The Quiet Resolution of the Science Wars

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-79
Author(s):  
Matt Grossmann
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Frequentist Statistics ◽  
Science Wars ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Methods

The “science wars” were resolved surprisingly quietly. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, critics of science from humanities disciplines fought with scientists over the extent to which science is a social and biased process or a path to truth. Today, there are few absolute relativists or adherents of scientific purity and far more acknowledgment that science involves biased truth-seeking. Continuing (but less vicious) wars over Bayesian and frequentist statistics likewise ignore some key agreements: tests of scientific claims require clarifying assumptions and some way to account for confirmation bias, either by building it into the model or by establishing more severe tests for the sufficiency of evidence. This sedation was accompanied by shifts within social science disciplines. Debates over both simplistic models of human nature (especially over rational choice theory) and over what constituted proper quantitative and qualitative methods died down as nearly everyone became theoretically and methodologically pluralist in practice. I herald this evolution, pointing to its benefits in the topics we cover, the ideas we consider, the evidence we generate, and how we evaluate and integrate our knowledge.

scholarly journals The rational choice of implementing Hamis Batar traditional rituals by the community of Rabasahain Village

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 91-102
Author(s):  
Hildigardis M. I. Nahak ◽  
◽  
Blajan Konradus ◽  
Dasma Damanik ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Research Methodology ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Ordinary People ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
The People ◽  
Science And Culture

Purpose: In this study, this research aimed to find out the process of implementing the Hamis Batar rite and how it means for the people of Rabasahain Village. Research methodology: The approach used in this study is qualitative. The analysis in this study uses the Rational Choice Theory. Respondents were selected by purposive sampling. 6 respondents are consisting of Village Head, 1 Traditional Head and 4 ordinary people who are often involved in the implementation of the Hamis Batar Ritual. Results: The Hamis Batar ritual is a traditional event carried out by the Rabasahain community as a form of gratitude to the creators and ancestors for the harvest obtained and its implementation depending on the agreement of the Fukun, Katuas And Ferik of the traditional house, as well as the readiness of corn as an offering. Based on the research, it can be concluded that the Hamis Batar ritual is categorized as a rational activity because it is considered to have a function and purpose for society. Limitations: This research does not cover more details about the Hamis Batar Ritual. This research only focuses on explaining the process of the Hamis Batar Ritual in brief and showing the ritual as a rational activity. Contribution: This research becomes scientific information for social science and culture. Keywords: Rituals, Indigenous activities, Rational choice theory

Is Reputation a Means or an End?

Reputation ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 28-61
Author(s):  
Gloria Origgi
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Theory ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Social Trait

This chapter is devoted to the theoretical approaches to reputation developed in the different branches of social science that adopt the theory of rational choice. It answers the principal questions of whether reputation can be seen as a rational strategy or as a means to other ends or an end in itself. The chapter explores the various ways in which cultivating one's reputation, given the costs it imposes and the benefits it confers, can be a rational strategy. It examines how several most prominent social scientists approach the questions on reputation. It also treats explanations that synthesize evolutionary theory with rational-choice theory only as “theoretical models” useful for illuminating the conditions for the possibility of the emergence of a social trait, such as reputation.

Cultural Contributions to Explaining Institutional Form, Political Change, and Rational Decisions

1999 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 862-893 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHARLES LOCKHART
Keyword(s):  
Group Theory ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Political Change ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Explanatory Variable ◽  
Institutional Form ◽  
Mary Douglas ◽  
The Social

Relying on culture as an important explanatory variable is regarded with skepticism by many contemporary political scientists. Yet, doubts about culture's usefulness rest in large part on false perceptions of various sorts. These misunderstandings relegate an important explanatory variable to the social science scrap heap. Accordingly, the author engages in three tasks. First, selected prominent arguments for culture's lack of explanatory usefulness are discussed. Second, it is demonstrated how at least one conceptualization of culture, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's grid-group theory, overcomes aspects of these difficulties and contributes to explaining institutional form and political change. Third, it is argued that grid-group theory contributes significantly to both institutional analysis and rational choice theory. Grid-group theory augments each of these latter two approaches and, more important, reveals complementary aspects, linking these modes of analysis together as mutually supportive elements of a more inclusive explanatory scheme.

Defending the role of rationality in the social sciences, rationally

2020 ◽  
pp. 053901842096344
Author(s):  
Tibor Rutar
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
The Social

Peter T. Leeson and Tobias Wolbring agree with me that rationality, properly clarified, should continue to assume an important theoretical role in modern social science. We disagree, however, about the precise extent of its role. In my reply to the debate I focus on two related issues that have emerged. First, can and should the concepts of rationality, or rational choice theory (RCT) more generally, be employed as something more than just one tool among many? Second, can all cases of norm-following be satisfactorily subsumed by rationality and RCT analysis?

Exploitation in the New Marxism of Collective Action

1987 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Brewer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Marxist Theory ◽  
Contemporary Society

The ‘new Marxism of collective action’ is a term Lash and Urry have recently used to describe a new intellectual current in Marxism which seeks to apply rational choice theory, and particularly game theory, to key Marxian concepts like collective action, class, revolution and exploitation. This current is seen as part of a general shift within social science away from structure towards agency. This paper focuses on a concept which Lash and Urry's outline ignored: namely, exploitation. Granting the concept this attention is useful for a number of reasons. Firstly, by summarizing the general debate on the concept, both within the new Marxism of collective action and outside, the paper allows the discussion of exploitation to be placed in the context of the more general debate between structuralist and humanistic versions of Marxism; especially in the context of the debate about whether there can be a Marxist theory of ethics and injustice. Secondly, by outlining how the concept is understood by advocates of the new Marxism of collective action, the paper accords the concept the central status which advocates reserve for it. In consequence, the paper identifies differences between advocates of the new Marxism of collective action with respect to how exploitation is to be understood, which suggest that the intellectual current is not as homogeneous as Lash and Urry imply. Moreover, the paper stresses that the differences between them with regard to exploitation are more than just unhelpful disagreements over matters of definition, but represent fundamental disagreements about the validity of Marx's original formulations in contemporary society.

scholarly journals Homo Economicus and the Stories of Jacob: On the Methodological Relevance of Rational Choice Theory for Studying the Hebrew Bible

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Hebrew Bible ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Economic Study ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Methodological Perspective ◽  
Economic Methods

Abstract Economics is widely accused of being a portrayer of a dark and dismal image of human nature (i.e. its model of homo economicus as a self-interested, even selfish and opportunistic maximizer of its own gains). This article argues that the model of homo economicus is not an empirical or prescriptive image of human nature but a useful, “heuristic,” methodical instrument for economic theorizing (in our case, for the economic study of religion that connects to the Hebrew Bible). This article demonstrates that in generic, methodological perspective, the model of homo economicus compares well to similarly unrealistic, “dismal” models of human nature in other disciplines that study religion. I develop these arguments by focusing on selective stories from Genesis, especially the stories of Jacob. Implications are derived regarding the application of economic methods and concepts for research on the texts in the Hebrew Bible.

The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge to Democratic Theory

1991 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 289-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark P. Petracca
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Democratic Citizenship ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Democratic Deliberation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Central Argument

In just three decades rational choice theory has emerged as one of the most active, influential, and ambitious subfields in the discipline of political science. Rational choice theory contends that political behavior is best explained through the application of its supposedly “value-neutral” assumptions which posit man as a self-interested, purposeful, maximizing being. Through the logic of methodological individualism, assumptions about human nature are treated as empirical discoveries. My central argument is that by assuming that self-interest is an empirically established component of human nature, rational choice theory supports and perpetuates a political life which is antithetical to important tenets of normative democratic theory. Rational choice theory offers an incoherent account of democratic citizenship and produces a political system which shows a constant biased against political change and pursuit of the public interest. This article concludes by discussing the merits of democratic deliberation for achieving these transformative ends.

The Biological Justification of Ethics: A Best-Case Scenario

1990 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Molecular Structure ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Case Scenario ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Normative Implications

Social and behavioral scientists — that is, students of human nature — nowadays hardly ever use the term ‘human nature’. This reticence reflects both a becoming modesty about the aims of their disciplines and a healthy skepticism about whether there is any one thing really worthy of the label ‘human nature’.For some feature of humankind to be identified as accounting for our ‘nature’, it would have to reflect some property both distinctive of our species and systematically influential enough to explain some very important aspect of our behavior. Compare: molecular structure gives the essence or the nature of water just because it explains most of its salient properties. Few students of the human sciences currently hold that there is just one or a small number of such features that can explain our actions and/or our institutions. And even among those who do, there is reluctance to label their theories as claims about ‘human nature’.Among anthropologists and sociologists, the label seems too universal and indiscriminant to be useful. The idea that there is a single underlying character that might explain similarities threatens the differences among people and cultures that these social scientists seek to uncover. Even economists, who have explicitly attempted to parlay rational choice theory into an account of all human behavior, do not claim that the maximization of transitive preferences is ‘human nature’.I think part of the reason that social scientists are reluctant to use ‘human nature’ is that the term has traditionally labeled a theory with normative implications as well as descriptive ones.

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