The Limits of Neutrality
For Frege logic is topic-neutral and thinker-neutral. Its laws, for him, are thus immune to be borne on by anything outside of logic itself, and thus to being or have been any other than they are. This chapter examines those two notions of neutrality and their limits. It locates logic in a particular restricted area of the object of the capacities of a rational being. It then asks how much of this can really be immune to thinker-specificity. It also draws on ideas of Leibniz, Reichenbach, and Putnam to cast doubt on the supposed consequences of topic-neutrality (or anyway offers a different understanding of what topic-neutrality might be).
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2015 ◽
Vol 94
(2)
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pp. 207-236
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2019 ◽
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