The semi-martingale equilibrium equity premium for risk-neutral investors

2018 ◽  
Vol 05 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850035
Author(s):  
George M. Mukupa ◽  
Elias R. Offen

In this paper, we study the risk-neutral investor’s equilibrium equity premium in a semi-martingale market with arbitrary, normal, binomial and gamma jumps. We simulate graphs for discrete distribution of jump amplitudes in order to study the parameter effect. The equity premium for this investor remains the same regardless of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] variations in the linear utility function. In fact, there is no optimal consumption for [Formula: see text]. For normal jumps, our results are consistent with the risk-averse investor’s power utility effect on the equity premium. However, the binomial and gamma amplitudes show significant variations between risk neutrality and risk aversion.

Author(s):  
Ron Lavi ◽  
Omer Shiran-Shvarzbard

We study a competition among two contests, where each contest designer aims to attract as much effort as possible. Such a competition exists in reality, e.g., in crowd-sourcing websites. Our results are phrased in terms of the ``relative prize power'' of a contest, which is the ratio of the total prize offered by this contest designer relative to the sum of total prizes of the two contests. When contestants have a quasi-linear utility function that captures both a risk-aversion effect and a cost of effort, we show that a simple contest attracts a total effort which approaches the relative prize power of the contest designer assuming a large number of contestants. This holds regardless of the contest policy of the opponent, hence providing a ``safety level'' which is a robust notion similar in spirit to the max-min solution concept.


2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 655-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Mahdi HOSSEINIAN ◽  
David G. CARMICHAEL

Where a consortium of contractors is involved, there exist no guidelines in the literature on what the outcome sharing arrangement should be. The paper addresses this shortfall. It derives the optimal outcome sharing arrangement for risk-neutral and risk-averse contractors within the consortium, and between the consortium and a risk-neutral owner. Practitioners were engaged in a designed exercise in order to validate the paper’s propositions. The paper demonstrates that, at the optimum: the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same risk-attitude should reflect the levels of their contributions; the proportion of outcome sharing among contractors with the same level of contribu­tion should be lower for contractors with higher levels of risk aversion; a consortium of risk-neutral contractors should receive or bear any favourable or adverse project outcome respectively; and the proportion of outcome sharing to a con­sortium of risk-averse contractors should reduce, and the fixed component of the consortium fee should increase, when the contractors become more risk-averse or the level of the project outcome uncertainty increases. The paper proposes an original solution to the optimal sharing problem in contracts with a consortium of contractors, thereby contributing to current practices in contracts management.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea C. Hupman

Classification algorithms predict the class membership of an unknown record. Methods such as logistic regression or the naïve Bayes algorithm produce a score related to the likelihood that a record belongs to a particular class. A cutoff threshold is then defined to delineate the prediction of one class over another. This paper derives analytic results for the selection of an optimal cutoff threshold for a classification algorithm that is used to inform a two-action decision in the cases of risk aversion and risk neutrality. The results provide insight to how the optimal cutoff thresholds relate to the associated costs and the sensitivity and specificity of the algorithm for both the risk neutral and risk averse decision makers. The optimal risk averse threshold is not reliably above or below the optimal risk neutral threshold, but the relation depends on the parameters of a particular application. The results further show the risk averse optimal threshold is insensitive to the size of the data set or the magnitude of the costs, but instead is sensitive to the proportion of positive records in the data and the ratio of costs. Numeric examples and sensitivity analysis derive further insight. Results show the percent value gap from a misspecified risk attitude increases as the specificity of the classification algorithm decreases.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 2967-2986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Matte ◽  
Marie-Amélie Boucher ◽  
Vincent Boucher ◽  
Thomas-Charles Fortier Filion

Abstract. A large effort has been made over the past 10 years to promote the operational use of probabilistic or ensemble streamflow forecasts. Numerous studies have shown that ensemble forecasts are of higher quality than deterministic ones. Many studies also conclude that decisions based on ensemble rather than deterministic forecasts lead to better decisions in the context of flood mitigation. Hence, it is believed that ensemble forecasts possess a greater economic and social value for both decision makers and the general population. However, the vast majority of, if not all, existing hydro-economic studies rely on a cost–loss ratio framework that assumes a risk-neutral decision maker. To overcome this important flaw, this study borrows from economics and evaluates the economic value of early warning flood systems using the well-known Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function, which explicitly accounts for the level of risk aversion of the decision maker. This new framework allows for the full exploitation of the information related to a forecasts' uncertainty, making it especially suited for the economic assessment of ensemble or probabilistic forecasts. Rather than comparing deterministic and ensemble forecasts, this study focuses on comparing different types of ensemble forecasts. There are multiple ways of assessing and representing forecast uncertainty. Consequently, there exist many different means of building an ensemble forecasting system for future streamflow. One such possibility is to dress deterministic forecasts using the statistics of past error forecasts. Such dressing methods are popular among operational agencies because of their simplicity and intuitiveness. Another approach is the use of ensemble meteorological forecasts for precipitation and temperature, which are then provided as inputs to one or many hydrological model(s). In this study, three concurrent ensemble streamflow forecasting systems are compared: simple statistically dressed deterministic forecasts, forecasts based on meteorological ensembles, and a variant of the latter that also includes an estimation of state variable uncertainty. This comparison takes place for the Montmorency River, a small flood-prone watershed in southern central Quebec, Canada. The assessment of forecasts is performed for lead times of 1 to 5 days, both in terms of forecasts' quality (relative to the corresponding record of observations) and in terms of economic value, using the new proposed framework based on the CARA utility function. It is found that the economic value of a forecast for a risk-averse decision maker is closely linked to the forecast reliability in predicting the upper tail of the streamflow distribution. Hence, post-processing forecasts to avoid over-forecasting could help improve both the quality and the value of forecasts.


Author(s):  
Ningning Wang ◽  
Jibao Gu ◽  
Qinglong Gou ◽  
Jinfeng Yue

The supply chain contracting has traditionally been based on the profit maximization assumption. Recent research has shown that some behavior factors may influence the decision making of supply chain members. The authors utilize a linear utility function to depict such behavior factors and incorporate these into the newsvendor model. The linear utility function provides sufficient flexibility to better capture people's various behavior factors. By supposing the agents are concerned with behavior factors, the authors first investigate how the factors affect the supply chain under wholesale price contract, and find that they do not influence coordination condition, but can adjust the distribution of profits. Then they extend their study to other four common contracts with a similar method and systematically demonstrate that the behavior of agents in such a linear setting has no effect on the conditions of coordinating supply chain.


2013 ◽  
Vol 756-759 ◽  
pp. 1784-1787
Author(s):  
Ya Feng Yang ◽  
Huan Cheng Zhang ◽  
Li Nan Shi

To make utility function reflect the comprehensive utility of things and decision, and consider the uncertainty in the decision analysis and things acknowledge, a deeply analysis of the set pair character of utility function is carried on from three aspects: risk aversion, risk neutral and risk pursuit, and then the set pair connection function of risk preference was constructed. Finally, the posture of preference connection degree was discussed.


Games ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
King Li ◽  
Kang Rong

Arad and Rubinstein (2012, AER) proposed the 11–20 money request game as an alternative to the P beauty contest game for measuring the depth of thinking. In this paper, we show theoretically that in the Nash equilibrium of the 11–20 game players are more likely to choose high numbers if they are risk-averse rather than risk neutral. Hence, the depth of thinking measured in the 11–20 game is biased by risk aversion. Based on a lab experiment, we confirm this hypothesis empirically.


1987 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 49-56
Author(s):  
Young Chin Kim ◽  
Bong Joon Yoon

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 417-434 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARJEN SIEGMANN

AbstractWe compute minimum nominal funding ratios for defined-benefit (DB) plans based on the expected utility that can be achieved in a defined-contribution (DC) pension scheme. Using Monte Carlo simulation, expected utility is computed for three different specifications of utility: power utility, mean-shortfall, and mean-downside deviation. Depending on risk aversion and the level of sophistication assumed for the DC scheme, minimum acceptable funding ratios are between 0.87 and 1.20 in nominal terms. For relative risk aversion of 5 and a DC scheme with a fixed-contribution setup, the minimum nominal funding ratio is between 0.87 and 0.98. The attractiveness of the DB plan increases with the expected equity premium and the fraction invested in stocks. We conclude that the expected value of intergenerational solidarity, providing time-diversification to its participants, can be large. Minimum funding ratios in real (inflation-adjusted) terms lie between 0.56 and 0.79. Given a DB pension fund with a funding ratio of 1.30, a participant in a DC plan has to pay a 2.7 to 6.1% point higher contribution on average to achieve equal expected utility.


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