Subsistence Negating Claims
One of the main defences against allegations of copyright infringement is that no infringement took place because copyright does not subsist in the subject matter at issue. This could be because the subject matter is not a ‘work’ in the copyright sense, or is not protected by copyright because it is not original or fixed in a tangible form. Digital technologies exacerbate this controversy. For instance, does a copy of a public domain image qualify for a new copyright by virtue of its digital processing (using, for instance, a raster graphics editor such as Photoshop)? Does a short sentence such as a tweet attract copyright and can strings of characters such as hashtags and hyperlinks be ‘copyright works’ in their own right? What about works created through artificial intelligence such as a search engine’s automatic translations? Or cases where more than one author contributes facts or pieces of information to a work that is subject to constant modification such as Wikipedia entries? The rationale for excluding subject matter from protection rests on the principle that mere ideas, facts, or commonplace elements should remain free to use, ensuring a robust public domain. In this regard, requesting the negation of copyright subsistence can serve as a defence against allegations for infringement and, in a broader sense, it can also help innovation and creativity through the re-use of subject matter that does not attract copyright protection. This chapter examines the way in which a negation of copyright subsistence can form a defence against allegations of infringement by making specific references to new technological uses. Significant reference is made to the doctrinal interpretation of the concepts ‘work’ and ‘originality’ as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the national courts of EU Member States, and the way in which these doctrines impact on the scope of permissible use.