US Responses and the First Phase

2019 ◽  
pp. 69-91
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

This chapter covers the early 2000s in the US and explains the backdrop to the legitimacy crisis that unfolded as the culture of banking crisis hit. It explains that following a regulatory tightening after the Enron scandal and the Dot.com boom, efforts diminished by the mid-2000s. Using opinion poll data the chapter then shows how public confidence in both the banks and the political classes fell dramatically as the financial crisis hit. It then explores the initial political responses to the financial crisis, arguing that though bank culture was identified as a problem as early as 2008–9, the initial responses focused only on tightening market discipline to reform conduct.

2019 ◽  
pp. 112-135
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

This chapter covers the early 2000s in the UK as a backdrop to the legitimacy crisis that unfolded as the global financial crisis hit. It explains the institutional set-up and the regulatory mindset that prevailed during the 2000s. This helps to explain what changed as financial crisis hit. Using opinion poll data the chapter then explores the fall in public confidence in both banks and state managers as a means of tracking the legitimacy crisis. Then the chapter explores the austerity agenda and rising protests in the UK, before explaining the nascent populist response by UK state managers at the early stage of the financial crisis.


2019 ◽  
pp. 92-111
Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

This chapter argues that after the initial responses to the financial crisis the culture of banking debate came to the fore from 2012 onwards. Following government spending cuts and political protests the repeated banking scandals that emerged constituted a second wave. US state managers moved beyond improving market discipline to ethical reform and new institutions. But the chapter argues that the unfolding legitimacy crisis was perhaps the main reason for the political focus on bank culture, and fundamentally shaped the populist tactics used by US state managers. The chapter also shows the glaring absence of a debate on the structural causes of banking culture.


2017 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maura Adshead

With the sole exception of Iceland, the downturn in the Irish economy in 2007 and 2008 was the most severe of any experienced by an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development member state. In Ireland, the crisis was widely understood to have five key dimensions: a banking crisis, a public finance crisis, an economic crisis, a social crisis and a reputational crisis. This article examines the political impact of that crisis, focusing in particular on the impact that austerity politics has had upon the evolution of the Irish left. The article traces the political responses to crisis inside and outside the Dáil and examines their potential to support the growth of anti-austerity politics in Ireland.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-310
Author(s):  
Marcus Miller

AbstractCould experiencing a health pandemic aid in understanding the nature of financial crisis? It might, for example, help to discriminate between different narratives that claim to do so. In this spirit, two influential accounts of the near-collapse of shadow banking in the US financial crisis of 2008 are analysed: one developed by Mark Gertler and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and the other presented by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission of the US Congress. Using a common two-sector framework, key features of these contrasting accounts of the market for banking services are presented, along with their corresponding diagnoses of what precipitated financial crisis. To see what the experience of Covid might imply about their relative credibility, four aspects of the current pandemic are considered: how it began from a small biological shock; how it gets spread by contagion; the significance of externalities; and how it may end with a vaccine. But the reader is left to form his or her own judgement.


Author(s):  
Rudolf L. Tökés

The collapse of public confidence in the political regime was a major, though not the only, precipitant of the radical political transformation of Hungary between 1989 and 1990. The purpose of this paper is twofold. It is to reconstruct and analyze the initially muted, but by the late 1970s semi-public, dialogue between the regime (by way of propaganda messages) and the public (by way of responses to survey questions) during the "mature" Kadar era in Hungary. The second objective is to trace the Hungarian people's beliefs about politics, society and living conditions, and the way these orientations changed between 1972 and 1989.


Author(s):  
Huw Macartney

Following the global financial crisis and repeated scandals, US and UK state managers made substantial efforts to reform the culture of their banking sectors. This book argues though that they focused on an extremely narrow definition of bank culture. They did so for two reasons: firstly, because the structural pressures of financialization—which are a far more important driver of the problematic features of bank culture in Anglo-America—are harder to remedy; but secondly, state managers also used their bank culture response to tackle a legitimacy crisis facing their institutions of government. In so doing they abdicated responsibility for the real problems—of inequality and instability—associated with their respective financial systems. Drawing on interviews with over 150 bankers this book explains the strategies employed by state managers before then examining what has and has not changed in the culture of banking in the US and UK.


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