Reply to Michael O’Sullivan

Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein produced a series of manuscripts, whose contents are published in part as Part II of Philosophical Investigations, and as Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology I and II, and Last Writings I and II. For the most part these read like nightstand diaries (of a sort I ...

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-182
Author(s):  
Stefan Majetschak

Abstract“A Misleading Parallel”. Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts. After the Philosophical Investigations, except for details, were largely finished in 1945, Wittgenstein, in his final years, undertook an intensive study of the grammar of our psychological concepts and the philosophical misinterpretations we often assign to them. Anyone looking through these extensive collections of philosophical remarks will probably quite often find it difficult to understand which questions Wittgenstein was addressing with individual remarks or groups of remarks and where the philosophical problems lay for which he was trying to find a solution, whether therapeutic or otherwise appropriate.In the article at hand I do not claim to fathom the full range of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology even in the most general way. Rather it is my intention to shed some light on a diagnosis which he made for the psychology of his time. In part 1 of this paper I would like to provide a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology and to suggest why he did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. In part 2 I’ll attempt to analyze how psychological concepts, according to Wittgenstein, might be construed in order to avoid any type of conceptual confusion.


Abstract Objectively identifying a phenomenon from observation is often difficult. This essay reflects upon this problem from a philosophical perspective by taking the Madden-Julian oscillation (MJO) as an example. I argue that it can be considered as a problem of Gestalt. This concept is introduced by closely following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s two philosophical works, “Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen)” and “Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie)”. Reflections upon the concept of Gestalt suggest why an objective identification of a phenomenon is so difficult. Importantly, the problem should not be reduced to that of a “pattern recognition”. Rather a given phenomenon must be considered as a whole, including a question of a driving mechanism.


Author(s):  
Rachael Wiseman

G.E.M. Anscombe (1919–2001) is recognized as one of the most brilliant philosophers of the twentieth century. She is also well known as the translator and editor of Wittgenstein’s later writings, including his Philosophical Investigations. The work Anscombe undertook between 1956 and 1958, during which time she was concerned with the content and foundations of moral philosophy, has been extremely influential in philosophy of action and ethics. Her 1957 monograph, Intention, seeks to give an account of the psychological concepts she thought necessary for moral philosophy to be possible – intention, desire, reason, motive – and is one of the most significant philosophical works on action. Her much anthologized paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) marks the beginning of the revival of virtue ethics. Anscombe’s work attempts to recover for a contemporary audience the premodern conception of human nature, action and ethics that is found in the writings of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas. Anscombe held that the bifurcation of man into mind and body which arose during the seventeenth century – and replaced the Aristotelian dichotomy of form and matter – had disastrous consequences in the philosophy of psychology and ethics. She subjected concepts along the fault line created by this change – cause, substance, mental event, intention, subject, object, freedom, sensation, self-consciousness – to detailed analysis using the method of grammatical enquiry. This method, learnt from Wittgenstein, involves describing the complex use of language in the context of our human form of life. In Anscombe’s work, this analysis reveals that the picture of the human subject that our Cartesian intellectual inheritance makes intuitive is profoundly mistaken.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-201
Author(s):  
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt

Abstract:In 1953 — two years after Wittgenstein’s death — the Philosophical Investigations as we know them today have been published in a bilingual (German-English) edition by Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees. This publication is divided into two parts – entitled “Part I” and “Part II”. In the revised 4th edition by Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte from 2009 the title “Part II” was deleted and renamed to “Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology — A Fragment”. This article presents some new research results about the genesis of the Philosophical Investigations in general and about “Part II” / “A Fragment” in particular. Furthermore, the so-called “C-Collection” arranged by Wittgenstein himself will be introduced in detail.


Author(s):  
Marie McGinn

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein raises difficulties for the idea that what comes before my mind when I hear, or suddenly understand, a word can impose any normative constraint on what I go on to do. The conclusion his reflections seem to force on us gives rise to a paradox: there is no such thing as going on to apply an expression in a way that accords with what is meant by it. The paradox can be seen as one horn of a dilemma, the other horn of which is Platonism about meaning. It is generally agreed that resolving the paradox means finding a middle course between the two horns of the dilemma. This chapter looks at three attempts to find the middle course: communitarianism, naturalized Platonism, and quietism. It then considers whether Charles Travis offers a way out of the dilemma which avoids the problems of the other views discussed.


Author(s):  
Mark Wilson

Scientists have developed various collections of specialized possibilities to serve as search spaces in which excessive reliance upon speculative forms of lower dimensional modeling or other unwanted details can be skirted. Two primary examples are discussed: the search spaces of machine design and the virtual variations utilized within Lagrangian mechanics. Contemporary appeals to “possible worlds” attempt to imbed these localized possibilities within fully enunciated universes. But not all possibilities are made alike and these reductive schemes should be resisted, on the grounds that they render the utilities of everyday counterfactuals and “possibility” talk incomprehensible. The essay also discusses whether Wittgenstein’s altered views in his Philosophical Investigations reflect similar concerns.


Author(s):  
Alice Crary

In this chapter, Alice Crary argues that a truly ‘realist’ work of literature might be one that, instead of conforming to familiar genre-specifications, attempts by other means to expose readers to the real—that is, to how things really are. Crary highlights Coetzee’s efforts to elicit what she calls ‘transformative thought’: a process that involves both delineating the progress of individual characters in their quests for reality, and, in formal terms, inviting readers to, for instance, imaginatively participate in such quests. With regard to The Childhood of Jesus, she highlights resonances between these features of Coetzee’s writing and Wittgenstein’s procedures in the Philosophical Investigations. In doing so, Crary brings out a respect in which literature and philosophy are complementary discourses: literature can deal in the sort of objective or universal truth that is philosophy’s touchstone, and philosophical discourse can have an essentially literary dimension.


Author(s):  
Paul Humphreys

Paul Humphreys pioneered philosophical investigations into the methodological revolution begun by computer simulations. He has also made important contributions to the contemporary literature on emergence by developing the fusion account of diachronic emergence and its generalization, transformational emergence. He is the discoverer of what has come to be called “Humphreys” Paradox in probability theory and has also made influential contributions to the literature on probabilistic causality and scientific explanation. This collection contains fourteen of his previously published papers on topics ranging from numerical experiments to the status of scientific metaphysics. There is also and a previously unpublished paper on social dynamics. The volume is divided into four parts on, respectively, computational science, emergence, probability, and general philosophy of science. The first part contains the seminal 1990 paper on computer simulations, with three other papers arguing that these new methods cannot be accounted for by traditional methodological approaches. The second part contains the original presentation of fusion emergence and three companion papers arguing for diachronic approaches to the topic, rather than the then dominant synchronic accounts. The third part starts with the paper that introduced the probabilistic paradox followed by a later evaluation of attempts to solve it. A third paper argues, contra Quine, that probability theory is a purely mathematical theory. The final part includes papers on causation, explanation, metaphysics, and an agent-based model that shows how endogenous uncertainty undermines utility maximization. Each of the four parts is followed by a comprehensive postscript with retrospective assessments.


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