Foreign Judgments

2019 ◽  
pp. 126-171
Author(s):  
Adrian Briggs

This chapter discusses the items of private international law of foreign judgments covered in part by a number of European regulations and other instruments prior to Exit Day. These are the Brussels I Regulation 44/2001 and the recast Brussels I Regulation 1215/2012; the 1988 Lugano Convention and the 2007 Lugano II Convention; the 1968 Brussels Convention as amended from time to time; and a number of minor Regulations such as the European Enforcement Order Regulation 805/2004. According to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, SI 2019 No 479, on Exit Day these instruments are revoked or, in the case of the Conventions given effect by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, as amended, repealed. The gap will be filled by the rules of the common law, or by the provisions of a bilateral Convention made under the Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (or in the case of Cyprus and Malta, presumably by registration under the Administration of Justice Act 1920).

2014 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kenny

AbstractThe common law rules for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments were radically reformulated by the Canadian Supreme Court in Beals v Saldanha. Few other common law jurisdictions have considered whether or not to follow Canada in this development in private International Law. In 2012, the Irish Supreme Court definitively rejected the Canadian approach. This note examines the judgment in that case, and assesses the reasoning of the Irish Court.


1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 205-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry J. Rodger

The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 introduced major reform to the common law choice of rule in delict/tort under Scots/English law respectively. To all intents and purposes, and in the face of sustained and strong criticism, the Act abandoned the common law rules based on double actionability with exceptions. The primary rule under the statute would appear to state that the applicable law is to be based on the general concept of the lex loci delicti. It is of some significance for the analysis here that the statute does not in fact utilise that Latin expression as it is indeed unclear that the expression has any technical meaning. Indeed, the provisions of the Act seek, but in the end fail, to achieve a greater degree of certainty than that rather nebulous though “right-minded” concept. Significantly, a principal objective of the reforms was to ensure that the lex fori no longer played a primary role in choice of law for delictual/tortious claims in private international law. Of course, doubts remain as to the likelihood of direct resort to the lex fori via potential escape devices provided for in the Act The two most likely stages for this arise during characterisation and later when the lex fori may be applied qua public policy.


Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eesa A Fredericks

This series of two articles provides a comparative overview of the position in the common-law conflict of laws in respect of the contractual capacity of natural persons. The comparative study is undertaken in order to provide guidelines for the future development of South African private international law. Reference is primarily made to case law and the opinions of academic authors. The legal position in the law of the United Kingdom, as the mother jurisdiction in Europe, is investigated in part I. Although Scotland is a mixed civil/common-law jurisdiction, the situation in that part of the United Kingdom is also discussed.Part II will deal with the rules and principles of private international law in respect of contractual capacity in Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), North America (the common-law provinces of Canada and the United States of America), Asia (India, Malaysia and Singapore) and Africa (Ghana and Nigeria). Part II also contains a comprehensive summary of the legal position in the common-law countries, followed by ideas for the reform of South African private international law in this regard.


Author(s):  
Douglas Zachary ◽  
Bodnar Andrew

This chapter starts by giving an overview of the topic of money had, and money received. The common law action for money had and received requires the claimant to establish that, firstly, he originally had legal title to the money; secondly, the defendant received it and; thirdly, such receipt was unjust due to a vitiating factor. It is a claim based upon the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the claimant’s expense. The claim is one of strict liability and hence does not depend upon the fault of the defendant recipient. Actions for money had and received at Common Law are founded on the principles of following and Common Law tracing, which require the property itself to be capable of being followed or traced. However, once money is transferred through the banking system, particularly the international banking system, it very often becomes impossible to identify the particular funds which were originally received.


Author(s):  
Oppong Richard Frimpong

This chapter studies the common law African countries Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Their main source of private international law rules is judicial decisions or case law. Because of the relatively underdeveloped nature of their private international law regimes, foreign case law often serves as an important source of persuasive authority. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the English courts is particularly persuasive and is often referred to by the courts. In general, an international convention or treaty does not have the force of law in the legal systems of the countries under study, unless it is expressly incorporated into national law. In essence, they are dualist countries. However, courts in some of the countries under study have demonstrated a willingness to seek guidance from international treaties that are not yet domestically in force, if the circumstances are appropriate. Thus, it is possible, that courts in the countries under study may be receptive to the Hague Principles, especially if argued by counsel.


1977 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
K. Lipstein

When I was first called upon to lecture during the darkest days of the war in 1941, because Hersch Lauterpacht was on some mission, I was still surrounded by my own teachers—Buckland, Duff, Gutteridge and McNair (Hazeltine had left). Of these Gutteridge and McNair influenced me most—the former by convincing me that foreign law was well worth studying, if not for its own sake, then in order to test the validity of one's own cherished notions and established techniques and to acquire the inspiration for new solutions, but not in order to discover an all pervading droit commun legislatif. McNair impressed upon me the reality of the rules of international law in the practice of states and in the administration of law by domestic courts. Not monism of a doctrinaire kind, but the age old tradition of the common lawyer to interpret English law so as not to conflict with international law was his inspiration, which has guided me ever since. I must not omit two other formative influences from times long passed. My teachers in Berlin included the last “Pandectist” (Th. Kipp), the broadly based Romanist, Greek scholar and modern comparatist as well as innovator of private international law (Rabel), and the superb exponent of private and private international law (M. Wolff) whose nephew, I am happy to think, will continue the propagation of the work which has been carried out in Cambridge since 1930 by Gutteridge, Hamson and myself. Gutteridge, Rabel and Wolff, whose works in the English language have enriched the fund of the common law, probably gave me the foundations on which most of my own work is based.


2019 ◽  
pp. 278-304
Author(s):  
Adrian Briggs

This chapter discusses English private international law in terms of property. The private international law of property covers immovable and movable property, tangible and intangible property, as well as intellectual and family property. In the United Kingdom, most of the conflicts rules are established by the common law. Although the EU intervened to harmonize private international law in the fields of succession to property and matrimonial property, those Regulations did not extend to the United Kingdom. Where the conflicts rules are found in the common law, a court may be entitled to apply the law selected in its renvoi sense: that is to say, to apply the law (including any conflicts rules) as it would be applied by a judge sitting in the foreign country and hearing the case himself.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Matthews

The Common Law rules of private international law on the capacity of a person to create a trust are peculiarly difficult to ascertain. It is submitted that, despite the claims of other candidates (such as the proper law of the trust, the law of the situs of the trust assets, and even the settlor's nationality), the law of the settlor's domicile should govern capacity of the settlor (i) to make a contract to create a trust, (ii) to transfer ownership of moveable property to the trustee, and (in) to impose the trust obligation on the trustee. Capacity of the settlor to transfer immovables to the trustee is, however, governed by the lex situs. Some offshore trust jurisdictions have enacted special rules relating to capacity to create a trust. Two main models may be distinguished, that of Jersey and that of the Cayman Islands. These rules were mainly designed to deal with a quite different problem, namely that of the settlor whose personal law includes rules on the protection of family wealth, such as so-called “forced heirship”". Whether the offshore rules actually succeed in avoiding the problem is, however, open to doubt in some cases.


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