Reflective Equilibrium, Its Virtues and Its Limits

2019 ◽  
pp. 11-58
Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Epistemological Challenge ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Moral Philosophers

For many moral philosophers, the method of reflective equilibrium is the correct account of how moral inquiry should ideally be conducted; it stands at the very center of moral epistemology. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium embodies important insights, it does not have the kind of centrality for moral epistemology that has been claimed for it. Impeccable application of the method is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral knowledge, and on its most defensible interpretation, the method takes for granted that we already have some moral knowledge (or at least reasonable beliefs). Because the ability of reflective equilibrium reasoning to deliver new moral knowledge generally depends on our already having substantial moral knowledge from other sources, the method is not a promising answer to the traditional epistemological challenge of how we are able to acquire moral knowledge in the first place.

The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics

1988 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Depaul
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Inquiry ◽  
Theory Construction ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
The Past ◽  
Problem Of The Criterion

The resurgence of interest in systematic moral theory over the past ten to fifteen years has brought to the fore debates concerning issues in moral epistemology, in particular, questions regarding the correct method for moral inquiry. Much of the controversy has focused on John Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium. One merit claimed for this coherence method is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. Several of Rawls’ prominent critics have charged that Rawls’ loosely assembled rabble of starting points are not epistemically hefty enough to hoist a moral theory upon their shoulders. Perhaps unwittingly, these critics cling to the two level conception of theory construction, for they both defend general principles as the only appropriate starting points for theory construction and insist upon viewing Rawls as one working within the two tiered conception who opts for more particular judgments as starting points.

Conclusions

2019 ◽  
pp. 192-200
Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Social Aspects ◽  
The Difference

In this chapter, I summarize the main claims that I endorse in the book. The claims are organized thematically, and I provide references to the specific sections and chapters in which I discuss the themes. The main themes are: 1. General Theses and Methodological Assumptions; 2. Reflective Equilibrium and Coherence as a Source of Moral Knowledge; 3. Social Aspects of Moral Knowledge; 4. Experience and Observation as Sources of Moral Knowledge; 5. Knowing the Difference Between Right and Wrong, Ryle’s Puzzle, and Losing Moral Knowledge. My hope is that this chapter will be useful for those who wish to read selectively.

Moral epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Intuitions ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Factual Proposition ◽  
The Way

Epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. So moral epistemology is the study of what would be involved in knowing, or being justified in believing, moral propositions. Some discussions of moral epistemology interpret the category of ‘moral propositions’ broadly, to encompass all propositions that can be expressed with terms like ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘ought’. Other discussions have focused on a narrower category of moral propositions – such as propositions about what rights people have, or about what we owe to each other. According to so-called noncognitivists, one cannot strictly speaking know (or be justified in believing) a moral proposition in the same sense in which one can know (or be justified in believing) an ordinary factual proposition. Other philosophers defend a cognitivist position, according to which it is possible to know or be justified in believing moral propositions in the very same sense as factual propositions. If one does know any moral propositions, they must presumably be true; and the way in which one knows those moral truths must provide access to them. This has led to a debate about whether one could ever know moral truths if a realist conception of these truths – according to which moral truths are not in any interesting sense of our making – were correct. Many philosophers agree that one way of obtaining justified moral beliefs involves seeking ‘reflective equilibrium’ – that is, roughly, considering theories, and adjusting one’s judgments to make them as systematic and coherent as possible. According to some philosophers, however, seeking reflective equilibrium is not enough: justified moral beliefs need to be supported by moral ‘intuitions’. Some hold that such moral intuitions are a priori, akin to our intuitions of the self-evident truths of mathematics. Others hold that these intuitions are closely related to emotions or sentiments; some theorists claim that empirical studies of moral psychology strongly support this ‘sentimentalist’ interpretation. Finally, moral thinking seems different from other areas of thought in two respects. First, there is particularly widespread disagreement about moral questions; and one rarely responds to such moral disagreement by retreating to a state of uncertainty as one does on other questions. Secondly, one rarely defers to other people’s moral judgments in the way in which one defers to experts about ordinary factual questions. These two puzzling features of moral thinking seem to demand explanation – which is a further problem that moral epistemology has to solve.

Traditional Moral Knowledge and Experience of the World

2008 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedict Smith
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
John Mcdowell ◽  
The World ◽  
Moral Demands

AbstractMacIntyre shares with others, such as John McDowell, a broad commitment in moral epistemology to the centrality of tradition and both regard forms of enculturation as conditions of moral knowledge. Although MacIntyre is critical of the thought that moral reasons are available only to those whose experience of the world is conceptually articulated, he is sympathetic to the idea that the development of subjectivity involves the capacity to appreciate external moral demands. This paper critically examines some aspects of MacIntyre’s account of how knowledge is related to tradition, and suggests ways in which the formation of moral subjectivity involves the ability to experience the world.

scholarly journals The Role of the Holy Will

2014 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
John J. Callanan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Practice ◽  
Moral Perfection ◽  
Immoral Action ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractIt is well known that Kant uses the notion of the holy will in the Groundwork so as to contrast it with the finite wills of human beings. It is less clear, however, what function this contrast is supposed to perform. I argue that one role of the holy will is to illustrate transcendental idealism’s account of the relation between moral knowledge and moral practice. The position is one intended to negotiate between ostensibly competing traditions. Kant uses the holy will as a way of endorsing the metaphysical picture of the scholastic tradition’s so-called ‘ethics of freedom’, whereby the ideal of moral perfection is conceived as the perfection of one’s power of freedom to the point where one is constitutively incapable of immoral action. This position is married however with the claim that the holy will’s inaccessibility to human cognition motivates a subject-oriented moral epistemology more usually associated with Enlightenment humanism. I conclude by claiming that the nuanced role for the holy will can be understood as part of Kant’s expansion of the value of religious faith [Glaube] to the domain of practical inquiry in general.

The Hard Problem for Soft Moral Realism

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (10) ◽  
pp. 555-576
Author(s):  
Lei Zhong ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
The Third ◽  
Moral Metaphysics ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
Moral Facts

Several leading moral philosophers have recently proposed a soft version of moral realism, according to which moral facts—though it is reasonable to postulate them—cannot metaphysically explain other facts (Dworkin 2011; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014). However, soft moral realism is faced with what I call the “Hard Problem,” namely, the problem of how this soft version of moral metaphysics could accommodate moral knowledge. This paper reconstructs and examines three approaches to solving the Hard Problem on behalf of the soft realist: the autonomy approach, the intuitionist approach, and the third-factor approach. I then argue that none of them is successful.

Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.

Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles

1969 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 249-262
Author(s):  
J. B. Schneewind
Keyword(s):  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
The Body ◽  
Similar Question ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Moral Philosophers

What is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge? And what must be the nature of moral principles in order for them to carry out this function? A specific set of answers to these questions is widely accepted among moral philosophers – so widely accepted as almost to constitute a sort of orthodoxy. The answers embody a view of the place of principles within the body of morality which crosses the lines between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Though I have put the question in cognitivist terms and shall discuss it in those terms, I think a similar question and a more or less parallel discussion could be given in non-cognitivist terms. Perhaps the time-honoured debate between the two positions can be suspended, at least temporarily, while we examine, not the nature of morality, but its structure.

The Biological Basis and Ideational Superstructure of Morality

2000 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 210-244
Author(s):  
Catherine Wilson
Keyword(s):  
True Belief ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
Biological Basis ◽  
Empirical Means ◽  
Moral Facts

If moral epistemology can be naturalized, there must be genuine moral knowledge, knowledge of what it is morally right for someone or even everyone to do in a particular situation. The naturalist hopes to explain how such knowledge can be acquired by ordinary empirical means, without appealing to a special realm of moral facts separate from the rest of nature, and a special faculty equipped to detect them. Various learning mechanisms for acquiring moral knowledge have been proposed. Most, however, have the following deficiency: What they actually explain is moral acculturation with respect to accepted or author-preferred moral norms, not the acquisition of moral knowledge. Of course, an additional premise to the effect that accepted moral norms or author-preferred norms embody moral truths would deal nicely with this problem, but at the expense of the distinction between opinion and knowledge, or true belief, in which epistemologists are necessarily interested.

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