The Obligation to Engage

Author(s):  
Jeremy Fantl

This chapter explores three arguments that you have at least a pro tanto obligation to engage even with those positions you find obviously false. First, as some informal logicians argue, an obligation to engage can be sourced in the nature of the practice of argumentation itself. Second, taking off from Mill’s argument for universal freedom of expression, an obligation to engage can be sourced in its good epistemic consequences. Third, an obligation to engage can be sourced in the rights or agency of the person whose position it is. This might be because, following Rawls and political liberalism generally, it is only legitimate to impose legal restrictions on those whose voices have a chance to influence the democratic process. Or perhaps people have an intrinsic right to be listened to.

Author(s):  
Andrew Clapham

‘Deprivations of life and liberty’ considers the rights to life and liberty, which may be limited through legal restrictions designed to protect a defined legitimate objective. The human rights approach starts from a presumption that we all have rights to liberty, freedom of expression, belief, assembly, association, property, and fair trial. Any restriction on these rights has to be justified as proportionate to the aims pursued by the restriction according to a four-stage schema developed in human rights law. Is the right to life absolute? When is the detention of an individual lawful?


Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer

Whereas the first four chapters of this book have sought to articulate the content and implications of the principle of freedom of expression and have likewise sought to justify the sway of that principle as a moral absolute, the present chapter seeks to rebut some sophisticated arguments that have been propounded in recent decades by Rae Langton and other analytic feminist philosophers (including Ishani Maitra, Mary Kate McGowan, and Jennifer Hornsby) on the topic of pornography. With the aid of J.L. Austin’s speech-act philosophy, Langton has argued that the widespread availability of hard-core pornography in a society constitutes the subordination of women and causes the silencing of women. This chapter, the longest in the book, first refutes Langton’s claims about the constituting of women’s subordination and then contends that her claims about the causation of silencing—even if correct—are otiose as considerations in support of legal restrictions on pornography.


Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer

Freedom of Expression as Self-Restraint rigorously expounds the principle of freedom of expression, and provides a novel justificatory foundation for it. Under that principle, a system of governance in any society can legitimately prohibit various modes of communication but cannot ever legitimately prohibit them qua modes of communication. As the book argues, such a principle is absolute in that it is exceptionless; it imposes general duties that are binding always and everywhere on every system of governance. In addition to injecting a new level of philosophical sophistication into the debates over these matters, the book supplies a novel justification for the principle of freedom of expression. It ties that principle to an ideal of governmental self-restraint, and it shows how that ideal connects to the paramount moral responsibility of every system of governance: the responsibility to bring about the political and social and economic conditions under which every member of a society can be warranted in harboring an ample sense of self-respect. In short, compliance by a system of governance with the principle of freedom of expression is integral to the fulfillment of that paramount responsibility. Kramer lengthily engages with arguments by feminists in favor of legal restrictions on pornography, and with prominent arguments in favor of banning the advocacy of hateful creeds. While accepting that some types or instances of pornography and hatemongering can properly be proscribed, he maintains that most types and instances of those modes of communication are morally protected by the principle of freedom of expression.


Author(s):  
Matthew H. Kramer

Although the principle of freedom of expression is a moral absolute that imposes general duties which bind all systems of governance always and everywhere, it is consistent with various legal or governmental restrictions on modes of expression—provided that those restrictions are directed against the modes of expression not qua modes of expression but instead qua communication-independent misconduct. This chapter explores this aspect of the principle of freedom of expression by cataloguing various types of communicative conduct that can properly be subjected to legal restrictions. Among those types of communicative conduct are perjury, libel, solicitation to commit a crime, true threats, fighting words, incitement (in the sense of the term articulated by the U.S. Supreme court ruling in Brandenburg v Ohio), and fraud. All of these types of communicative conduct, along with several others, can be legally prohibited in accordance with the principle of freedom of expression.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 348-368 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Raffel

The right of the citizen to express his views publicly is a basic feature of the democratic system. However, the freedom of expression, and the closely related freedom of public assembly, do at times conflict with other major social interests. As a result, no society has accepted the theory that these freedoms should be absolute. The democratic process requires a balancing of these freedoms with other important values and public interests. Consequently, each state has placed various limitations on the freedom of expression and public assembly. If a government limits these freedoms too much, it may do irreparable damage to the democratic process. Likewise, the fact that the freedom is enshrined in some constitutional document does not ensure that it will be given any meaningful protection. Whether or not fundamental freedoms are really preserved, is the true test of a democracy.Demonstrations have traditionally been used as a vehicle for expressing dissent. A citizen who is generally satisfied with the social and politicalstatus quowill probably not feel a need to exhibit his satisfaction publicly.


Author(s):  
Roger Magyar

Rawls' justification of political liberalism has been the subject of recent discussion in socio-political philosophy. In Political Liberalism, he has adjusted his original notion of ideal convergence, found in A Theory of Justice, to one of overlapping consensus. I argue that Catholics would find themselves excluded from being good citizens as Rawls defines proper citizenship. This follows from his statements concerning fairness in participating in the democratic process in that it would lead to, what I term, the Catholic paradox. This perspective from within the Catholic point of view indicates that there are similar problems to be found in other traditionally informed conceptions of what the good life is. In this way, the Catholic paradox draws attention to the empirical implausibility that competing conceptions of what the good life is, as understood from within their traditions, will not endorse Rawls' political theory. I then relate how easily it can be inferred that other traditions will face the same paradox and that they will not accept Rawls' political theory as being justified from their perspectives.


Author(s):  
Galyna Moroz

Purpose. The article is aimed at analyzing the general theoretical principles and the essential characteristics of legal restrictions in environmental law; defining category of “environmental legal restrictions”, their content, system and the status of the respective legislation. Methodology. The methodology consists in carrying out a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of environmental legislation and formulating relevant conclusions on this basis. During the research, the following methods of scientific research were used: terminological, systemic and structural, comparative legal, structural and functional. Results. The objectively determined necessity of unconditional adherence to the legally established environmental requirements, prohibitions and restrictions as well as their potential scientifically substantiated enhancement in order to achieve environmentally significant goals oriented towards the priorities of sustainable development is substantiated. Restrictive mechanisms are scattered across statutory and regulatory acts of different legal force and even different branches of law, therefore, the need for their systematization and unification as well as generalization of the experience of their practical implementation in order to establish a comprehensive system of environmental restrictions is discussed. In our opinion, the conceptual basis and general essential characteristics of public environmental requirements and restrictions should be reflected in the future Environmental Code of Ukraine. Scientific novelty. In the course of the research, the author defines restrictions in environmental law as a specific sectoral imperative mechanism for regulating relations in the field of environmental safety, which consists in systematically introducing legislation on imperative provisions of environmental law as well as establishing specific legal regimes and mechanisms for their application and implementation. Practical significance. The main conclusions can be used in law-making and law-enforcing activities, as well as in further theoretical and legal research and in the educational process.


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