scholarly journals Constitutional Reform in the UK: A Note on the Legacy of the Kilbrandon Commission

2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-354
Author(s):  
Gary Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Stephen Tierney

The chapter examines Brexit and the English question, arguing that Brexit should be understood as a result of the ongoing demotic process in England. As Tierney explains, the UK is an asymmetric system. England alone constitutes population-wise almost four-fifths of the UK. This has influenced devolution: while since the 1990s power has transferred outwards towards the devolved nations, England herself has never received equivalent constitutional autonomy, or recognition, within the UK. Proposals for regional devolution within England, transferring powers to nationwide cities, have also failed. the recent introduction within the House of Common of the principle ‘English Votes for English Laws’—allowing only MPs elected in English constituencies to vote on laws concerning England alone, thus overcoming the well-known West Lothian question—is also an inadequate response to ever-increasing nationalistic views. To address this situation post-Brexit, Tierney concludes that constitutional reform is necessary, entrenching a coherent system of intergovernmental relations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-322
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bradbury

The book has provided four sets of conclusions. First, the examination of territorial strain, the nature of territorial problems and the characteristics of background conditions gives us a lens through which to evaluate critically the social, economic and cultural context to territorial politics. The second set of conclusions relate to the approaches used in the movements for territorial constitutional change in exploiting the support they did have and overcoming those weaknesses that still existed. As part of the reality of how territorial change happens it is to be expected that in the particular case of the UK that all territorial movements emerged out of party political contestation and self-interested party choices, and then had to define approaches heavily determined by party constraints. The third set of conclusions relate to UK central government. The UK centre was also in part defined by the pursuit of party power, and the key party at the UK level ready to address territorial constitutional reform — the Labour Party — faced large challenges and anxieties after 18 years out of office when they prepared for the 1997 general election. The final set of conclusions relate to the importance of constitutional policy processes to the resolution of conflicts in centre–periphery relations. Approaches to the development of devolution policy were followed which made the best efforts to achieve territorial balance under the constraints that they faced. The policy processes in Scotland and Northern Ireland achieved sometimes high, but at least sufficient, levels of inclusiveness in their mechanisms of negotiation.


2019 ◽  
pp. 124-142
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter looks at the separation of powers. The separation of powers is a doctrine requiring that executive, legislative, and judicial powers within a state should be clearly divided and allocated to separate institutions; the aim is to prevent the concentration of power in any one branch and reduce the potential for arbitrary or oppressive exercise of power. Although the degree of separation between the three branches varies between states, codified constitutions will regulate those spheres of power by allocating specific roles and functions to each branch and will allow checks or controls to operate between them to ensure accountability. The separation of powers in the UK is weakest between the legislative and executive, and strongest and most distinct between the judiciary and the other two branches. Indeed, the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 has brought stronger separation between the judiciary and the executive, making the judiciary more autonomous.


Legal Studies ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Ian Cram

How easy ought it to be to enact constitutional amendment? In the absence of constitutionally prescribed procedures, fundamental reforms in the UK can often appear hurried, under-consultative and controlled by transient political majorities. In the recent referendum on Scottish independence, the NO campaign's promise of additional powers to Holyrood in the face of a possible ‘Yes’ vote appears to fit this pattern (even if, for reasons of political sensitivity, it was not driven directly by members of the Coalition government). A recent sample of concluded constitutional reforms, including the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, have drawn criticism from within Westminster on the grounds of defective process. Specific options to improve pre-parliamentary and parliamentary stages of constitutional reform have been proposed with a view to attaining principled procedures of constitutional reform removed from executive control that signal attachment to process values such as wide and effective consultation, deliberation outside and inside Parliament, and informed scrutiny. The foregoing prescriptions for remedying defective processes may, however, be said in the ultimate analysis to retain a normative preference for a more formal, elite-managed vision of constitutional change that is premised upon a limited conception of the citizens' ‘informed consent’. In any case, in purely descriptive terms, top-down managed change does not capture the totality of patterns of past constitutional reform in the UK. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, radical grassroots campaigns for the extension of the franchise resulted ultimately in universal adult suffrage. More recently, the Scotland Act 1998 can be seen as the culmination of a civic society–led, deliberative engagement with ordinary voters over decades that offered an alternative vision of ‘bottom-up’ constitutional reform to that seen in more formal, elite-led processes of constitutional reform. The inclusive and participatory nature of the campaign for Scottish devolution marked out a radically different model of constitutional reform to that which has typified Westminster-style amendment and which is still largely directed by political elites. In such circumstances as prevail currently at Westminster, it is difficult to give much credence to claims that the outcomes of constitutional reform processes enjoy the ‘informed consent’ of the people.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
SILVIA SUTEU

Abstract:This article looks at the continued calls for popular participation in UK constitution-making following the 2014 Scottish independence and 2016 Brexit referendums. In particular, it discusses the prospect of a UK constitutional convention being set up to deliberate upon and make recommendations concerning constitutional reform. The article proceeds by first mapping the arguments in favour of setting up such a body in a country with little but growing experience with direct democracy. It then analyses three difficulties surrounding a UK constitutional convention: deciding on a manageable mandate, identifying the political community or communities it is to represent and the method for selecting its membership, and defining the place of such a convention within the UK’s broader constitution-making mechanisms. The article highlights fundamental unknowns in need of clarification before such an instrument could be used while at the same time admitting the limitations of a constitutional convention as a panacea for all of the UK’s constitutional woes. In exploring these questions, the article shows how constitutional reform debates in the UK are no less complex than were those surrounding Scottish independence and have been further compounded by Brexit.


Author(s):  
Federico de Montalvo Jääskeläinen

In 2011 the British Parliament approved, within the context of the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, what can be seen as the most significant constitutional reform that the British government has undertaken in recent decades. This reform, called Fixed-term Parliament Act, 2011, restricts what was one of the main rights of the Prime Minister; dissolving the chamber in order to be able to call early elections. The reform is not motivated by an attempt to overcome the political crisis, similar to other European countries, that the UK is experiencing, but rather by the new demands that seem to derive from the current coalition government. It is certainly a reform that merits analysis by other nations, such as our own, in which fragmented parliaments are growing ever more likely, lacking strong majorities and posing problems that go beyond politics to the heart of the system.En 2011 el Parlamento británico aprobó, al amparo del acuerdo de coalición entre los conservadores y liberal-demócratas, la que puede considerarse la principal reforma constitucional a la que se ha visto sometido la forma de gobierno británica en las últimas décadas. Dicha reforma, bajo el nombre de Fixed-term Parliaments Act, 2011, supuso la supresión de una de las principales facultades del Primer Ministro, la de disolver la Cámara y convocar anticipadamente elecciones generales. Dicha reforma responde no tanto a la pretensión de superar la crisis política que vive el Reino Unido, similar a la que viven otros Estados europeos, sino a las nuevas exigencias que parecen derivarse del actual gobierno de coalición. En todo caso, se trata ciertamente de una reforma que merece la pena ser analizada desde otros Estados, como el nuestro, en los que se presagia un nuevo Parlamento muy fragmentado, sin mayorías de gobierno, con las consecuencias no sólo políticas que ello va seguramente a conllevar.


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter discusses the origins and meaning of the separation of powers doctrine. It highlights the contribution of French nobleman and parliamentary magistrate Charles Louis de Secondat, otherwise known as Baron de Montesquieu, to political theory: L’Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws). The chapter also addresses the question of whether there is a separation of powers in the UK constitution. Differences of opinion between academics and judges as to the importance of the separation of powers doctrine to an understanding of the UK constitution are reviewed. Examples of overlap between the three functions of government are presented, and the key reforms made by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 are discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 526-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham Gee ◽  
Grégoire Webber

Abstract What is a conservative disposition? And can it supply any insights into the UK’s changing constitution? We offer answers to these questions by identifying core elements of a conservative disposition and exploring how it offers contingent guidance to public lawyers striving to make sense of a changing constitution. Our goal is to show why a conservative disposition remains relevant to public lawyers, in large measure because, rather than despite, the constitution is changing. We examine the disposition’s relationship with change and review how a conservative disposition offers open-ended guidance on when to pursue change, how to pursue it, how much of it to pursue at any point in time and what reasons should motivate it. After evaluating arguments against the relevance of a conservative disposition to constitutional thought, we relate conservative arguments to two important proposals for constitutional reform: the withdrawal of the UK from the European Convention on Human Rights and a written constitution.


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