Europeanization With and Against the Odds

Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The extent to which member states still enjoy the autonomy to regulate their society and economy ultimately depends on the way the Court interprets the constraints of the Treaty. As a consequence, the domestic impact of the EU goes beyond the implementation of European secondary law, which Europeanization research focuses on. European case law should take immediate effect in the member states, but the literature in this area expects member states to contain compliance. Chapter 6 contrasts two case studies for markedly different member-state reactions to case law: the German reaction to the Meilicke tax cases and the Irish reaction to the Zambrano case. While the Meilicke case confirms that case law does not generally have a direct impact at the member-state level, the implementation of the Zambrano case by Ireland and other member states shows that member states also implement EU case law in a rule-of-law fashion.

Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-104
Author(s):  
Radim Charvát

Abstract The paper addresses the issue whether customs authorities of Member States are entitled to suspend or detain goods in transit (i.e., products directing from one non- Member State to another non-Member State through the EU) and the evolving case-law of the Court of Justice related to this matter. Prior to the judgment in Philips and Nokia cases, a so-called manufacturing fiction theory was applied by some Member State courts (especially Dutch courts). According to this theory, goods suspended or detained by customs authorities within the EU were considered to be manufactured in the Member State where the custom action took place. In the Philips and Nokia judgments, the Court of Justice rejected this manufacturing fiction theory. But the proposal for amendment to the Regulation on Community trade mark and the proposal of the new Trademark directive, as a part of the trademark reform within the EU, go directly against the ruling in the Philips and Nokia cases and against the Understanding between the EU and India.


Author(s):  
Lorin-Johannes Wagner

The question of who ought to be regarded as Union citizen is a central but not an easily answered question. Drawing on an analysis of the ECJ’s case-law and the underlying constitutional set up of Union citizenship, this article argues that the notion of nationality in EU law is based on a jurisdictional conception that builds on the idea of a genuine link and a territorial link with the EU. Relying on this understanding the article assesses the peculiar cases of Germany, the UK and Denmark, establishing not only if and how Member States can reconfigure the meaning of their nationality under EU law but also highlighting that the notion of nationality as a peremptory marker for Union citizenship is defined within the constitutional realm of EU law. The understanding that Member States are free to define their nationality within EU law, hence, is a misplaced overstatement of sovereignty. Against this backdrop the last part of the article turns to the case of Latvian non-citizens, arguing that Latvian non-citizens, who are generally not regarded as Union citizens, have been Union citizens all along.


elni Review ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 17-23
Author(s):  
Jonathan Verschuuren ◽  
Floor Fleurke

Although the EU ETS has been operating in three trading periods for ten years and has been extensively covered by legal research, there has been remarkably little attention given to the enforcement of the ETS. Although, generally, we have seen an increasing centralization of the EU ETS, monitoring and enforcement are still largely in the hands of the emissions authorities in the states in which the EU ETS operates: 28 EU Member States plus Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. This article reports on the main findings of an ex-post evaluation of the legal implementation of the EU ETS at Member State level with a focus on compliance. The central research question was: Has the effectiveness of the compliance mechanism of the EU ETS improved in the third period (2013-2020)? What further improvements (if any) are necessary? To answer this question, the authors of this article have described the relevant EU law in each of the three periods, reviewed previous evaluations and relevant research projects, and evaluated the implementation of the EU ETS in selected Member States, both through existing sources and through interviews with key players in the compliance mechanism at Member State level. The Member States that the authors studied for the latter part of the project were Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Greece, Poland and the UK.


Author(s):  
Agnieszka Frąckowiak-Adamska

AbstractThis contribution argues that an obligation for an executing court to conduct an individual assessment in case of systemic deficiencies of the judiciary in other Member States is not an adequate tool for ensuring the respect for the rule of law. Infringements of the independence of the judiciary require other legal mechanisms of protection than fundamental rights. Moreover, individual test is often not feasible in the European judicial area as some other acts providing for recognition of judgments in the EU do not contain the mechanisms of refusal of recognition or execution. A breach of the obligation to ensure independence of the courts should logically result in suspending the participation of a given Member State in the EU policy area at stake.


2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 236-259
Author(s):  
Nasiya Daminova

The first attempts of the European Commission and Parliament to invoke Art. 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union against the Polish and Hungarian governments demonstrate the EU’s political willingness to claim its own authority in defending core European values (Art. 2 TEU) in case of state disobedience. However, despite these attempts to integrate the Rule of Law concept into the overall EU’s supervisory machinery, the Commission’s and the Parliament’s submissions indicate a lack of coherency in implementing the principle as a relevant tool to address multiple challenges arising within the EU Member States legal systems. The parallel developments in the CJEUs case-law (LM/ML, Torubarov) support this statement. Regardless of the Council’s yes/ no decisions in the Polish and Hungarian cases, these lines of reasoning are capable of giving rise to further questions in application of the European Arrest Warrant Framework decision or the Asylum Procedures Directive, in particular the EU Member States which remain within the scope of the EU’s attention in view of systemic Human Rights violations (Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia). Moreover, the series of the CJEU’s judgements on the Polish judicial reform are capable of paving the way to the de facto intervention into traditional areas of the EU Member States competence – the organisation of the national judicial systems, in light of the development of a EU-specific principle of effective judicial review.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kim Lane Scheppele ◽  
Dimitry Vladimirovich Kochenov ◽  
Barbara Grabowska-Moroz

Abstract Although compliance with the founding values is presumed in its law, the Union is now confronted with persistent disregard of these values in two Member States. If it ceases to be a union of Rule-of-Law-abiding democracies, the European Union (EU) is unthinkable. Purely political mechanisms to safeguard the Rule of Law, such as those in Article 7 Treaty of European Union (TEU), do not work. Worse still, their existence has disguised the fact that the violations of the values of Article 2 TEU are also violations of EU law. The legal mechanisms tried thus far, however, do not work either. The fundamental jurisprudence on judicial independence and irremovability under Article 19(1) TEU is a good start, but it has been unable to change the situation on the ground. Despite ten years of EU attempts at reining in Rule of Law violations and even as backsliding Member States have lost cases at the Court of Justice, illiberal regimes inside the EU have become more consolidated: the EU has been losing through winning. More creative work is needed to find ways to enforce the values of Article 2 TEU more effectively. Taking this insight, we propose to turn the EU into a militant democracy, able to defend its basic principles, by using the traditional tools for the enforcement of EU law in a novel manner. We demonstrate how the familiar infringement actions—both under Article 258 and 259 TFEU—can be adapted as instruments for enforcing EU values by bundling a set of specific violations into a single general infringement action to show how a pattern of unlawful activity rises to the level of being a systemic violation. A systemic violation, because of its general and pervasive nature, in itself threatens basic values above and beyond violations of individual provisions of the acquis. Certified by the Court of Justice, a systemic violation of EU law should call for systemic compliance that would require the Member State to undo the effects of its attacks on the values of Article 2. The use of Article 260 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) to deduct fines from EU funds due to be received by the troubled Member State would provide additional incentives for systemic compliance. We illustrate this proposed militant democratic structure by explaining and critiquing what the Commission and Court together have done to reign in the governments of Hungary and Poland so far and then showing how they can do better.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig

The discussion in the previous chapter was concerned with proportionality and EU action. We now consider proportionality and the legality of Member State action. The discussion begins with positive law and analysis of the principal areas in which proportionality is used to contest the legality of Member State action. The application of proportionality and the four freedoms will be considered, followed by examination of the case law on proportionality and equality, with the focus then shifting to the way in which proportionality constrains Member States’ implementation and application of EU legislation.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter discusses the distortion of competition and the effect on inter-Member State trade conditions. Article 107(1) TFEU provides that State aid is prohibited if two complementary conditions are fulfilled, namely if the State measure in issue distorts or threatens to distort competition and affects trade between Member States. The common trend within the EU Courts' case law is that no actual assessment of these criteria is required. In order to establish that competition is distorted and trade between Member States affected, it is not necessary to define the market or to carry out a thorough investigation as regards the impact that the contested measure might have upon the economic operators involved. All that matters is whether an advantage is granted to a market operator, at the detriment of another which will, as a matter of fact, encroach upon the good functioning of competition and trade between Member States.


Author(s):  
Leonard Besselink

This chapter analyses Article 7 TEU on sanctions against Member States for certain potential and actual breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, and the related ‘Rule of Law initiatives’. It argues that the debates over these reveal a twofold boundary issue: that of the legal delimitation of the procedures and powers under Article 7, and that of the fuzzy boundaries of the Member State political orders as distinct from the EU political order. The very identity of the foundational values of the Union and of the Member States makes it impossible to delimit the scope of EU law from that of Member State orders when it comes to guaranteeing these values. This also explains the politically highly sensitive nature of doing so. Thus, this chapter seeks to define the contours of the ensuing problems with a precise legal reconstruction of Article 7 TEU and its development.


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