Indonesia and the ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific

2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dewi Fortuna Anwar

Abstract Indonesia has taken a leadership role within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in drafting a common outlook on the Indo-Pacific concept. The widening of Indonesia's geostrategic canvas from the Asia–Pacific to the Indo-Pacific is in line with President Joko Widodo's intent to make Indonesia a Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). In view of the rivalry between the US and China and the emergence of various Indo-Pacific initiatives from other countries, Indonesia believes that ASEAN must try to maintain its centrality. The draft of Indonesia's perspective for an ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific: towards a peaceful, prosperous, and inclusive region was submitted for considerations by ASEAN, and after 18 months of intensive lobbying by Indonesia the concept was finally adopted at the ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The ASEAN outlook promotes the principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, respect for international law and ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. It proposes a building-block approach, seeking commonalities between existing regional initiatives in which ASEAN-led mechanisms will act as a fulcrum for both norm-setting and concrete cooperation. Rather than creating a new regional architecture, the East Asia Summit (EAS) is proposed as the platform for advancing the Indo-Pacific discourse and cooperation. Indonesia's ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific marks its renewed foreign policy activism as a middle power and underlines the continuing importance that Indonesia places on ASEAN as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, emphasising ASEAN's centrality as the primary vehicle for managing relations with the major powers in the Indo-Pacific region.

Author(s):  
Timothy Doyle ◽  
Dennis Rumley

In this chapter we argue that, in the Indo-Pacific region since the ‘end’ of the ‘old’ Cold War, there has been a process of political and economic competition among regional great powers for influence over Indo-Pacific core middle powers. One of the essential aims of this process is to create a regional middle power coalition in opposition to either China or the US, one of the elements of the new Cold War. As a result, the foreign policies of US-co-opted states will exhibit a shift in emphasis towards support for the US pivot and an expression of a greater foreign policy interest than heretofore in the Indo-Pacific region, following the US. The result is that an Indo-Pacific self-identification and an ‘Indo-Pacific narrative’ become important components of the foreign policy rhetoric and debate of US-co-opted states.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita ◽  
Denisa Rizkiya

The policy was introduced by the U.S. President Barack Obama early in his first administration in 2010, marked specific changing to the U.S. foreign policy like never before. The U.S. continuously views South and South East Asia, including the Indian Ocean, as a crucial driver for America’s economic growth and prosperity throughout the 21st century. Numerous numbers of cooperation and partnership have been done to enhance the ties between the U.S. and the regions. The U.S. presence and involvement in most essential regional meetings and summits can also be seen as an effort to seek opportunities, politically, economically, as well as security. This article tries to analyze how the U.S. rebalance towards Asia policy, a term used for the U.S.' foreign policy influenced the regional stability in Asia-Pacific region. 


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ryan Friesen

<p>With the rise of China and the United States (US) foreign policy rebalance to the Asia-Pacific meeting in international space, small states like New Zealand have decisions to make about how to manage their balancing act between the two major powers. This research is the result of an extensive literature review of the available material coming from international relations scholars, diplomats, governments, and news media. The focus of this thesis is on the options a small state like New Zealand has amid China’s rise and the US foreign policy ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific since late-2011, but some attention has been given to how the US rebalance has been rolled out and New Zealand’s position therein. The findings point to a spectrum of options available to New Zealand which goes between choosing a China-centric economic focused set of foreign policies on one end, and backing US interests both in economic and security terms on the other end. It is clear New Zealand has chosen a middle ground and has adopted a hedging strategy designed to optimize its relationship with both the US and China. The task ahead for New Zealand is to use what influence it has to foster an environment where the likelihood of conflict between the two major powers is reduced without giving up too much independence in foreign policy decision making.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ryan Friesen

<p>With the rise of China and the United States (US) foreign policy rebalance to the Asia-Pacific meeting in international space, small states like New Zealand have decisions to make about how to manage their balancing act between the two major powers. This research is the result of an extensive literature review of the available material coming from international relations scholars, diplomats, governments, and news media. The focus of this thesis is on the options a small state like New Zealand has amid China’s rise and the US foreign policy ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific since late-2011, but some attention has been given to how the US rebalance has been rolled out and New Zealand’s position therein. The findings point to a spectrum of options available to New Zealand which goes between choosing a China-centric economic focused set of foreign policies on one end, and backing US interests both in economic and security terms on the other end. It is clear New Zealand has chosen a middle ground and has adopted a hedging strategy designed to optimize its relationship with both the US and China. The task ahead for New Zealand is to use what influence it has to foster an environment where the likelihood of conflict between the two major powers is reduced without giving up too much independence in foreign policy decision making.</p>


2021 ◽  
pp. 135-153
Author(s):  
Vladimir Batyuk

Despite the critical attitude of the current American President towards his predecessor, the Trump administration actually continued the course of the Obama administration to turn the Asia-Pacific region into the most important priority of American foreign policy. Moreover, the US Asia-Pacific strategy was transformed under Trump into the Indo-Pacific strategy, when the Indian Ocean was added to the Asia-Pacific region in the US strategic thinking. The US Pacific command was renamed the Indo-Pacific command (May 2018), and the US Department of defense developed the Indo-Pacific strategy (published in June 2019). The Indo-Pacific strategy is an integral part of Trump’s national security strategy, according to which China, along with Russia, was declared US adversary. The American side complained about both the economic and military-political aspects of the Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, official Washington is no longer confident that it can cope with those adversaries, China and Russia, alone. Trying to implement the main provisions of the Indo-Pacific strategy, official Washington has staked not only on building up its military power in the Indo-Pacific, but also on trying to build an anti-Chinese system of alliances in this huge region. Along with such traditional American allies in the region as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, the American side in the recent years has made active attempts to attract India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam to this system of alliances as well. These American attempts, however, can only cause serious concerns not only in Beijing, but also in Moscow, thereby contributing to the mutual rapprochement of the Russian Federation and China. Meanwhile, the Russian-Chinese tandem is able to devalue American efforts to strategically encircle China, creating a strong Eurasian rear for the Middle Kingdom.


Author(s):  
Feng Zhang ◽  
Richard Ned Lebow

This chapter examines the policy mistakes that the Obama administration made in managing the Sino-American relationship. The Obama administration developed no distinct China strategy and was in fact averse to developing such a strategy. It chose to embed largely reactive China policies within a regional strategy of the so-called “pivot” or “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region. While China was relegated to a management issue, the rebalance strategy damaged the US-China relationship by deepening strategic mistrust between the two countries and agitating China to seek strategic adventures in Asia. The rebalance did not cause Chinese assertiveness by itself, but the geopolitical setting it created served to exacerbate China’s already fermenting assertive inclinations and prompted its strategic adventurism.


Author(s):  
Paolo Amorosa

The first chapter, like all others in the book, is divided in three sections. Section 1 offers an analysis of the US foreign policy discourse at the turn of the century and connects it with the growing popularity of international law within the elites. Section 2 follows Scott in his work as Secretary Root’s legal advisor at the State Department, until the two moved together to lead the newly established Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The highlight of Scott’s government stint was the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conference, where he championed the project for an international court and created a large part of the transatlantic professional connections that would be crucial to his later projects. Section 3 describes how Scott, since 1910 a powerful administrator at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, deployed the massive resources at his disposal.


2020 ◽  
pp. 211-232
Author(s):  
Robert Sutter

This chapter reviews Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) interactions with the United States since the 1940s, and it reveals a general pattern of the United States at the very top of China’s foreign priorities. Among those few instances where China seemed to give less attention to the United States was the post-2010 period, which saw an ever more powerful China advancing at US expense. However, China’s rapid advance in economic, military, and diplomatic power has progressively alarmed the US government, which now sees China as its main international danger. Looking forward into the future, deteriorating US-China relations have enormous consequences for both countries, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document