Brexit and the English Question

Author(s):  
Stephen Tierney

The chapter examines Brexit and the English question, arguing that Brexit should be understood as a result of the ongoing demotic process in England. As Tierney explains, the UK is an asymmetric system. England alone constitutes population-wise almost four-fifths of the UK. This has influenced devolution: while since the 1990s power has transferred outwards towards the devolved nations, England herself has never received equivalent constitutional autonomy, or recognition, within the UK. Proposals for regional devolution within England, transferring powers to nationwide cities, have also failed. the recent introduction within the House of Common of the principle ‘English Votes for English Laws’—allowing only MPs elected in English constituencies to vote on laws concerning England alone, thus overcoming the well-known West Lothian question—is also an inadequate response to ever-increasing nationalistic views. To address this situation post-Brexit, Tierney concludes that constitutional reform is necessary, entrenching a coherent system of intergovernmental relations.

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Hunt ◽  
Rachel Minto

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) is an assertion of UK nation-state sovereignty. Notwithstanding this state-centrism, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have distinct interests to protect as part of the Brexit negotiations. This article explores how the interests of one regional case, Wales, were accommodated in the pre-negotiation phase, at a domestic level—through intergovernmental structures—and an EU level through paradiplomacy. We explore the structures for sub-state influence, Wales’ engagement with these structures and what has informed its approach. We argue that Wales’ behaviour reflects its positioning as a ‘Good Unionist’ and a ‘Good European’. Despite the weakness of intra-UK structures, Wales has preferred to pursue policy influence at a UK (not an EU) level. In Brussels, regional interests inform the context for Brexit. Here, Wales has focused on awareness-raising, highlighting that the UK Government does not command the ‘monopoly on perspectives’ towards Brexit in the United Kingdom.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-322
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bradbury

The book has provided four sets of conclusions. First, the examination of territorial strain, the nature of territorial problems and the characteristics of background conditions gives us a lens through which to evaluate critically the social, economic and cultural context to territorial politics. The second set of conclusions relate to the approaches used in the movements for territorial constitutional change in exploiting the support they did have and overcoming those weaknesses that still existed. As part of the reality of how territorial change happens it is to be expected that in the particular case of the UK that all territorial movements emerged out of party political contestation and self-interested party choices, and then had to define approaches heavily determined by party constraints. The third set of conclusions relate to UK central government. The UK centre was also in part defined by the pursuit of party power, and the key party at the UK level ready to address territorial constitutional reform — the Labour Party — faced large challenges and anxieties after 18 years out of office when they prepared for the 1997 general election. The final set of conclusions relate to the importance of constitutional policy processes to the resolution of conflicts in centre–periphery relations. Approaches to the development of devolution policy were followed which made the best efforts to achieve territorial balance under the constraints that they faced. The policy processes in Scotland and Northern Ireland achieved sometimes high, but at least sufficient, levels of inclusiveness in their mechanisms of negotiation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 124-142
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter looks at the separation of powers. The separation of powers is a doctrine requiring that executive, legislative, and judicial powers within a state should be clearly divided and allocated to separate institutions; the aim is to prevent the concentration of power in any one branch and reduce the potential for arbitrary or oppressive exercise of power. Although the degree of separation between the three branches varies between states, codified constitutions will regulate those spheres of power by allocating specific roles and functions to each branch and will allow checks or controls to operate between them to ensure accountability. The separation of powers in the UK is weakest between the legislative and executive, and strongest and most distinct between the judiciary and the other two branches. Indeed, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 has brought stronger separation between the judiciary and the executive, making the judiciary more autonomous.


10.1068/c38m ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kay ◽  
Gillian Bristow ◽  
Mark McGovern ◽  
David Pickernell

Current arguments in Australia concerning horizontal fiscal equalisation may help inform the debate in the United Kingdom concerning possible changes to the Barnett formula and the establishment of financial relations with any regional governments in England. Although Australia is a long-established federation, with mature institutions for managing the financial aspects of intergovernmental relations, the most populous states are now pushing for a per-capita-based system to replace the existing formula—based on needs and costs—overseen by the independent Commonwealth Grants Commission. This has important implications for the United Kingdom, where the Barnett formula—a per capita system for deciding annual changes in the funding for the devolved administrations—has been increasingly challenged. In particular, the Barnett system has been vulnerable to nontransparent ‘formula-bypass’ agreements. We argue that the status quo in the United Kingdom appears secure as long as England remains a single entity and the UK Treasury sees the financial implications of larger per capita expenditure in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland as relatively small. However, we speculate that regionalisation of government in England would be likely to increase the pressure: to abandon the Barnett system; to look more systematically at need and cost, rather than population, as criteria for allocating funds between governments; and to move towards an Australian-type system. However, the recent experience of Australia also shows that larger states prefer a per-capita-based system allied to more political, less transparent, arrangements to deal with ‘special circumstances’. It may be that a Barnett-type formula would suit the new ‘dominant states’ in a fully federalised United Kingdom which would, ironically, create an alliance of interests between Scotland and London.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 411-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kenealy

In his recent book The Lockerbie Bombing: The Search for Justice, Kenny MacAskill recounts his decision to release Abdelbaset Al-Megrahi, the only man convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. Eight years have passed since Al-Megrahi's release on compassionate grounds. In the book MacAskill ranges far beyond the events in which he was closely involved, recounting the bombing itself, the subsequent investigation, trial and appeals in an effort to offer a comprehensive account of the Lockerbie bombing. In this article I review the book and return to some of the key issues raised by MacAskill's decision and the broader context in which it was made. I argue that the book sheds little new light on Lockerbie and that it falls short in precisely the areas where MacAskill might have the most insight to offer. It is a rather bloodless and legalistic account that renders the complexities and the shades of grey of international politics in black and white. The case will nevertheless remain fascinating to scholars of intergovernmental relations in the UK, of para-diplomacy, and of international politics.


2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT L. GREER

AbstractThe relationship between political decentralisation and the welfare state is much studied, and large-scale studies have repeatedly found that decentralised states have less generous welfare states. How do we fit that with other studies that emphasise the potential of decentralisation to raise welfare standards? This article argues that decentralisation, as a variable, is too broad and it is more efficient to focus on the structure of veto players in the central state, intergovernmental relations and intergovernmental finance. Those are the actual mechanisms that connect decentralisation to the welfare states, and they can all vary independently of decentralisation. It uses recent changes in the United States and United Kingdom as examples. The fragmentation and average weakness of the US welfare state is mostly due to a federal government riddled with internal veto points that permits considerable interstate variation and low overall average provision, while tight central control on finances in the UK means that most variation is in the organisation, rather than levels, of social services.


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