The Argument for Democracy

2021 ◽  
pp. 142-164
Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

This chapter defends an epistemic argument for democracy, namely the argument that the rule of the many is better at aggregating knowledge and, in the version presented here, at producing better decisions than the rule of the few. This argument builds on the formal properties of two key democratic decision-making mechanisms of democracy, namely inclusive deliberation on equal grounds and majority rule with universal suffrage. Properly used in sequence and under the right conditions, these two mechanisms ensure that no information and viewpoint is ignored and maximize the cognitive diversity brought to bear on collective political problems and predictions. Building on existing formal results by Lu Hong and Scott Page, the chapter introduces the “Number Trumps Ability” theorem, which formalizes the intuition that many minds are smarter than just a few. Under the right conditions systems governed by democratic decision-procedures can be expected to deliver greater epistemic performance than less inclusive and egalitarian systems.

Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore

This chapter argues that majority rule is a useful complement of inclusive deliberation, not just because majority rule is more efficient timewise, but because it has distinct epistemic properties of its own. It also stresses that majority rule is best designed for collective prediction—that is, the identification of the best options out of those selected during the deliberative phase. Of all the competing alternatives (rule of one or rule of the few), majority rule maximizes the chances of predicting the right answer among the proposed options. The chapter considers several accounts of the epistemic properties of majority rule, including the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Miracle of Aggregation, and a more fine-grained model based on cognitive diversity.


1997 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 54-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Houlgate

In his lectures on the philosophy of history Hegel passes this famous judgement on the French Revolution. “Anaxagoras had been the first to say that nous governs the world; but only now did humanity come to recognize that thought should rule spiritual actuality. This was thus a magnificent dawn”. What first gave rise to discontent in France, in Hegel's view, were the heavy burdens that pressed upon the people and the government's inability to procure for the Court the means of supporting its luxury and extravagance. But soon the new spirit of freedom and enlightenment began to stir in men's minds and carry them forward to revolution. “One should not, therefore, declare oneself against the assertion”, Hegel concludes, “that the Revolution received its first impulse from Philosophy” (VPW, p 924). However, Hegel points out that the legacy of the revolution is actually an ambiguous one. For, although the principles which guided the revolution were those of reason and were indeed magnificent – namely, that humanity is born to freedom and self-determination – they were held fast in their abstraction and turned “polemically”, and at times terribly, against the existing order (VPW, p 925). What ultimately triumphed in the revolution was thus not concrete reason itself, but abstract reason or understanding (VPW, p 923). In Hegel's view, the enduring legacy of such revolutionary understanding was, not so much the Terror, but the principle that “the subjective wills of the many should hold sway” (VPW, p 932). This principle, which Hegel calls the principle of “liberalism” and which we would call the principle of majority rule, has since spread from France to become one of the governing principles of modern stat. It has been used to justify granting universal suffrage, to justify depriving corporations and the nobility of the right to sit in the legislature, and in some cases to justify abolishing the monarchy. What is of crucial importance for Hegel, however, is that such measures have not rendered the state more modern and rational, but have in fact distorted the modern state.


Author(s):  
Thomas L. Saaty ◽  
Liem T. Tran

Using fuzzy set theory has become attractive to many people. However, the many references cited here and in other works, little thought is given to why numbers should be made fuzzy before plunging into the necessary simulations to crank out numbers without giving reason or proof that it works to one’s advantage. In fact it does not often do that, certainly not in decision making. Regrettably, many published papers that use fuzzy set theory presumably to get better answers were not judged thoroughly by reviewers knowledgeable in both fuzzy theory and decision making. Buede and Maxwell (1995), who had done experiments on different ways of making decisions, found that fuzzy does the poorest job of obtaining the right decision as compared with other ways. “These experiments demonstrated that the MAVT (Multiattribute Value Theory) and AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) techniques, when provided with the same decision outcome data, very often identify the same alternatives as ‘best’. The other techniques are noticeably less consistent with the Fuzzy algorithm being the least consistent.”


Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore

Individual decision making can often be wrong due to misinformation, impulses, or biases. Collective decision making, on the other hand, can be surprisingly accurate. This book demonstrates that the very factors behind the superiority of collective decision making add up to a strong case for democracy. The book shows that the processes and procedures of democratic decision making form a cognitive system that ensures that decisions taken by the many are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few. Democracy as a form of government is therefore valuable not only because it is legitimate and just, but also because it is smart. The book considers how the argument plays out with respect to two main mechanisms of democratic politics: inclusive deliberation and majority rule. In deliberative settings, the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are enhanced more by inclusiveness than by individual competence. The book explores this idea in the contexts of representative democracy and the selection of representatives. It also discusses several models for the “wisdom of crowds” channeled by majority rule, examining the trade-offs between inclusiveness and individual competence in voting. When inclusive deliberation and majority rule are combined, they beat less inclusive methods, in which one person or a small group decides. The book thus establishes the superiority of democracy as a way of making decisions for the common good.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Saaty ◽  
Liem T. Tran

Using fuzzy set theory has become attractive to many people. However, the many references cited here and in other works, little thought is given to why numbers should be made fuzzy before plunging into the necessary simulations to crank out numbers without giving reason or proof that it works to one’s advantage. In fact it does not often do that, certainly not in decision making. Regrettably, many published papers that use fuzzy set theory presumably to get better answers were not judged thoroughly by reviewers knowledgeable in both fuzzy theory and decision making. Buede and Maxwell (1995), who had done experiments on different ways of making decisions, found that fuzzy does the poorest job of obtaining the right decision as compared with other ways. “These experiments demonstrated that the MAVT (Multiattribute Value Theory) and AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) techniques, when provided with the same decision outcome data, very often identify the same alternatives as ‘best’. The other techniques are noticeably less consistent with the Fuzzy algorithm being the least consistent.”


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 282
Author(s):  
Supriatin Supriatin ◽  
Bambang Soedijono Wiraatmadja ◽  
Emha Taufiq Luthfi

Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (yang selanjutnya disebut BLSM) adalah kompensasi yang diberikan pemerintah kepada orang miskin guna mengurangi beban ekonomi yang semakin menekan kehidupan mereka, sebagai akibat naiknya harga BBM yang membawa dampak membubungnya harga kebutuhan pokok. Penelitian ini dilatarbelakangi oleh banyaknya kasus yang menyatakan bahwa penyaluran BLSM tidak tepat sasaran, ada BLSM yang diperuntukkan bagi masyarakat tidak mampu secara ekonomi, namun terkadang masih ada masyarakat kaya yang juga menerimanya khususnya di kabupaten Indramayu, hal tersebut menyulitkan pihak penyeleksi dalam mengadakan penyeleksian calon penerima dana BLSM ini untuk itu dibuat sistem pendukung keputusan dalam menentukan penerima BLSM di kabupaten Indramayu dengan menggunakan metode Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). Tujuan penelitian ini adalah Memberikan usulan untuk prioritas penerima BLSM agar tepat sasaran dan dapat membantu pemerintah kabupaten indramayu dalam pengambilan keputusan. Berdasarkan hasil analisis dengan menggunakan metode AHP, maka dapat dihasilkan suatu alternatif pengambilan keputusan dalam menentukan penerima BLSM yang efektif yang dapat menyaring 39% masyarakat yang seharusnya tidak mendapatkan BLSM.Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat (BLSM) is the compensation given by the government to the poor in order to reduce the economic burden of an increasingly pressing their lives, as a result of rising fuel prices impact soaring prices of basic necessities. This research is motivated by the many cases which states that the distribution BLSM not on target, there BLSM not intended for economically disadvantaged communities, but sometimes there are people who also receive particularly rich in Kabupaten Indramayu, it is difficult for the selectors to selection of recipients of funds held BLSM made to the decision support system in determining the recipient BLSM in Kabupaten Indramayu using Analytic Hierarchy Processahp (AHP) method. The purpose of this study is to provide the proposed recipient BLSM priority for the right target and can help local governments indramayu in decision making. Based on the analysis by using the method of AHP, it can produce an alternative decision-making in determining effective BLSM receiver that can filter out 39% of the people who should not get BLSM.


2018 ◽  
pp. 23-48
Author(s):  
Barry Hoffmaster ◽  
Cliff Hooker

A second kind of formal rationality, complementary to the maximizing expected utility in Chapter 1, is logical inference. In much of moral philosophy and in standard bioethics decision making is applied ethics. Moral theories are taken to be comprised of principles that are applied to the facts of cases to deduce conclusions about what ought to be done. The canonical depiction of bioethics, for instance, consists of the four principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice. The real examples in this chapter expose the many failings of that applied ethics. Most of the cases are about when to die and how to die, but the term ‘euthanasia’ is indeterminate. The crucial notion of ‘autonomy’ also is indeterminate. Both need to be clarified and specified. But how is this to be done? Similarly, when principles and rules conflict, as they often do, how is the one that prevails to be determined? There are no higher principles or rules that can be applied to get the right answer in any of these cases. More broadly, what makes a problem a moral problem, and what does being a moral problem mean? These issues require non-formal rational deliberation, not the formal rationality of deduction.


Author(s):  
Peter Emerson

By what principle does one majority have the right to rule, and another not? Secondly, while elections are generally transparent, why should forming a government be secretive? Is it because people believe, not only in majority rule, which may be fine, but also in (simple or weighted) majority voting, which is not so good? There are, after all, other more accurate voting systems by which can be identified the will of the majority; some of these latter methodologies are non-majoritarian. Now, if decision-making were to be based on a non-majoritarian voting procedure, the right to majority rule might be brought into question; indeed, majoritarianism might become obsolescent. Other forms of governance should therefore also be examined. Accordingly, this paper considers first, some of the deficiencies of a majoritarian polity; next, a more inclusive form of decision-making; then, majoritarian and non-majoritarian types of governance; and lastly, a voting system by which a parliament may elect a national government.


Author(s):  
Lucienne Abrahams ◽  
Mark Burke ◽  
Lauri Elliott ◽  
Warren Hero

Gauteng, South Africa’s economic center, has a history of social exclusion by virtue of differentiated access to employment, income, assets, and education. Levels of civic engagement prior to 1994 were limited by the absence of universal political suffrage and a society in which the majority of the population was denied the right to participate in decision-making based on racial discrimination. The achievement of universal suffrage in 1994 created the foundations for greater civic engagement. However, as social interaction and societal governance becomes increasingly electronically mediated (through the Internet, Web 2.0 technologies, and mobile content platforms), a large proportion of the population is excluded from these new forms of on-Net interaction. This chapter argues that policies that push universal household broadband service can contribute to reducing social exclusion through creating the foundation for households to operate as units of production and overcome economic deprivation, thus laying a stronger basis for civic engagement.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-457
Author(s):  
Frances E. Lee

Majority rule is a hallmark of modern liberal democracy. It is also a complicated, and contentious, idea. It has been subjected to extensive criticism by a range of philosophers, political theorists, and constitutional scholars ever since Plato. And it has been subjected to a range of qualifications and constraints by political elites and constitutional engineers intent on instituting supermajoritarian requirements. Melissa Schwartzberg’s Counting the Many: The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule (Cambridge University Press, 2014) is a careful historical and analytic critique of supermajority rule. As Schwartzberg argues: “Although supermajority rules ostensibly aim to reduce the purported risks associated with majority decision making, they do so at the cost of introducing new liabilities associated with the biased judgments they generate and secure.” This is an important argument, of relevance to normative and empirical scholars of democracy and democratization. And so we have invited a range of scholars working on these topics to review the book. — Jeffrey C. Isaac


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document