scholarly journals Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion

Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
King Li ◽  
Kang Rong
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Lab Experiment ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Beauty Contest ◽  
Game Players

Arad and Rubinstein (2012, AER) proposed the 11–20 money request game as an alternative to the P beauty contest game for measuring the depth of thinking. In this paper, we show theoretically that in the Nash equilibrium of the 11–20 game players are more likely to choose high numbers if they are risk-averse rather than risk neutral. Hence, the depth of thinking measured in the 11–20 game is biased by risk aversion. Based on a lab experiment, we confirm this hypothesis empirically.

scholarly journals OPTIMAL OUTCOME SHARING WITH A CONSORTIUM OF CONTRACTORS

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 655-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mahdi HOSSEINIAN ◽  
David G. CARMICHAEL
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Outcome ◽  
Original Solution ◽  
Project Outcome ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Current Practices

Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribu­tion should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a con­sortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.

Cutoff Threshold Decisions for Classification Algorithms with Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Hupman
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Classification Algorithm ◽  
Classification Algorithms ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Optimal Cutoff ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Bayes Algorithm ◽  
Cutoff Threshold

Classification algorithms predict the class membership of an unknown record. Methods such as logistic regression or the naïve Bayes algorithm produce a score related to the likelihood that a record belongs to a particular class. A cutoff threshold is then defined to delineate the prediction of one class over another. This paper derives analytic results for the selection of an optimal cutoff threshold for a classification algorithm that is used to inform a two-action decision in the cases of risk aversion and risk neutrality. The results provide insight to how the optimal cutoff thresholds relate to the associated costs and the sensitivity and specificity of the algorithm for both the risk neutral and risk averse decision makers. The optimal risk averse threshold is not reliably above or below the optimal risk neutral threshold, but the relation depends on the parameters of a particular application. The results further show the risk averse optimal threshold is insensitive to the size of the data set or the magnitude of the costs, but instead is sensitive to the proportion of positive records in the data and the ratio of costs. Numeric examples and sensitivity analysis derive further insight. Results show the percent value gap from a misspecified risk attitude increases as the specificity of the classification algorithm decreases.

The Determinants of Risk Aversion: The Role of Intergenerational Transmission

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria De Paola
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Intergenerational Transmission ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
The Public ◽  
Measures Of Risk ◽  
High Ability Students ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractThis article studies the relationship between risk attitudes and individual characteristics focusing on the intergenerational transmission of risk preferences. We use a dataset of a sample of Italyn students which allows us to build different measures of risk aversion based, respectively, on a survey asking students about their willingness to invest in a risky asset and about their preferences for job security and on the results of an entry test using explicit penalty points in the case of incorrect answers. In line with the findings highlighted by the existing literature, we find that women are more risk averse than men, more patient subjects are more risk averse, while high-ability students are less risk averse. As far as intergenerational transmission of preferences is concerned, it emerges that students whose fathers are entrepreneurs have a higher propensity to take risks, while students whose fathers are employed in the public sector are more risk averse. Only fathers matter with regards to their children’s risk attitudes. These results are robust to different measures of risk aversion and to different specifications of our model.

scholarly journals Why Buy Accident Forgiveness Policies? An Experiment

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fan Liu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Time Preferences ◽  
Purchase Decision ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Purchase Decisions ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Product Price ◽  
High Degree

Risk and time preferences influence the insurance purchase decisions under uncertainty. Accident forgiveness, often considered as “premium insurance,” protects policyholders against a premium increase in the next period if an at-fault accident occurs. In this paper, by conducting a unique experiment in the controlled laboratory conditions, we examine the role of risk and time preferences in accident forgiveness purchase decisions. We find that individual discount rates and product price significantly affect premium insurance purchase decision. Interestingly, we also find evidence that less risk averse policyholders in general behave more like risk neutral when making insurance decision. Risk attitudes affect insurance decision-making only among those who have relatively high degree of risk aversion.

scholarly journals The General Economic Premium Principle

1984 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Bühlmann
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Exponential Utility ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Existence Of Equilibrium ◽  
Easy Proof ◽  
Quantitative Results

AbstractWe give an extension of the Economic Premium Principle treated in Astin Bulletin, Volume 11 where only exponential utility functions were admitted. The case of arbitrary risk averse utility functions leads to similar quantitative results. The role of risk aversion in the treatment is essential. It also permits an easy proof for the existence of equilibrium.

scholarly journals The development of risk aversion and prudence in Chinese children and adolescents

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Heinrich ◽  
Jason Shachat
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Children And Adolescents ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Choice Task ◽  
Chinese Children ◽  
Binary Choice ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Chinese Children And Adolescents

AbstractThis study experimentally evaluates the risk preferences of children and adolescents living in an urban Chinese environment. We use a simple binary choice task that tests risk aversion, as well as prudence. This is the first test for prudence in children and adolescents. Our results reveal that subjects from grades 5 to 11 (10 to 17 years) make mostly risk-averse and prudent choices. The choices of 3rd graders (8 to 9 years) do not differ statistically from risk neutral benchmarks, but at the same time they make mostly prudent choices. We also find evidence for a transmission of risk preferences. There is positive correlation between all children’s and their parents’ tendency to make risk-averse choices. There is also positive correlation between girls’ and their parents’ tendency to make prudent choices.

Risk Aversion, the Hand Rule, and Comparison between Strict Liability and the Negligence Rule

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kangoh Lee
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Strict Liability ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Liability Rules ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Negligence Rule

AbstractOne of the most important propositions in the economics of liability rules states that strict liability and the negligence rule are equivalent and first-best efficient if the standard of due care is set according to the Hand rule. This proposition hinges on the assumption that individuals are risk neutral. This paper considers this proposition with risk-averse individuals, and demonstrates that the proposition does not extend. In particular, the two liability rules are not equivalent, and the analysis compares the two liability rules in terms of utilitarian social welfare.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Game Model and Contract Design: Risk Neutrality vs. Risk Aversion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianhu Cai ◽  
Huazhen Lin ◽  
Xiaoqing Hu ◽  
Minyan Ping
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Risk Neutral

Abstract This paper incorporates the players’ risk attitudes into a green supply chain (GSC) consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier conducts production and determines the green level and wholesale price as a game leader, the retailer sells green products to consumers and determines the retail price as a follower. Equilibrium solutions are derived, and the influence of risk aversion on the GSC is examined. Our results show that, for the centralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the green level and the retail price; while for the decentralized GSC, risk aversion lowers the wholesale price and the retail price, but it may induce the supplier to increase the green level given a large risk tolerance of the supplier. Meanwhile, the risk-averse decentralized GSC may obtain more expected profit than the risk-neutral decentralized GSC. Furthermore, this paper designs a revenue-and-cost-sharing joint contract to coordinate the risk-neutral GSC, and such a contract can improve the risk-averse GSC under specific conditions.

A Risk Theory of Exploitation

2018 ◽  
pp. 205-226
Author(s):  
Horacio Spector
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Risk Theory ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Labour Exploitation ◽  
Advanced Economies ◽  
Risk Neutral

This chapter offer a risk theory of labour exploitation that is based on contemporary economic and financial theory. In advanced economies capitalists have very sophisticated ways of spreading their risk through portfolios of investments in stocks, bonds, and other instruments. This diversification of capital allows them to reduce or control natural aversion to risk to large losses. Now, because workers only own their workforce, they must contemplate unemployment as a threatening alternative to any employment offer they may consider. Therefore, they must make high-stakes decisions under conditions of risk aversion. Since they make risk-averse decisions, they are led to accept wages and conditions that they would reject if they could choose in a risk-neutral way. The chapter suggests that labour law is a set of institutions that tends to rectify the situation of risk aversion to which labourers are led by a productive and legal system that, simultaneously, allows capitalists to diversify their risks.

The semi-martingale equilibrium equity premium for risk-neutral investors

2018 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850035
Author(s):  
George M. Mukupa ◽  
Elias R. Offen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Equity Premium ◽  
Discrete Distribution ◽  
Optimal Consumption ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Power Utility ◽  
Risk Neutral ◽  
Linear Utility ◽  
Linear Utility Function

In this paper, we study the risk-neutral investor’s equilibrium equity premium in a semi-martingale market with arbitrary, normal, binomial and gamma jumps. We simulate graphs for discrete distribution of jump amplitudes in order to study the parameter effect. The equity premium for this investor remains the same regardless of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] variations in the linear utility function. In fact, there is no optimal consumption for [Formula: see text]. For normal jumps, our results are consistent with the risk-averse investor’s power utility effect on the equity premium. However, the binomial and gamma amplitudes show significant variations between risk neutrality and risk aversion.

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