A Risk Theory of Exploitation

Author(s):  
Horacio Spector

This chapter offer a risk theory of labour exploitation that is based on contemporary economic and financial theory. In advanced economies capitalists have very sophisticated ways of spreading their risk through portfolios of investments in stocks, bonds, and other instruments. This diversification of capital allows them to reduce or control natural aversion to risk to large losses. Now, because workers only own their workforce, they must contemplate unemployment as a threatening alternative to any employment offer they may consider. Therefore, they must make high-stakes decisions under conditions of risk aversion. Since they make risk-averse decisions, they are led to accept wages and conditions that they would reject if they could choose in a risk-neutral way. The chapter suggests that labour law is a set of institutions that tends to rectify the situation of risk aversion to which labourers are led by a productive and legal system that, simultaneously, allows capitalists to diversify their risks.

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 655-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mahdi HOSSEINIAN ◽  
David G. CARMICHAEL

Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribu­tion should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a con­sortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Hupman

Classification algorithms predict the class membership of an unknown record. Methods such as logistic regression or the naïve Bayes algorithm produce a score related to the likelihood that a record belongs to a particular class. A cutoff threshold is then defined to delineate the prediction of one class over another. This paper derives analytic results for the selection of an optimal cutoff threshold for a classification algorithm that is used to inform a two-action decision in the cases of risk aversion and risk neutrality. The results provide insight to how the optimal cutoff thresholds relate to the associated costs and the sensitivity and specificity of the algorithm for both the risk neutral and risk averse decision makers. The optimal risk averse threshold is not reliably above or below the optimal risk neutral threshold, but the relation depends on the parameters of a particular application. The results further show the risk averse optimal threshold is insensitive to the size of the data set or the magnitude of the costs, but instead is sensitive to the proportion of positive records in the data and the ratio of costs. Numeric examples and sensitivity analysis derive further insight. Results show the percent value gap from a misspecified risk attitude increases as the specificity of the classification algorithm decreases.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
King Li ◽  
Kang Rong

Arad and Rubinstein (2012, AER) proposed the 11–20 money request game as an alternative to the P beauty contest game for measuring the depth of thinking. In this paper, we show theoretically that in the Nash equilibrium of the 11–20 game players are more likely to choose high numbers if they are risk-averse rather than risk neutral. Hence, the depth of thinking measured in the 11–20 game is biased by risk aversion. Based on a lab experiment, we confirm this hypothesis empirically.


Author(s):  
Timo Heinrich ◽  
Jason Shachat

AbstractThis study experimentally evaluates the risk preferences of children and adolescents living in an urban Chinese environment. We use a simple binary choice task that tests risk aversion, as well as prudence. This is the first test for prudence in children and adolescents. Our results reveal that subjects from grades 5 to 11 (10 to 17 years) make mostly risk-averse and prudent choices. The choices of 3rd graders (8 to 9 years) do not differ statistically from risk neutral benchmarks, but at the same time they make mostly prudent choices. We also find evidence for a transmission of risk preferences. There is positive correlation between all children’s and their parents’ tendency to make risk-averse choices. There is also positive correlation between girls’ and their parents’ tendency to make prudent choices.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kangoh Lee

AbstractOne of the most important propositions in the economics of liability rules states that strict liability and the negligence rule are equivalent and first-best efficient if the standard of due care is set according to the Hand rule. This proposition hinges on the assumption that individuals are risk neutral. This paper considers this proposition with risk-averse individuals, and demonstrates that the proposition does not extend. In particular, the two liability rules are not equivalent, and the analysis compares the two liability rules in terms of utilitarian social welfare.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850035
Author(s):  
George M. Mukupa ◽  
Elias R. Offen

In this paper, we study the risk-neutral investor’s equilibrium equity premium in a semi-martingale market with arbitrary, normal, binomial and gamma jumps. We simulate graphs for discrete distribution of jump amplitudes in order to study the parameter effect. The equity premium for this investor remains the same regardless of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] variations in the linear utility function. In fact, there is no optimal consumption for [Formula: see text]. For normal jumps, our results are consistent with the risk-averse investor’s power utility effect on the equity premium. However, the binomial and gamma amplitudes show significant variations between risk neutrality and risk aversion.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 314-329
Author(s):  
Johan Burgaard ◽  
Mogens Steffensen

Risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are separated via the celebrated recursive utility building on certainty equivalents of indirect utility. Based on an alternative separation method, we formulate a questionnaire for simultaneous and consistent estimation of risk aversion, subjective discount rate, and EIS. From a representative group of 1,153 respondents, we estimate parameters for these preferences and their variability within the population. Risk aversion and the subjective discount rate are found to be in the orders of 2 and 0, respectively, not diverging far away from results from other studies. Our estimate of EIS in the order of 10 is larger than often reported. Background variables like age and income have little predictive power for the three estimates. Only gender has a significant influence on risk aversion in the usually perceived direction that females are more risk-averse than males. Using individual estimates of preference parameters, we find covariance between preferences toward risk and EIS. We present the background reasoning on objectives, the questionnaire, a statistical analysis of the results, and economic interpretations of these, including relations to the literature.


2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Utkur Djanibekov ◽  
Grace B. Villamor

AbstractThis paper investigates the effectiveness of different market-based instruments (MBIs), such as eco-certification premiums, carbon payments, Pigovian taxes and their combination, to address the conversion of agroforests to monoculture systems and subsequent effects on incomes of risk-averse farmers under income uncertainty in Indonesia. For these, the authors develop a farm-level dynamic mean-variance model combined with a real options approach. Findings show that the conservation of agroforest is responsive to the risk-aversion level of farmers: the greater the level of risk aversion, the greater is the conserved area of agroforest. However, for all risk-averse farmers, additional incentives in the form of MBIs are still needed to prevent conversion of agroforest over the years, and only the combination of MBIs can achieve this target. Implementing fixed MBIs also contributes to stabilizing farmers’ incomes and reducing income risks. Consequently, the combined MBIs increase incomes and reduce income inequality between hardly and extremely risk-averse farmers.


2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 831-868 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruxanda Berlinschi ◽  
Ani Harutyunyan

This research investigates migrant self-selection on values, beliefs, and attitudes using data from Eastern European and former Soviet countries. We find that individuals who intend to emigrate are more politically active, more critical of governance and institutions, more tolerant toward other cultures, less tolerant of cheating, more optimistic, and less risk averse. With the exception of risk aversion, all selection patterns are heterogeneous across regions of origin. On the other hand, no self-selection pattern is detected on education, willingness to pay for public goods, and economic liberalism. These findings provide new insights into the determinants of international migration and reveal some of its less known consequences, such as a possible reduction of domestic pressure for political improvements in post-Soviet states due to politically active citizens’ higher propensity to emigrate.


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