Law and Public Reason
This chapter provides an account of Hegel’s conception of the law and of the law’s realization within Civil Society and the State. It is argued that Hegel is a legal positivist because he holds that right is binding only when it has been promulgated as law, and that law can be valid even if it does not measure up to the standard of right. The chapter gives an account of Hegel’s contextualism and shows that he is committed to an essential but limited role for philosophy in determining the content of the law. Ultimately Hegel’s view is best understood as a public reason conception of the rationality of law. The court system is a prototype of public reason in that its goal is to guarantee standards of evidence and publicity in a setting of mutual recognition. The chapter argues that Hegel does believe in the need for a written constitution, and that his view of the legislative power is a further elucidation of public reason based on the idea of representative interests.