter argues, fails to engage with the dynamics of will, resulting in two shortcomings: (1) the problem of directionality, or that Frankfurtian freedom obtains whenever first- and second-order volitions align, regardless of which desire was made to change, and (2) the potential for infinite regress of higher-order desires. The authors propose that a satisfying account of the genesis of second-order volitions can resolve these issues. To provide this they draw from George Ainslie’s mechanistic account of self-control, which relies on intertemporal bargaining wherein an individual’s self-predictions about future decisions affect the value of her current choices. They suggest that second-order volitions emerge from precisely this sort of process, and that a Frankfurt-Ainslie account of free will avoids the objections previously raised.

Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom ◽  
Gregg D. Caruso
Keyword(s):  
Social Policy ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Meaning In Life ◽  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Social Conditions ◽  
Causal Efficacy ◽  
Derk Pereboom ◽  
Free Will Skepticism ◽  
The Will

Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso’s chapter on hard-incompatibilist existentialism explores the practical and existential implications of free will skepticism, focusing on punishment, morality, and meaning in life. They consider two different routes to free will skepticism: the route that denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will, which receives impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience, and the route that does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that, whether deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will. They argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route, the second remains intact and that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy.

scholarly journals Wittgenstein on Freedom of the Will: Not Determinism, Yet Not Indeterminism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Philosophical Problem ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Freedom Of The Will ◽  
The Will

Since the publication of Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Freedom of the Will in 1989, his remarks about free will and determinism have received very little attention. Insofar as these lectures give us an opportunity to see him at work on a traditional—and seemingly intractable—philosophical problem and given the voluminous secondary literature written about nearly every other facet of Wittgenstein’s life and philosophy, this neglect is both surprising and unfortunate. Perhaps these lectures have not attracted much attention because they are available to us only in the form of a single student’s notes (Yorick Smythies). Or perhaps it is because, as one Wittgenstein scholar put it, the lectures represent only “cursory reflections” that “are themselves uncompelling." Either way, my goal is to show that Wittgenstein’s views about freedom of the will merit closer attention.

scholarly journals Theological question in a philosophical perspective: Nikolai Berdyaev’s theory of a lie

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-479
Author(s):  
Evgenii E. Nesmeyanov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
20Th Century ◽  
Scientific Practice ◽  
Psychological Characteristics ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Philosophical Perspective ◽  
European Culture ◽  
Voluntary Consent ◽  
The Will ◽  
Religious Theory

The article considers the conception of a lie established in the work of Nikolai Berdyaev during the first half of the 20th century. The socially organized lie was at the center Berdyaev’s attention. In the middle of the 20th century, new theoretical perceptions of necessity, legality and even value of a lie emerge. A lie is declared to be a norm of European culture, an inevitable component of economic, political and scientific practice, an essential component of people’s ordinary and family life. Criticizing these ideas, Berdyaev puts forward a number of counterarguments relevant both during his time and at the beginning of the 21st century, which makes this article significant. The fundamental originality of the study of a lie by the Russian philosopher consists in changing the main cause of the phenomenon, from the personal moral and psychological characteristics of a person to the ontological cause. Berdyaev creates a philosophical-religious theory of “Tragic theodicy”, where he links the origin of the free will of a person (including the freedom to lie) with the peculiarities of the origin of Space from two sources. These sources are the will of God and from voluntary consent to become the existence of some primordium — “Meon (abyss)”, “Abyss”, “Baselessness”: human free will is not a gift from God. A person’s freedom to act comes before the act itself, its roots are in Meon. For this reason, it is impossible to make God responsible for cosmic disasters and for the irrational destructive behavior of man. God is all-merciful, but not almighty, and He cannot prevent the negative consequences of a person’s free will. A lie on a worldwide scale is “a lie of the world”, which produces horrendous consequences and creates “a false existence”, it is related to Meon and it is produced by people. The article is intended to attract the attention of the scientific community to the creative heritage of Nikolai Berdyaev.

scholarly journals Libertad, autodeterminación e imputabilidad: El determinismo no necesitarista de Leibniz

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agustín Echavarría
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Self

RESUMENEn el presente artículo se analiza la fundamentación leibniziana de la voluntad libre entendida como capacidad de autodeterminación, a partir de sus notas esenciales: espontaneidad, deliberación y contingencia. Al estar la voluntad determinada por la serie de percepciones que brotan de la naturaleza de la sustancia, el dominio de esta sobre sus propios actos es indirecto y diacrónico. Si bien Leibniz elude el necesitarismo mediante la atribución a la voluntad de la posibilidad lógica de obrar de forma que como obra, la imputabilidad moral de las acciones queda seriamente comprometida. El artículo concluye con una valoración crítica de la postura de Leibniz desde una perspectiva de la naturaleza de la voluntad como apertura trascendental al bien en cuanto tal.PALABRAS CLAVELIBERTAD, AUTODETERMINACIÓN, IMPUTABILIDAD, DETERMINISMO, LEIBNIZABSTRACTIn the present article we analyze Leibniz’s foundation of free will, understood as a potency of self-determination, examining it from its essential features: spontaneity, deliberation and contingency. Since will is determined by the series of perceptions which flow from the nature of substance, its dominion over its own acts is indirect and diachronic. Even if Leibniz avoids necessitarianism by attributing the logical possibility of doing otherwise to the will, the actions’ moral imputability is seriously compromised. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of Leibniz’s position, from a perspective in which the nature of will is considered as a transcendental openness towards good as such.KEY WORDSFREE WILL, SELF-DETERMINATION, IMPUTABILITY, DETERMINISM, LEIBNIZ

scholarly journals REKONSTRUKSI NALAR PERADABAN ISLAM

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muh. Rusli
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Will ◽  
Islamic Civilization

<p><em>Islam has enriched the glorious time in its early civilization period. However, it undergoes a set back later due to the wrong understanding of Muslims to their religion. Therefore, it is necessary to reconstruct the logic of Islamic civilization to regain the gloriousness. Among those required efforts are such as to create a new spirit toward a new civilization, the will to adopt new knowledges without problematizing its sources, reconstructing the meaning of “God’s free will”, on being “tolerant ummah” and any efforts to strentheng the ummah.</em><strong></strong></p>

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