Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: India and Australia at the Forefront

2021 ◽  
pp. 002088172110567
Author(s):  
Shubhamitra Das
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Post Colonial ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
Conflict And Cooperation ◽  
Western Model ◽  
Middle Powers

Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of great movement, conflict and cooperation, contestations and coalition-building. The emergence of minilateral and multilateral cooperation by the middle powers is increasing in the region, with the regional countries enthusiastically mapping the region focussing on their centrality. History proves that the role of middle-power countries became more prominent during the moments of international transition. The two contrasting powers like India and Australia; one with a post-colonial identity in foreign policy-making, subtle emphasis on non-aligned movement (NAM) and emerging as an influential power, and, on the other, a traditional middle power with an alliance structure and regionalism akin to the Western model, have equal stakes in the region and it is inevitable for them to take a leadership position in building what is called a middle power communion in the Indo-Pacific. This article will explore the understanding of middle powers and how India and Australia, as middle powers; are strategically placed and, being great powers within their respective regions; take the responsibility of region-building and maintaining peace with great powers, and how the Indo-Pacific and Quad are emerging as discourses within their foreign policy-making.

Regional Middle Powers and the Indo-Pacific Strategic Narrative

2019 ◽  
pp. 110-142
Author(s):  
Timothy Doyle ◽  
Dennis Rumley
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Pacific Region ◽  
Economic Competition ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Policy Interest

In this chapter we argue that, in the Indo-Pacific region since the ‘end’ of the ‘old’ Cold War, there has been a process of political and economic competition among regional great powers for influence over Indo-Pacific core middle powers. One of the essential aims of this process is to create a regional middle power coalition in opposition to either China or the US, one of the elements of the new Cold War. As a result, the foreign policies of US-co-opted states will exhibit a shift in emphasis towards support for the US pivot and an expression of a greater foreign policy interest than heretofore in the Indo-Pacific region, following the US. The result is that an Indo-Pacific self-identification and an ‘Indo-Pacific narrative’ become important components of the foreign policy rhetoric and debate of US-co-opted states.

scholarly journals Illiberalism, geopolitics, and middle power security: Lessons from the Norwegian case

2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-102
Author(s):  
Nina Græger
Keyword(s):  
Soft Power ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Multilateral Cooperation ◽  
The Us ◽  
Foreign Policies ◽  
Bilateral Cooperation ◽  
Human Rights Norms ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Global Solidarity

Middle powers have played a key role in supporting global governance, a rules-based order, and human rights norms. Apart from conveying and effectuating global solidarity and responsibility, multilateral cooperation has been an arena where middle powers seek protection and leverage relatively modest power to greater effect, sometimes as “helpful fixers” to great powers. This article argues that geopolitical revival and the contestation of the liberal order are challenging middle powers' traditional sheltering policies, based on empirical evidence from the Norwegian case. First, the weakening of multilateral organizations is making middle powers more vulnerable to great power rivalry and geopolitics, and Norway's relationship with Russia is particularly pointed. Second, existing shelters such as NATO and bilateral cooperation with the US are negatively affected by the latter's anti-liberal foreign policies, making looser sheltering frameworks important supplements. While Norway's and other middle powers' traditional policies within the “soft power” belt may continue, “doing good” may become less prioritized, due to the need for security.

Searching for Middle Powers

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Neack
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Global South ◽  
The Self ◽  
Coalition Building ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
International Power ◽  
Post War ◽  
Middle Powers

What is a “middle power,” and what foreign policy is associated with it? Scholars and diplomats in Canada, Australia, and a more or less stable collection of northern countries—and increasingly scholars from the Global South—have proposed that the term denotes a particular international position, rights, and responsibilities. Canada has been especially associated with claims that it deserved unique representation in the halls of international power by virtue of its secondary or middle contributions to World War II and the post-war peace. Middle powers, it was proposed, were countries who both made significant contributions to that global order and were more likely than the self-interested great powers to protect the values of that order. However, the term “middle power” never has had a clear meaning or definition, and the so-called middle powers have largely been self-electing (whether the self-election was by scholars or practitioners). Scholarly efforts to bring more rigor to the concept have failed to agree on its basic definition and membership list. This failure results largely from a fundamental disagreement over whether the “middle power” is defined by its functional capabilities, characterized by its strong moral imperative as a “good international citizen,” designated by its position in the international hierarchy, or revealed in its foreign policy behaviors. In time, the behavioral notion that middle powers engaged in “middle power diplomacy” held sway in the scholarship such that any country that pursued multilateral compromises, engaged in acts of “good international citizenship,” and promoted coalition building was labeled a middle power. This subsequently led to a growing scholarship on which states were “middle powers” based on their foreign policy behaviors. In particular, countries from the Global South who embraced multilateralism were included in the ranks of the middle powers. The inclusion of countries from the Global South created a fundamental problem for the term, since middle power advocates portrayed them as strong supporters of the international order. Southern middle powers, on the other hand, were champions or leaders of states who stood against that order because of historical and present injustices in it. However, even those countries said to be Southern or emerging middle powers seem more interested in establishing their own status within the existing order rather than asserting a common vision on behalf of a revised order. Ultimately, the lack of agreement about what “middle power” means leaves scholars and practitioners uncertain about whether the term is a useful guide for any particular country’s foreign policy.

scholarly journals Toward a differentiation-based framework for middle power behavior

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Sarah Teo
Keyword(s):  
International Politics ◽  
Social Power ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Functional Differentiation ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Power Politics ◽  
Underlying Assumption ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
New Framework

Abstract Differentiation is a foundational premise in the study of middle powers, as evident in the way that the relevant literature distinguishes these states from the great powers and smaller states. Despite the underlying assumption of differentiation, the middle power literature has rarely engaged theoretically with the concept. This paper seeks to make more explicit this basis of differentiation in the study of middle powers, by advancing a new framework for middle power behavior that draws on differentiation theory. The framework makes the case that it is the differentiated structure in international politics – a departure from the dominant neorealist understanding of structure – that enables the behavior of middle powers. The effects of this differentiated structure are activated by the relative, relational, and social power politics that middle powers engage in, in a particular time and place. Through this process, middle powers are able to leverage their ‘middlepowerness’ in international politics by weakening stratification particularly where the great powers are concerned, and strengthening functional differentiation through taking on key and distinctive roles. By putting differentiation at the core of a framework for middle power behavior, the paper strives to make a constructive contribution to the theorizing of middle powers.

Proof of Greatness or Evidence of Modesty? A Comparative Analysis of China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-162
Author(s):  
Min Ye ◽  
Quan Li
Keyword(s):  
International System ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Peacekeeping Operations ◽  
Un Peacekeeping ◽  
Un Security Council ◽  
The Status ◽  
Dynamic Perspective ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
International Status

Abstract Any serious discussion about the consequences of China’s rise must start with a systematic and rigorous assessment of China’s actual influence and status in the international system. In this article, we examine a widely used indicator in the debate about China’s international status. Although many existing studies see China’s active participation in United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations as incontestable evidence of China’s great power status, others contend that it signifies the status of only a middle power. We posit that China’s policy behaviour should be evaluated in a comparative manner, and from a dynamic perspective. After comparing the patterns and features of China’s personnel contributions with that of 20 other major countries in the world, we find that China’s behaviour is more similar to that of developing ‘middle powers’, such as Turkey, India, and Brazil, as opposed to established ‘great powers’ such as other permanent members of the UN Security Council or traditional ‘western middle powers’.

Spanish Foreign Policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 649-667
Author(s):  
Ramón Pacheco Pardo
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Soft Power ◽  
Policy Making ◽  
Dominant Role ◽  
Transition To Democracy ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
High Degree ◽  
Domestic Level

Spain’s foreign policy since its transition to democracy has been marked by a high degree of continuity over the years and across governments. Foreign-policy-making structures have remained relatively unchanged at the domestic level, with the president and the Cabinet Office playing a dominant role as a result of the presidentialization of Spanish politics. Domestic structures are complemented by EU-level structures evermore relevant as foreign policy has become increasingly Europeanized. In terms of goals, successive Spanish governments have prioritized Europeanization itself, a strong presence in Latin America and the Mediterranean, and boosting economic opportunities for Spanish businesses. Regarding foreign-policy tools, Spain has long displayed a preference for multilateralism, diplomacy, and soft power over the use of military power. In other words, Spain has prioritized the use of the main tools available to middle powers.

scholarly journals A New Perspective on Poland’s Policy towards Russia in 2005–2007: a Middle Power Attempts to Engage a Rising Major Power

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Marijuš Antonovič
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Neoclassical Realism ◽  
Major Power ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Law And Justice ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Made In

Abstract Scholars of middle powers have been trying to solve its definitional issues and some progress has been made in the systemic approach. This article shows that further advancement may be gained by employing neoclassical realism in studying middle powers’ foreign policy behaviour. This done by analysing Poland’s policy towards Russia in 2005–2007. It is widely accepted in academic literature that Poland in 2005–2007, during the rule of the Law and Justice Party, pursued a confrontational policy towards Russia. However, this article challenges such widespread views. It demonstrates that Poland’s policy towards Russia was actually simultaneously based on balancing and engagement. Using a neoclassical realist framework and data gathered from interviews with Poland’s main foreign policymakers at that time, this article shows that the balancing was caused by the power asymmetry and differing interests between Russia and Poland, whereas the engagement – by the Polish policymakers’ attempts to influence Russia’s intentions towards Poland and by their perceived situation in the European balance of power.

China–Turkey Relations from the Perspective of Neoclassical Realism

2021 ◽  
pp. 234779892110626
Author(s):  
Mustafa Cüneyt Özşahin ◽  
Federico Donelli ◽  
Riccardo Gasco
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
World Politics ◽  
Strategic Culture ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Neoclassical Realism ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Middle Powers

There is plenty of studies focusing on China’s global outreach through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In tandem with this, the extensive literature on China depicts it as the next hegemon to succeed in the USA. Along this line, flourishing ties with various Asian nations, including the Middle Eastern countries, as a result of China’s recent foreign policy activism has been addressed extensively. While most research has been stressing the rising assertiveness of China in world politics, only a limited number of studies have touched upon the responses from middle or small powers against China’s ascent. Drawing from neoclassical realism, this article contends two levels of analysis for delineating the interaction between Turkey, a middle power, and China, a rising great power. First, the exchange between Turkey and the USA is vital in determining the cordial relations between Turkey and China. Alteration in the American policy vis-à-vis Turkey in the wake of the Arab Spring is relevant to Turkey’s growing relations with China. Second, is the rising anti-Westernism of foreign policy elites as part of the alteration in the strategic culture of Turkish politics, which makes Turkey’s rapprochement with China possible. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these two levels are intertwined and feed each other. Consequently, employing a neoclassical realist approach, the article argues that the middle powers’ stance against a rising hegemon is conditional upon the bilateral relations with the current hegemon and peculiarities of domestic politics.

Egypt’s Middle Power Aspirations Under el-Sisi

2020 ◽  
pp. 91-112
Author(s):  
Nael M. Shama
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International System ◽  
Geographic Location ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Size Population ◽  
System States ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Policy Behavior ◽  
The Way ◽  
Foreign Policy Behavior

In the international system, states whose capabilities are neither too great nor too small are called middle powers. At a general level of analysis, a middle power could be identified using three approaches: its possession of material capabilities, the way it acts and the way its policymakers perceive its foreign policy identity. The first, often called the “position” approach, sketches at length relevant quantifiable factors, such as geographic location, size, population, gross domestic product (GDP), and defense spending. Yet, a state’s ownership of material capabilities does not in itself indicate that it wants to embrace an assertive and active foreign policy. Therefore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s a shift took place, to the “behavioral” approach, which examines the foreign policy behavior of states to identify and understand middle powers. The third approach, the “identity” approach, considers how policymakers think about the foreign policy identity of their states. This approach presents a straightforward method of identification that has a reasonable power of prediction. It informs us of the kind of foreign policy behavior likely to be followed.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers

2020 ◽  
Vol 56 (02) ◽  
pp. 2040008 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN L. JOB
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Asia Pacific ◽  
Middle Power ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The Us ◽  
Middle Powers ◽  
Security Guarantees ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
Hard Place

“Middle powers,” variously defined, have served relevant and significant roles in the post-WWII regional and global orders, facilitated by structural conditions of “long peace” among great powers and proactive leadership by and among creative middle powers. Within the complex Asia-Pacific security order, “middle powers” such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea have had the “space” to engage the non-like minded and advance multilateralism with security guarantees from the US. However, Beijing and Washington today are eliminating this space and its associated choices for middle-power diplomacy by increasingly characterizing their rivalry as a confrontation of “existential threats” between incompatible “civilizations” and securitizing trade and technology. China and the US are each selectively ignoring or purposely eroding key aspects of a rules-based international order. This paper highlights the dilemmas of South Korea, Australia, and Canada, middle powers who have found themselves individually and collectively “stuck” facing contradictory global and regional policy choices.

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