American Torture from the Philippines to Iraq
What accounts for the United States’ recurring turn to torture in wars against insurgents and terrorists over the past hundred-plus years? After all, torture is an abhorrent and risky interrogation method. Drawing on archival and bibliographic research, the book argues that the antitorture norm has two features that can lead to torture. First, the antitorture norm can, paradoxically, encourage torture by attracting those who believe unscrupulous methods confer advantages on those who use them. Second, because it is difficult to separate torture from milder acts, the norm lacks specificity. This gray area allows practitioners to portray their behavior as something short of torture and redefine torture to exclude their behavior. The two explanations interact as well: torture occurs because actors believe that it is harsh enough to work, and the definition of torture is blurry enough that actors believe they can sell their methods as legitimate. The book confirms these patterns in three comparable but disparate settings from the history of U.S. foreign policy: the Philippine-American War (1899–1902), the early Cold War up to the Vietnam War, and the post-2001 war on terror. In one extension of the argument, the book shows how the pervasive belief that autocrats have an edge over rule-bound democracies has tempted certain elected officials to chip away at their own liberal-democratic institutions.