Conclusion

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Mühlendahl ◽  
Dimitris Botis ◽  
Spyros Maniatis ◽  
Imogen Wiseman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Trade Mark ◽  
Registration Process ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Short Period ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The Court of Justice has considered within a relatively short period of time a large number of trade mark cases from two perspectives: as an interpretive court for the purposes of both the Directive and the Regulation and as a supreme court of appeal under the Regulation and its implementing rules. In both contexts it has interpreted and applied provisions that were essentially identical. However, under the Regulation the Court also had to be supportive of the new Union-wide trade mark right and the bodies administering it. For example, by strengthening the role of the Boards of Appeal and streamlining their decision-making trends, the Court could achieve a number of things: make the registration process more efficient, raise the level of dependency on the decision-making instances of OHIM, make the appeal route to the courts in Luxembourg more difficult, and lessen the burden imposed on the General Court (previously the Court of First Instance) and the Court of Justice.

Equity and certainty in contract law

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Do So

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.

The Court

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilmann Büttner
Keyword(s):  
Civil Service ◽  
Complete System ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Legal Entity ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Civil Service Tribunal ◽  
Court Of First Instance ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The UPC, universally referred to as ‘the Court’ throughout the text of the Agreement pursuant to Art 2(a) UPCA, is to be regarded legally as a legal entity sui generis (Art 4(1) UPCA) and structurally as a uniform entity. The Court entity as a whole comprises both the judiciary structures, which are the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal, and the non-judiciary structures, which are the Registry with sub-registries set up at all divisions of the Court (Art 10(1) and (2) UPCA). The Court’s structure visibly follows that of the CJEU which, according to Art 19 TFEU, comprises as a unitary court the European Court of Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal, thus establishing a complete system of courts.

13 Conclusion

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dickson Brice
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Supreme Courts ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Conference Papers ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This chapter attempts to sum up the conclusions that can be drawn about the Irish Supreme Court from the surveys and analyses in foregoing chapters. It highlights the constraints placed on the Court’s decision-making, especially its lack of power to turn away many appeals. Some of the Court’s principal achievements are reviewed but some of the opportunities it has failed to exploit are also referred to. The future of the Court is considered, especially in light of the creation of the Court of Appeal in 2014. Attention is given to the importance of strong leadership at the Chief Justice level and to the need for more public pronouncements from the judges in lectures and conference papers. Final remarks are made on how the Court compares to supreme courts in other common law countries.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS: IV. CITIZENSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 493-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erika Szyszczak
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
International Obligations ◽  
Court Of First Instance

Citizenship and human rights continue to play an important role in the evolution of Community law. Both sets of principles have appeared in the case law of the European Courts and in the creation of a Constitutional document for Europe. Part II of the draft Constitution incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union. Additionally, the first report from the independent network of experts in fundamental human rights details the various international human rights obligations which the Member States are subject to, analysing Member State policy in a number of areas in the light of the international obligations.1Paradoxically, at a time when greater emphasis is being paid to the constitutional recognition of human rights there are indications of divisions between some of the Advocates General, the Court of First Instance and the European Court of Justice (the Court) on the constitutional role of fundamental rights in relation to access to justice.

scholarly journals The judgment of crimes against humanity in Brazil: Analysis through the critical criminological lens of lola aniyar

2021 ◽  
pp. 47135-47145
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Lewis Carroll ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Military Dictatorship ◽  
Criminal Control ◽  
Decision Making Rule

In this article we discuss two recent Brazilian Supreme Court judgments about crimes committed during the civil-military dictatorship: Allegation of Disobedience of Fundamental Precept suit n. 153 (constitutionality of the 1979 amnesty law), and Extradition suit n. 1362, that discussed the extradition of an Argentine citizen who was convicted of committing crimes against humanity during the Argentine dictatorship). We analyze the role of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the (re) construction of the “criminal problem” and “criminal control” in relation to crimes against humanity perpetrated during the periods of the Argentine (1978-1983) and Brazilian (1964-1985) dictatorship. We take Lola Aniyar de Castro Thought’s, seeking some inspiration, for whom the criminology of the 21st Century is the “criminology of human rights”, and criminal control would be the thermometer of human rights. In the last part of this article, we discussed what seems to have been “the triumph of Lewis Carroll”, in the metaphor of reversing meanings: when protecting human rights is not to protect human rights, by creating an ad hoc decision-making rule from which “remembering is to forget”, and “forgetting is to remember”, provided that, from the peculiar Rule n. 42, the investigation and accountability for crimes against humanity are not allowed.

scholarly journals THE ROLE OF REMORSE IN SENTENCING

Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Pieter du Toit
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
South African ◽  
Deterrent Effect ◽  
The South ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Mitigating Factor ◽  
Court Of Appeal

It has become an established feature of the South African sentencing practice to consider the level of remorse displayed by the accused. Genuine contrition or remorse is generally regarded as a mitigating factor whilst the absence thereof is considered to be an aggravating factor. Our courts link the presence of remorse with the prospect of the rehabilitation of the offender. In S v Seegers (1970 (2) SA 506 (A) 512G–H) Rumpff JA held that remorse, as an indication that the offence will not be committed again, is an important consideration, in suitable cases, when the deterrent effect of a sentence on the accused is considered. This note considers the meaning of “remorse” in the eyes of our courts, the approach of South African courts (in particular the Supreme Court of Appeal) to the role of remorse in sentencing, as well as the question whether the presence or absence of remorse can truly be determined by a court.

scholarly journals Bokolo v S 2014 (1)sacr 66 (sca): The practicality of challenging dna evidence in court

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma Charlene Lubaale
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Scientific Validity ◽  
Dna Evidence ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Ideal

The techniques used in DNA profiling are well established and scientifically validated. The scientific validity of DNA evidence can, however, be so persuasive that such evidence risks being reduced to proof of guilt or innocence. Thus, the incorrect use of DNA evidence could lead to a miscarriage of justice where the innocent are convicted and the guilty are acquitted. Drawing from the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Bokolo v S (Bokolo case), this case note discusses how DNA evidence can be placed in its proper forensic context. The article sets out the ideal role of expert witnesses, the role of opposing or neutral experts, and the active role of judicial officers in evaluating DNA evidence.

Understanding the Role of the European Court of Justice in European Integration

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 214-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBA ◽  
MATTHEW GABEL ◽  
CHARLES HANKLA
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Political Constraints ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In 2008 we published an article finding evidence for political constraints on European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision making. Stone Sweet and Brunell (this issue) argue that our theoretical foundations are fundamentally flawed and that our empirical evidence supports neofunctionalism over intergovernmentalism “in a landslide.” We respectfully disagree with Stone Sweet and Brunell regarding both their conclusions about our theoretical arguments and what the empirical evidence demonstrates. We use this response to clarify our argument and to draw a clearer contrast between our and their perspective on the role the ECJ plays in European integration. Finally, we reevaluate their neofunctionalist hypotheses. Ultimately, we do not find support in the data for Stone Sweet and Brunell's empirical claims.

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