Regional Middle Powers and the Indo-Pacific Strategic Narrative

Author(s):  
Timothy Doyle ◽  
Dennis Rumley

In this chapter we argue that, in the Indo-Pacific region since the ‘end’ of the ‘old’ Cold War, there has been a process of political and economic competition among regional great powers for influence over Indo-Pacific core middle powers. One of the essential aims of this process is to create a regional middle power coalition in opposition to either China or the US, one of the elements of the new Cold War. As a result, the foreign policies of US-co-opted states will exhibit a shift in emphasis towards support for the US pivot and an expression of a greater foreign policy interest than heretofore in the Indo-Pacific region, following the US. The result is that an Indo-Pacific self-identification and an ‘Indo-Pacific narrative’ become important components of the foreign policy rhetoric and debate of US-co-opted states.

Author(s):  
Nina Græger

Middle powers have played a key role in supporting global governance, a rules-based order, and human rights norms. Apart from conveying and effectuating global solidarity and responsibility, multilateral cooperation has been an arena where middle powers seek protection and leverage relatively modest power to greater effect, sometimes as “helpful fixers” to great powers. This article argues that geopolitical revival and the contestation of the liberal order are challenging middle powers' traditional sheltering policies, based on empirical evidence from the Norwegian case. First, the weakening of multilateral organizations is making middle powers more vulnerable to great power rivalry and geopolitics, and Norway's relationship with Russia is particularly pointed. Second, existing shelters such as NATO and bilateral cooperation with the US are negatively affected by the latter's anti-liberal foreign policies, making looser sheltering frameworks important supplements. While Norway's and other middle powers' traditional policies within the “soft power” belt may continue, “doing good” may become less prioritized, due to the need for security.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002088172110567
Author(s):  
Shubhamitra Das

Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of great movement, conflict and cooperation, contestations and coalition-building. The emergence of minilateral and multilateral cooperation by the middle powers is increasing in the region, with the regional countries enthusiastically mapping the region focussing on their centrality. History proves that the role of middle-power countries became more prominent during the moments of international transition. The two contrasting powers like India and Australia; one with a post-colonial identity in foreign policy-making, subtle emphasis on non-aligned movement (NAM) and emerging as an influential power, and, on the other, a traditional middle power with an alliance structure and regionalism akin to the Western model, have equal stakes in the region and it is inevitable for them to take a leadership position in building what is called a middle power communion in the Indo-Pacific. This article will explore the understanding of middle powers and how India and Australia, as middle powers; are strategically placed and, being great powers within their respective regions; take the responsibility of region-building and maintaining peace with great powers, and how the Indo-Pacific and Quad are emerging as discourses within their foreign policy-making.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Abstract Indonesia has taken a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in drafting a common outlook on the Indo-Pacific concept. The widening of Indonesia's geostrategic canvas from the Asia–Pacific to the Indo-Pacific is in line with President Joko Widodo's intent to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). In view of the rivalry between the US and China and the emergence of various Indo-Pacific initiatives from other countries, Indonesia believes that ASEAN must try to maintain its centrality. The draft of Indonesia's perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region was submitted for considerations by ASEAN, and after 18 months of intensive lobbying by Indonesia the concept was finally adopted at the ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The ASEAN outlook promotes the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for international law and ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. It proposes a building-block approach, seeking commonalities between existing regional initiatives in which ASEAN-led mechanisms will act as a fulcrum for both norm-setting and concrete cooperation. Rather than creating a new regional architecture, the East Asia Summit (EAS) is proposed as the platform for advancing the Indo-Pacific discourse and cooperation. Indonesia's ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific marks its renewed foreign policy activism as a middle power and underlines the continuing importance that Indonesia places on ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, emphasising ASEAN's centrality as the primary vehicle for managing relations with the major powers in the Indo-Pacific region.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 2040007
Author(s):  
HSIN-HSIEN WANG ◽  
SHINN-SHYR WANG ◽  
WEI-FENG TZENG

In comparison to hegemony, lesser powers usually struggle for survival between two or more great powers under state power asymmetry, a perpetual phenomenon in international politics. With the rise of China and the increasingly strengthening role of the US in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to learn how lesser powers manage their relations with the two. To explore this issue, we propose that the strength of state power will constrain the strategies of lesser powers as they choose between the US and China. Borrowing from existing theories and ideas on strategies that include balancing, bandwagoning, and hedging, we argue that the stronger a country’s power, the more likely it will choose a balancing strategy. At the same time, the weaker the country, the more likely that it will go with bandwagoning. Regional middle powers will show varied strategy choices, as they possess a higher degree of freedom in choosing which great power to side with. To validate these arguments, we construct two indicators — differences in trade dependence on the US and China and differences in the voting score consistent with the US and China — to quantify the strategies of lesser powers toward great powers and examine whether the variable of strategies follows the expected pattern. Our analysis shows that countries in the middle of the spectrum of state power demonstrated great freedom in choosing strategies toward the two powers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 2040008 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN L. JOB

“Middle powers,” variously defined, have served relevant and significant roles in the post-WWII regional and global orders, facilitated by structural conditions of “long peace” among great powers and proactive leadership by and among creative middle powers. Within the complex Asia-Pacific security order, “middle powers” such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea have had the “space” to engage the non-like minded and advance multilateralism with security guarantees from the US. However, Beijing and Washington today are eliminating this space and its associated choices for middle-power diplomacy by increasingly characterizing their rivalry as a confrontation of “existential threats” between incompatible “civilizations” and securitizing trade and technology. China and the US are each selectively ignoring or purposely eroding key aspects of a rules-based international order. This paper highlights the dilemmas of South Korea, Australia, and Canada, middle powers who have found themselves individually and collectively “stuck” facing contradictory global and regional policy choices.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 14-24
Author(s):  
Fadlan Muzakki

Indonesian foreign policy is considered as a uniqe and rare policy. This is because the main focus of Indonesian foreign policy is Free and Active. For country like Indonesia which had just got independence in 1945, the country is considered as a country with a pioneer foreign policy to stand in a non-block. Therefore, Indonesia was quite popular with  non-block movement and Bandung Conference in the Cold War Period. This paper discusses Indonesian foreign policy and match its policy with underlying theory of Foreign Policies: Realism, Idealism, and Constructivism. Moreover, this essay also analyses Indonesian Foreign Policy through Middle Power Concept. Additionally, this essay also explains the practices of Indonesian Foreign Policy in current years, especially under Joko Widodo’s Administration. Last but not least, the author also reveals Indonesian foreign policy and its relations to media, society or public opinion.


2019 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
T. A. Vorobyova ◽  
V. T. Yungblud

The period of détente is usually associated with a decrease of confrontation in US-Soviet relations, the signing of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons and anti-missile defense systems and the development of trade and economic relations, scientific and cultural exchanges. Strengthening security in Europe is considered another facet of détente. From this perspective détente is viewed as an alternative to the Cold War, and the end of détente is seen as a missed opportunity to develop international relations in the direction of a secure world with working mechanisms for harmonizing the interests of both the great powers and other countries.The article deals with the history of relations in the triangle USA – USSR – China in 1977– 1980. The evolution of Washington’s foreign policy strategy and the inclusion to it policies towards the USSR and China in these years came at the background of pronounced Soviet– Chinese antagonism. In the first months there was no clear plan in the actions of the Carter administration, there was a sharp rivalry for influence on the president between individual political figures (first of all – S. Vance and Zb. Brzezinski). They proposed different scenarios of the development of the US–Soviet and US – China relations. Throughout the Carter presidency, the US used as much as possible the tensions between Moscow and Beijing. In the framework of tripartite relations, each of the sides consistently pursued its own course aimed at achieving unilateral benefits. There were no attempts to establish a trilateral dialogue with an agreed agenda. The processes of détente practically did not affect the complex of international problems that existed within the American – Soviet – Chinese triangle. Moreover, Washington’s use of the «Chinese card» prevented the reduction of tensions in American–Soviet relations and strengthened the Cold War logic and methods in the planning and implementation of US foreign policy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1377-1394
Author(s):  
Umut Aydin

Abstract In the post-Cold War era, a number of middle powers rose to prominence thanks to domestic reforms and a favourable international environment of economic and political globalization. These countries began to pursue middle power foreign policies, working actively in international organizations, engaging in areas such as conflict mediation, humanitarian assistance and the promotion of human rights, and helping to diffuse democracy and market reforms in their neighbourhoods. In this way, they contributed to the stability and expansion of the liberal international order in the post-Cold War period. Nonetheless, recent democratic and economic backsliding in these middle powers raises concerns. Focusing on the cases of Turkey and Mexico, this article explores how reversals in democratic and market reforms, exacerbated by recent trends towards deglobalization, influence emerging middle powers' foreign policies and their potential contributions to the liberal international order. I argue that whereas their rise had helped reinforce and expand the liberal international order, emerging middle powers' illiberal turn may have a destabilizing effect on this order.


Author(s):  
Bruno Maçães

Popular consensus says that the US rose over two centuries to Cold War victory and world domination, and is now in slow decline. But is this right? History's great civilizations have always lasted much longer, and for all its colossal power, American culture was overshadowed by Europe until recently. What if this isn't the end? This book offers a compelling vision of America's future, both fascinating and unnerving. From the early American Republic, it takes us to the turbulent present, when, it argues, America is finally forging its own path. We can see the birth pangs of this new civilization in today's debates on guns, religion, foreign policy, and the significance of Trump. Should the coronavirus pandemic be regarded as an opportunity to build a new kind of society? What will its values be, and what will this new America look like? The book traces the long arc of US history to argue that in contrast to those who see the US on the cusp of decline, it may well be simply shifting to a new model, one equally powerful but no longer liberal. Consequently, it is no longer enough to analyze America's current trajectory through the simple prism of decline vs. progress, which assumes a static model—America as liberal leviathan. Rather, the book argues that America may be casting off the liberalism that has defined the country since its founding for a new model, one more appropriate to succeeding in a transformed world.


Author(s):  
Filip Ejdus

During the cold war, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was a middle-sized power pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy and a defence strategy based on massive armed forces, obligatory conscription, and a doctrine of ‘Total National Defence’. The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s resulted in the creation of several small states. Ever since, their defence policies and armed forces have been undergoing a thorough transformation. This chapter provides an analysis of the defence transformation of the two biggest post-Yugoslav states—Serbia and Croatia—since the end of the cold war. During the 1990s, defence transformation in both states was shaped by the undemocratic nature of their regimes and war. Ever since they started democratic transition in 2000, and in spite of their diverging foreign policies, both states have pivoted towards building modern, professional, interoperable, and democratically controlled armed forces capable of tackling both traditional and emerging threats.


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