An Experiment in Coercive Consociation

Author(s):  
Brendan O’Leary

The making of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985 is examined in detail, and interpretations of its significance are assessed. Was the AIA simply a form of inter-governmentalism, or was it tacitly or unintentionally a project to incentivize unionists to favor power-sharing? That is, is it best interpreted as a coercive way of promoting consociation? The impact of the 1985 AIA is assessed across parties, movements, and paramilitaries, and in particular its impact on the administration of justice, and on social justice within Northern Ireland, is discussed. Its foundational role in making the Good Friday Agreement possible is also highlighted.

Author(s):  
Marc Mulholland

‘The twenty-first century’ explains how the Good Friday Agreement saw considerable institutional restructuring in Northern Ireland. An Assembly was elected in 1998, with a power-sharing government, with David Trimble of the UUP as First Minister and Seamus Mallon of the SDLP as Deputy First Minister operating between 1998 and 2001. Between 2001 and 2007, the power-sharing government collapsed and the DUP and Sinn Féin succeeded in becoming the main political parties for their respective communities. The 2006 St Andrews Agreement brought the extremes together. The power-sharing government collapsed once more in 2017 when Sinn Féin withdrew. Identity politics in Northern Ireland and the impact of Brexit on the Northern Ireland question are also discussed.


Author(s):  
David Bolton

This Chapter is the first of two that describe efforts to understand the mental health and related impacts of the conflict in Northern Ireland, often referred to as The Troubles. The Chapter covers the period from the outbreak of violence in the late 1960’s up until the period around the peace accord, the Belfast Agreement (or Good Friday Agreement) of April 1998. The early studies reveal little, if any, major effects on the wellbeing and mental health of the population, but as the years go by, evidence starts to build of the impact of the violence, particularly as the ceasefires of the early and mid 1990’s take hold. The developing understanding of the impact was due in part to the evolution of methods and approaches being used by researchers - which is discussed in more detail at the end of Chapter 5.


Author(s):  
Etain Tannam

This chapter assesses the impact of UK withdrawal from the EU on British–Irish relations. It examines yet another possible disintegrative effect of Brexit on the UK system, namely the re-unification of Ireland. The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, bringing to a close decades of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland, had created an excellent working relations between Dublin and London. However, Brexit has threated this equilibrium, and has unexpectedly brought back on the agenda a possible border poll. The chapter then looks at the unfolding of the Brexit negotiations from June of 2016 to March of 2020 from the perspectives of British–Irish relations. It also studies the importance of the British–Irish relationship and the EU in the peace process in Northern Ireland, and considers potential methods of managing the relationship after Brexit.


Author(s):  
Veronica Membrive

2018 was the celebration year of the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, bringing power-sharing and much peace to Northern Ireland. Twenty years seem a fair distance to address the issue from a comical viewpoint. Lisa McGee's television show Derry Girls (2018) released in Channel 4, and recently in Netflix, seems to convey a nostalgic and caustic outlook at the 1990s during the last years of The Troubles and focuses on the lives of a gang of four Irish teenagers growing up in the setting of Catholic Derry. This chapter will interrogate the banalization of evil conveyed by McGee by tackling the representation of evil and violence in Northern Ireland during The Troubles.


Author(s):  
Thomas Hennessey

This chapter compares and contrasts the 1973 and 1998 Agreements that, on the face of it, are remarkably similar: both involve power-sharing and an institutional link between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The phrase ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’, attributed to Seamus Mallon, masks a misunderstanding of the fundamental differences between the two Agreements. The former Agreement looked to establish a Council of Ireland with executive powers that had the potential to evolve into an embryonic all-Ireland government; the latter Agreement established a consultative North-South Ministerial Council with no executive powers that could not evolve into a united Ireland by incremental moves. This was the key to Unionist acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in comparison to Unionist rejection of the Sunningdale Agreement. In constitutional terms the GFA was a Unionist settlement that secured Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom, recognised British sovereignty in Northern Ireland and established that a united Ireland could only be achieved on the basis of the principle of consent. In contrast the Sunningdale Agreement was, in constitutional terms, a Nationalist settlement that did not recognise Northern Ireland was part of the UK and attempted to bypass the principle of consent by establishing powerful North-South bodies. The chapter argues that the only thing the two Agreements has in common was a power-sharing element for the government of Northern Ireland.


Author(s):  
John Doyle ◽  
Eileen Connolly

This chapter analyses the potential impact of Brexit on the Northern Ireland ‘peace process’, through a discussion of four interrelated issues—political divisions in Northern Ireland; the single market; the common travel area; and the Good Friday Agreement, all of which reflect the fundamental political divisions between Irish nationalists and those who believe that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. The chapter highlights two main threats to peace – the undermining of the Good Friday Agreement which is premised on membership of the EU and its institutional framework, and the crucial issue of where the inevitable hard border between the EU and the UK will be located. It argues that Brexit has the potential to destroy the peace process and suggests possible policy solutions to mitigate the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland, while also assessing the political obstacles to the adoption of such flexible policy solutions.


Author(s):  
Eamonn O’Kane

This chapter seeks to examine the impact and legacy of the failed Sunningdale initiative on British policy in Northern Ireland. At a superficial level British policy towards the problem oscillated markedly in the 25 years between the Sunningdale and Belfast/Good Friday Agreements. The approach of seeking to build a power-sharing devolved government with a strong Irish dimension proved unattainable in 1974. Over the subsequent years the British appeared to toy with: Irish unity; full integration of Northern Ireland into the United Kingdom; devolution without an Irish dimension (or indeed much power to share); and a variant of joint authority with the Irish government without power-sharing in Northern Ireland, before returning successfully to the Sunningdale model in the late 1990s. This chapter will question the reasons for this oscillating approach. Was it a result of a disillusion with Sunnningdale amongst British policy-makers; a reflection of their pragmatism; a desire to insulate wider British politics from the Irish question; or an indication of a lack of ideological commitment and interest in Northern Ireland in wider British political circles? Drawing on the available archival sources, and interview data from British policymakers, the chapter will argue that it was not slow learning that delayed the ‘return’ to Sunningdale for the British, but the realities of events on the ground in Northern Ireland and the political attitudes of those involved in the conflict. The British were key players in this conflict but their ability to control events and outcomes was severely limited. Sunningdale represented what the British believed would be the most acceptable solution to the problem in 1973, but the conditions were not conducive for almost a quarter of a century.


Author(s):  
John Coakley ◽  
Jennifer Todd

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 ended a protracted violent conflict in Northern Ireland and became an international reference point for peace-building. Negotiating a Settlement In Northern Ireland, 1969–2019 traces the roots and outworkings of the Agreement, focussing on the British and Irish governments, their changing policy paradigms and their extended negotiations from the Sunningdale conference of 1973 to the St Andrews Agreement of 2006. It identifies three dimensions of change that paved the way for agreement: in elite understandings of sovereignty, in development of wide-ranging and complex modes of power-sharing, and in the interrelated emergence of substantial equality in the socio-economic, cultural, and political domains. The book combines wide-ranging analysis with unparalleled use of witness seminars and interviews where the most senior British and Irish politicians, civil servants and advisors discuss the process of coming to agreement. In tracing the processes by which British and Irish perspectives converged to address the Northern Ireland conflict, the book provides a benchmark against which the ongoing impact of Brexit on the Good Friday Agreement can be assessed.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 857-858
Author(s):  
David E. Schmitt

John McGarry and a distinguished group of comparativists have produced a volume important not only for scholars interested in the study of Northern Ireland but also for those concerned with ethnic conflict and nationalism generally. Although its success is certainly not assured, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, a consociational (power-sharing) settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict with international confederal dimensions, has sparked much interest by scholars and practitioners concerned with other ethnonational conflicts. The agreement was achieved with considerable pressure and support from international actors. The international community has played an increasingly important part in the resolution, management, and containment of ethnonational conflict, and the success or failure of the Good Friday Agreement may hold important lessons for international efforts elsewhere. From both a theoretical and practical perspective, this is a fine edited volume with internal coherence and useful contributions.


Author(s):  
Arthur Aughey

Lord Bew has argued in his Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789-2006 that the failure of the power-sharing experiment in 1973-74, and especially on the proposal for a Council of Ireland, was largely the product of inflated nationalist aspirations encountering raised unionist anxieties amidst exaggerated official assumptions about what was politically achievable. These three As can be said to have fostered a fourth A - ambiguity - which was destructive of the project for political stability. If these four As together constitute a template for instability, there appears at first sight to be an irony. Has not ‘constructive ambiguity’ contributed to the enduring peace since the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement? This chapter suggests that the experience of 1973-74 still applies in Northern Ireland and that it is the absence of ambiguity which makes aspiration, anxiety and assumption institutionally manageable.


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