“An Entirely New War”
This chapter shows how the Korean War meaningfully altered the course of the United States’ early Cold War grand strategy: in 1950, amidst the burgeoning superpower rivalry, the United States had embraced a version of containment that relied primarily on political and economic tools, enabling the United States to continue unwinding its wartime posture through demobilization, limited national security spending, and reliance on a small nuclear arsenal to deter attacks on its core interests in Western Europe and Japan. The Korean War called each of these premises into question, recasting American assessments of the Cold War balance of power, as well as the requirements for deterrence and defense of overseas commitments. By the mid-1950s, the United States had massively and durably increased its military power; expanded its overseas commitments to include security guarantees to the North American Trade Organization (NATO), South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan; and accepted the necessity of forward deployment as well as a large nuclear arsenal to maintain this extended deterrent.