Action Rational and Irrational

Author(s):  
Steve Bruce

The model of human action as resting on rational choices between alternative opportunities for maximizing our utility has been borrowed from liberal economics by social scientists keen to refute the conventional explanation of secularization. This chapter considers whether we can treat religion as a commodity that people buy more or less of according to individual rational choice. It argues that religion differs from soap powder both extrinsically (because we cannot readily compare its costs or benefits) and in terms of its social roots: in most societies switching religion threatens social bonds far more than does changing car brands. Finally, it advances an important general principle: that we should be very reluctant to impute to other people motives that we would not impute to ourselves.

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 ◽  
pp. 157-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edna Ullmann-Margalit

I want to focus on some of the limits of decision theory that are of interest to the philosophical concern with practical reasoning and rational choice. These limits should also be of interest to the social-scientists' concern with Rational Choice.Let me start with an analogy. Classical Newtonian physics holds good and valid for middle-sized objects, but not for the phenomena of the very little, micro, sub-atomic level or the very large, macro, outer-space level: different theories, concepts and laws apply there. Similarly, I suggest that we might think of the theory of decisionmaking as relating to middle-sized, ordinary decisions, and to them only. There remain the two extremes, the very ‘small’ decisions on the one hand and the very ‘big’ decisions on the other. These may pose a challenge to the ordinary decision theory and may consequently require a separate treatment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Akhmad Siddiq

Capturing the case of Parade Tauhid in Indonesia, this paper aims to describe embodied relationship between religion (Islam) and politics. As part of social action, Islamic activism provides variety of contention which is practiced in the name of Islam: ideologically, structurally, and purposely. Within his explanation of communicative action theory, Habermas acknowledges what so-called as strategic action which can be defined as every action oriented to success under the aspect of rational choice and assess the efficacy of influencing decisions or positions of rational opponent. In this context, Parade Tauhid is perceived to be conducted for reaching several political and theological purposes based on rational choices, although it is practiced by performing religious event. This paper attempts to describe definition of Islamic activism, explore the event of Parade Tauhid, and analyze the parade using Habermass theory of strategic action.Keywords: Islamic activism, Parade Tauhid, and strategic action.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 71
Author(s):  
Hongren Zhao

<p>Loss aversion is one of the most widely accepted ideas in social science, that is, the loss is greater than the gain. This paper is divided into four parts. First of all, the construction of loss aversion is introduced and discussed. The second part is about the evidence that supports loss aversion. As a result, the current evidence does not support losses, which are generally more influential than gains. The third part is to solve the following questions: despite the evidence to the contrary, why aversion is still generally accepted as a general principle among social scientists, including consumer psychologists. The aim of the analysis is to link beliefs about loss aversion to more general concepts, such as acceptance and adherence to scientific beliefs. In the last part, how to understand the relative impact of loss and income from the context, and how to broaden the new field of investigation in the field of consumer psychology are discussed.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-556
Author(s):  
Ryan H. Murphy

AbstractLeeson (2020) objects to the conflation of economics with applied econometrics, and argues that economics instead should be thought of as the implications of the assumption that individuals maximize, i.e. rational choice theory. But, narrowly defining economics in terms of method demands that we ignore alternative theoretical frameworks which potentially hold explanatory power about topics thought of as economics, all for the sake of a definition. I suggest that applying rational choice theory and applying econometrics became the comparative advantage for economists relative to other social scientists by accidents of history. These comparative advantages largely persist. It is reasonable to call applications of both rational choice theory and econometrics to topics outside conventional economic topics ‘economics’ simply because these applications remain the comparative advantage of economists.


Author(s):  
Javier de Andrés ◽  
Pedro Lorca ◽  
Jose Emilio Labra

This chapter aims to determine the factors influencing the decision of implementing an ERP system in a country where technology awareness and the technological development are not as high as those of some others. Firstly, the authors assume that adopters make rational choices but the authors also introduce an alternative innovation model based on the imitation perspective. A questionnaire was sent to the Spanish listed companies and the ERP; adopting firms were compared with a matched control group. The main results indicate that the only factors stemming from the rational-choice perspective, whose influence is relevant, are firm size and the ROI ratio. Also, the authors found that the introduction of the euro and the Y2K issue had an influence in the ERP decision. The influence of the sectoral adscription was supported partially. These findings evidence a certain influence of the imitation effect. The results of this chapter could eventually be extrapolated to the countries whose national culture is similar to that of Spain.


Behaviour ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 147 (11) ◽  
pp. 1379-1412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorg Massen ◽  
Elisabeth Sterck ◽  
Henk de Vos

AbstractBoth humans and group-living animals associate and behave affiliatively more with some individuals than others. Human friendship has long been acknowledged, and recently scientists studying animal behaviour have started using the term friendship for close social associates in animals. Yet, while biologists describe friends as social tools to enhance fitness, social scientists describe human friendship as unconditional. We investigate whether these different descriptions reflect true differences in human friendship and animal close social associations or are a by-product of different research approaches: namely social scientists focussing on proximate and biologists on ultimate explanations. We first stress the importance of similar measures to determine close social associations, thereafter examine their ultimate benefits and proximate motivations, and discuss the latest findings on the central-neural regulation of social bonds. We conclude that both human friendship and animal close social associations are ultimately beneficial. On the proximate level, motivations for friendship in humans and for close social associations in animals are not necessarily based on benefits and are often unconditional. Moreover, humans share with many animals a similar physiological basis of sociality. Therefore, biologists and social scientist describe the same phenomenon, and the use of the term friendship for animals seems justified.


Reputation ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 28-61
Author(s):  
Gloria Origgi

This chapter is devoted to the theoretical approaches to reputation developed in the different branches of social science that adopt the theory of rational choice. It answers the principal questions of whether reputation can be seen as a rational strategy or as a means to other ends or an end in itself. The chapter explores the various ways in which cultivating one's reputation, given the costs it imposes and the benefits it confers, can be a rational strategy. It examines how several most prominent social scientists approach the questions on reputation. It also treats explanations that synthesize evolutionary theory with rational-choice theory only as “theoretical models” useful for illuminating the conditions for the possibility of the emergence of a social trait, such as reputation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Bialek ◽  
Artur Domurat ◽  
Ethan Andrew Meyers

In this chapter, the way people consider possibilities in decision making are unpacked and explored. It begins by outlining the concept of rational choice – what a decision maker ought to choose. Specifically, it discusses how, for a given decision, a rational choice can (or cannot) be determined. Whether people often make rational choices, and what can be done to shift people toward making rational choices more often. The chapter also portrays decision making in a human light: explaining how defining a rational choice and the decision process are constrained by human biology and behavior. The steps required to make a decision are delineated, and at each step, it is briefly discussed when and how people can diverge from what they ought to be doing or choosing. The chapter closes by discussing how people evaluate decisions after they have made them and the factors that affect the evaluation.


Legal Theory ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-203
Author(s):  
Jules L. Coleman

There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms of desires and beliefs. I intend to perform some action because I believe that it will (is likely to) produce an outcome that I desire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”


Legal Theory ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-210
Author(s):  
Wayne A. Davis

According to Jules Coleman, Rational Choice (RC) Theory holds that human action is both intentional and rational. “The rationality of intentional action is evaluated along the two dimensions corresponding to the two elements of the belief-desire model.” On the belief-dimension, RC Theory assumes that people are “able to draw appropriate inferences from the information (or truths) they possess.”


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document