Locke as a Steadfast Relationist about Time and Space
In the literature on John Locke’s metaphysics of space and time, there is a near-consensus that his views undergo a radical evolution. In the 1670s, Locke holds relationism, but, by the first, 1690 edition of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke has adopted Newtonian absolutism. This chapter argues for an alternative reading, on which Locke’s Essay is explicitly neutral or non-committal with regard to the ontology of space and time, and yet there is reason to believe that the Essay implicitly preserves Locke’s earlier relationism. As well as challenging the existing scholarship, this chapter excavates another form of pre-Leibnizian relationism, and which may be of interest to twenty-first-century relationists; and provides ammunition to anti-Newtonian readings of Locke more generally.