The Incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic with Exponentiation

1992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond M. Smullyan
Keyword(s):  
Axiom System ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
First Order ◽  
Axiom Scheme

We shall now turn to a formal axiom system which we call Peano Arithmetic with Exponentiation and which we abbreviate “P.E.”. We take certain correct formulas which we call axioms and provide two inference rules that enable us to prove new correct formulas from correct formulas already proved. The axioms will be infinite in number, but each axiom will be of one of nineteen easily recognizable forms; these forms are called axiom schemes. It will be convenient to classify these nineteen axiom schemes into four groups (cf. discussion that follows the display of the schemes). The axioms of Groups I and II are the so-called logical axioms and constitute a neat formalization of first-order logic with identity due to Kalish and Montague [1965], which is based on an earlier system due to Tarski [1965]. The axioms of Groups III and IV are the so-called arithmetic axioms. In displaying these axiom schemes, F, G and H are any formulas, vi and vj are any variables, and t is any term. For example, the first scheme L1 means that for any formulas F and G, the formula (F ⊃ (G ⊃ F)) is to be taken as an axiom; axiom scheme L4 means that for any variable Vi and any formulas F and G, the formula . . . (∀vi (F ⊃ G) ⊃ (∀vi (F ⊃ ∀vi G) . . . is to be taken as an axiom.

On generalized quantifiers in arithmetic

1982 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 187-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Morgenstern
Keyword(s):  
Axiom System ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Generalized Quantifiers ◽  
First Order ◽  
Order Language ◽  
Truth Definition ◽  
Order Arithmetic ◽  
Infinite Set

In this note we investigate an extension of Peano arithmetic which arises from adjoining generalized quantifiers to first-order logic. Markwald [2] first studied the definability properties of L1, the language of first-order arithmetic, L, with the additional quantifer Ux which denotes “there are infinitely many x such that…. Note that Ux is the same thing as the Keisler quantifier Qx in the ℵ0 interpretation.We consider L2, which is L together with the ℵ0 interpretation of the Magidor-Malitz quantifier Q2xy which denotes “there is an infinite set X such that for distinct x, y ∈ X …”. In [1] Magidor and Malitz presented an axiom system for languages which arise from adding Q2 to a first-order language. They proved that the axioms are valid in every regular interpretation, and, assuming ◊ω1, that the axioms are complete in the ℵ1 interpretation.If we let denote Peano arithmetic in L2 with induction for L2 formulas and the Magidor-Malitz axioms as logical axioms, we show that in we can give a truth definition for first-order Peano arithmetic, . Consequently we can prove in that is Πn sound for every n, thus in we can prove the Paris-Harrington combinatorial principle and the higher-order analogues due to Schlipf.

Gödel’s Proof Based on ω-Consistency

1992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond M. Smullyan
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Underlying Assumption ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory

The proof that we have just given of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic was based on the underlying assumption that Peano Arithmetic is correct—i.e., that every sentence provable in P.A. is a true sentence. Gödel’s original incompleteness proof involved a much weaker assumption—that of ω-consistency to which we now turn. We consider an arbitrary axiom system S whose formulas are those of Peano Arithmetic, whose axioms include all those of Groups I and II (or alternatively, any set of axioms for first-order logic with identity such that all logically valid formulas are provable from them), and whose inference rules are modus ponens and generalization. (It is also possible to axiomatize first-order logic in such a way that modus ponens is the only inference rule—cf. Quine [1940].) In place of the axioms of Groups III and IV, however, we can take a completely arbitrary set of axioms. Such a system S is an example of what is termed a first-order theory, and we will consider several such theories other than Peano Arithmetic. (For the more general notion of a first-order theory, the key difference is that we do not necessarily start with + and × as the undefined function symbols, nor do we necessarily take ≤ as the undefined predicate symbol. Arbitrary function symbols and predicate symbols can be taken, however, as the undefined function and predicate symbols—cf. Tarski [1953] for details. However, the only theories (or “systems”, as we will call them) that we will have occasion to consider are those whose formulas are those of P.A.) S is called simply consistent (or just “consistent” for short) if no sentence is both provable and refutable in S.

Boolean-valued structures

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Button ◽  
Sean Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Mathematical Concepts ◽  
Semantic Framework ◽  
First Order ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Boolean Valued Model ◽  
Semantic Values

Chapters 6-12 are driven by questions about the ability to pin down mathematical entities and to articulate mathematical concepts. This chapter is driven by similar questions about the ability to pin down the semantic frameworks of language. It transpires that there are not just non-standard models, but non-standard ways of doing model theory itself. In more detail: whilst we normally outline a two-valued semantics which makes sentences True or False in a model, the inference rules for first-order logic are compatible with a four-valued semantics; or a semantics with countably many values; or what-have-you. The appropriate level of generality here is that of a Boolean-valued model, which we introduce. And the plurality of possible semantic values gives rise to perhaps the ‘deepest’ level of indeterminacy questions: How can humans pin down the semantic framework for their languages? We consider three different ways for inferentialists to respond to this question.

scholarly journals Making Higher-Order Superposition Work

2021 ◽  
pp. 415-432
Author(s):  
Petar Vukmirović ◽  
Alexander Bentkamp ◽  
Jasmin Blanchette ◽  
Simon Cruanes ◽  
Visa Nummelin ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Higher Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
Theorem Prover ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Higher Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
New Challenges

AbstractSuperposition is among the most successful calculi for first-order logic. Its extension to higher-order logic introduces new challenges such as infinitely branching inference rules, new possibilities such as reasoning about formulas, and the need to curb the explosion of specific higher-order rules. We describe techniques that address these issues and extensively evaluate their implementation in the Zipperposition theorem prover. Largely thanks to their use, Zipperposition won the higher-order division of the CASC-J10 competition.

Natural deduction based set theories: a new resolution of the old paradoxes

1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 393-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Classical Logic ◽  
Natural Deduction ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
First Order ◽  
Axiom Scheme ◽  
Universe Of Sets ◽  
Comprehension Axiom

AbstractThe comprehension principle of set theory asserts that a set can be formed from the objects satisfying any given property. The principle leads to immediate contradictions if it is formalized as an axiom scheme within classical first order logic. A resolution of the set paradoxes results if the principle is formalized instead as two rules of deduction in a natural deduction presentation of logic. This presentation of the comprehension principle for sets as semantic rules, instead of as a comprehension axiom scheme, can be viewed as an extension of classical logic, in contrast to the assertion of extra-logical axioms expressing truths about a pre-existing or constructed universe of sets. The paradoxes are disarmed in the extended classical semantics because truth values are only assigned to those sentences that can be grounded in atomic sentences.

scholarly journals A Complete Cyclic Proof System for Inductive Entailments in First Order Logic

10.29007/xgc6 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radu Iosif ◽  
Cristina Serban
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Proof System ◽  
Inference Rules ◽  
Tree Automata ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Inductive System ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inductive Definitions ◽  
Small Set

In this paper we develop a cyclic proof system for the problem of inclusion between the least sets of models of mutually recursive predicates, when the ground constraints in the inductive definitions are quantifier-free formulae of first order logic. The proof system consists of a small set of inference rules, inspired by a top-down language inclusion algorithm for tree automata [9]. We show the proof system to be sound, in general, and complete, under certain semantic restrictions involving the set of constraints in the inductive system. Moreover, we investigate the computational complexity of checking these restrictions, when the function symbols in the logic are given the canonical Herbrand interpretation.

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning

scholarly journals Extensions in graph normal form

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Fixed Points ◽  
Propositional Logic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Special Cases

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.

Relational Chase Procedures Interpreted as Resolution with Paramodulation1

1991 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Joachim Biskup ◽  
Bernhard Convent
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Inference Problem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Inference Problems ◽  
The One ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
Insight Into

In this paper the relationship between dependency theory and first-order logic is explored in order to show how relational chase procedures (i.e., algorithms to decide inference problems for dependencies) can be interpreted as clever implementations of well known refutation procedures of first-order logic with resolution and paramodulation. On the one hand this alternative interpretation provides a deeper insight into the theoretical foundations of chase procedures, whereas on the other hand it makes available an already well established theory with a great amount of known results and techniques to be used for further investigations of the inference problem for dependencies. Our presentation is a detailed and careful elaboration of an idea formerly outlined by Grant and Jacobs which up to now seems to be disregarded by the database community although it definitely deserves more attention.

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