The 1990s, Fulcrum of Change: Politics and Culture

2021 ◽  
pp. 71-85
Author(s):  
Michael J. Rosenfeld

In his campaign for president in 1992, Bill Clinton did something surprising: he advocated for gay rights. After winning the presidency, however, he was unable to integrate gay soldiers into the military as he had promised to do. Congress instead created a program known as Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, which forced gay soldiers back into the closet. Congress also passed, and President Clinton signed, the Defense of Marriage Act, which prevented the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages and allowed states to continue to deny marriage rights to same-sex couples. In 1997 television star Ellen DeGeneres came out as a lesbian both in person and in character on her TV show Ellen, becoming one of the most prominent out-of-the-closet gay people in the US.

Sexualities ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 776-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Connell

More than five years out from its implementation, we still know relatively little about how members of the US military and its ancillary institutions are responding to the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Contrary to what one might expect given the long history of LGBTQ antipathy in the military, I found in interviews with Boston area Reserve Officer Training Core (ROTC) cadets unanimous approval for the repeal of DADT. When pressed to explain why there was so much homogeneity of favorable opinion regarding the repeal, interviewees repeatedly offered the same explanation: that Boston, in particular, is such a progressive place that even more conservative institutions like the ROTC are spared anti-gay sentiment. They imagined the Southern and/or rural soldier they will soon encounter when they enter the US military, one who represents the traditionally homophobic attitudes of the old military in contrast to their more enlightened selves. This “metronormative” narrative has been critiqued elsewhere as inadequate for understanding the relationship between sexuality and place; this article contributes to that critique by taking a new approach. Rather than deconstruct narratives of queer rurality, as the majority of metronormativity scholarship has done, I deconstruct these narratives of urban queer liberation. I find that such narratives mask the murkier realities of LGBTQ attitudes in urban contexts and allow residents like the ROTC cadets in this study to displace blame about anti-gay prejudice to a distant Other, outside of their own ranks.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony C. Infanti

108 Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy 110 (2013)This essay takes a critical look at the tax fallout from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, which declared section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional. The essay is important because, while other federal laws will apply to some same-sex couples some of the time, the federal tax laws are a concern for all same-sex couples all of the time. The essay is timely because it addresses the recently issued IRS guidance regarding the tax treatment of same-sex couples. In this essay, I first describe the path that led to the decision in Windsor. Then, I turn to describing the ways in which the post-Windsor tax terrain may actually be worse for same-sex couples than the bleak tax landscape that they faced before that decision. Under DOMA, same-sex couples already faced a debilitating level of uncertainty in determining how the federal tax laws applied to their relationships. Post-Windsor, same-sex couples will see this uncertainty multiply -- even after receiving guidance from the IRS on the implementation of the Windsor decision in the federal tax context. They will have to grapple not only with lingering questions surrounding the federal tax treatment of relationships that are not recognized, but also with new questions regarding whether and how their relationships will be recognized for federal tax purposes. Moreover, it seems that dispatching discrimination designed to erode the progress of same-sex couples toward formal equality has served only to entrench the privileged status of marriage in our federal tax laws rather than fostering the recognition of a broader array of human relationships.


Author(s):  
Paul Snell

LGBT people have gone from being a “politics” to a “people” from the end of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st. They were mostly excluded from public life, and reduced to their sexuality. And when they weren’t reduced, they were restricted. Legislatures, not only failed to protect LGBT people from discrimination, but created new barriers for them under the guise of “protecting” the presumed heterosexual and cisgender basis of society. In America, the Defense of Marriage Act, (DOMA) and Don’t Ask Don’t Tell (DADT) are the most consequential examples of legislative action that treats LGBT people as morality issues rather than citizens. As LGBT people have gone from the margins to the center of public life, however, their political status changed. LGBT people are no longer a sexuality—but a constituency. There is an undisputed electoral connection. Legislators act on behalf of LGBT constituents in symbolic and substantive ways ranging from membership in LGBT caucuses in their chambers, to voting for bills that clearly help LGBT citizens in specific ways. They also exert pressure on representatives for whom they share no electoral connection, and who are not themselves LGBT. These allies act for LGBT citizens because they it aligns with ideological beliefs in justice and equity. This growth in activity has not only been limited to the US Congress, but has also occurred in US state legislatures and around the world. Activity has not always been synonymous with success, as the US Congress’s long struggle to pass an Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) that is inclusive of all aspects of the “LGBT” umbrella demonstrates. Nevertheless, LGBT voters are no longer “an issue”, but a part of the polity. Now that “LGBT” is an established political group there are serious questions that need to be addressed about what is being represented—and why it matters.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Markard

After having invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the U.S. Supreme Court “dropped the other shoe” inObergefell v. Hodgesby declaring the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage at the state level unconstitutional. Written by Justice Kennedy, the majority opinion heavily relied on the dignity-bestowing character of marriage to show why this exclusion is so harmful. But this strategy comes with a cost: it inflicts a stigma even as it conveys recognition—a drawback that an equality analysis can avoid. Respondents had argued that opening marriage dangerously disconnected marriage from procreation, both the historical reason for and the essence of marriage. In finding that they had failed to provide evidence for the harmful outcomes they described, the majority not only provided the rational basis test with a new kind of “bite.” It also asserted that tradition or religious beliefs were not enough to justify exclusion. Once secular purposes define marriage and rational reasons are required to regulate access, the road to marriage equality opens wide. As the line of cases leading up toObergefellsuggests, and developments in Germany, Austria, and other jurisdictions confirm, equality works as a one-way ratchet—albeit without necessarily including polygamy and incest. Crucially, equality changes the focus: From an equality perspective, the harm lies not in the exclusion from a dignity-conferring institution, but in the suggestion that the excluded group is not worthy of participating in it and does not deserve the recognition and benefits associated with it. Instead of aspiring to achieve dignity through marriage, in this view same-sex couples claim recognition as free and equal citizens. Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation subsumes an individual under a group category whose purported characteristics are systematically devalued, thus refusing to appreciate a person as an individual. It is this denial of recognition that conveys harm to the dignity of the individual above and beyond the respective disadvantage suffered. Thus taken with equality, dignity does not have the exclusive effect it has in isolation, as struggling against degrading exclusion stresses common traits.


ICL Journal ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alec Walen

AbstractJustice Roberts′s dissent in Obergefell v Hodges - the case in which the US Supreme Court found a constitutional right for same sex couples to marry - rested on the premise the Court cannot invoke the right to marry as a basis for changing the definition of marriage. But his argument works only if the Court has no obligation to find a constitutional meaning for the term. I argue here that it has such an obligation. I argue further that an analogy with the concept of ‘person’ throws light on how that obligation should work. And finally, I argue that the most plausible constitutional definition would include same sex couples.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 372-387
Author(s):  
Mariëtta D C van der Tol

Abstract This article suggests that there may be scope to accommodate individual conscience whilst holding institutions to their full civil duties by making a structural distinction between institutions and individual members and employees. This distinction might circumvent the paralysing contrasts between more abstract human rights categories. This article approaches the question of conscience through the lens of a Dutch legislation on the position of wedding officials and in particular through a thorough critique of it by the Netherlands Council of State. The Council’s critique illuminates two important distinctions, first, between institutions and individuals and, second, between conscience and behaviour. These findings are potentially relevant in cases on access of lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people to services provided by private companies. For example, may photographers and videographers deny services to same-sex couples? May a bakery decline to supply wedding cakes? May a bakery refuse to create a custom-made cake for an LGB event? These questions arose, respectively, in the US cases Elane Photography, Telescope, and Masterpiece cases as well as the British Ashers Bakery case. And, should a Christian law school’s accreditation be rejected when a code of conduct impairs access of LGB students, eg in the Canadian Trinity Western cases?


2008 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth McK. Norrie

During the 2008 US Presidential election, voters in California, as well as choosing a president, were asked to withdraw the right of same-sex couples to marry, the Californian Supreme Court having, six months previously, conferred that right by judicial decision.1 ‘Proposition 8’ aimed to restore the definition of marriage to its historical heterosexual limitations, and it passed, by a fairly narrow margin. The feature most remarkable to an outsider during the Proposition 8 campaign was the stunningly apocalyptical terms in which the debate was conducted, on both sides of the argument. The same-sex marriage debate is in the United States of America conducted in such venomous terms as to leave a European observer quite breathless. Nancy Polikoff’s latest book brings some calm to the discussion. It is a measured and thoughtful contribution to the debate and, though she does not directly address the question of why it is so much more contentious in the US than in other Western jurisdictions, her analysis does shed much light on that puzzling question. There are three main explanations that spring out of this engaging book.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony C. Infanti

"93 North Carolina Law Review Addendum 1 (2014)Within days in December, a federal judge in Utah made news by loosening that state's criminal prohibition against polygamy and the Attorney General of North Dakota made news by opining that a party to a same-sex marriage could enter into a different-sex marriage in that state without first obtaining a divorce or annulment. Both of these opinions raised the specter of legalized plural marriage. What discussions of these opinions missed, however, is the possibility that the IRS might already have legalized plural marriage in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision last June in United States v. Windsor, which struck down section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). In exploring that possibility, this essay continues my work analyzing the shortcomings of the IRS's implementation of the Windsor decision. The Secretary of the Treasury promised that IRS guidance would provide same-sex couples with "certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance." To the contrary, I have explained that the IRS's guidance provides no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA did, because it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the unwary, creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully, unintended) consequences. In this essay, I extend that analysis by explaining how ambiguity in the IRS's guidance may also have unintentionally opened the door to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes."


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