Anscombe on Practical Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Moran
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
Observational Knowledge ◽  
The Way

The notion of “practical knowledge” is a central part of the philosophical account of intentional action in Elizabeth Anscombe’s monograph Intention. It is characterized in a number of different ways: as a form of “non-observational” knowledge of what one is doing, as the way a person knows what she will do when this is grounded in an intention and not a mere prediction, as a “non-contemplative” mode of knowing that is “the cause of that which it understands.” The paper attempts to organize and show the coherence of these various strands in Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge, and argues that it enables us to understand both how the agent’s perspective on what she is doing plays a constitutive role in the identity of the intentional action in question, while yet allowing that a person can fail to do what she takes herself to be doing.

scholarly journals Reconciling Practical Knowledge with Self-Deception

Mind ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 128 (512) ◽  
pp. 1205-1225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correct Description ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Do So

Abstract Is it impossible for a person to do something intentionally without knowing that she is doing it? The phenomenon of self-deceived agency might seem to show otherwise. Here the agent is not (at least in a straightforward sense) lying, yet disavows a correct description of her intentional action. This disavowal might seem expressive of ignorance. However, I show that the self-deceived agent does know what she's doing. I argue that we should understand the factors that explain self-deception as masking rather than negating the practical knowledge characteristic of intentional action. This masking takes roughly the following form: when we are deceiving ourselves about what we are intentionally doing, we don't think about our action because it's painful to do so.

scholarly journals Practical Knowledge and Acting Together

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olle Blomberg
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Joint Action ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Special Kind ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Philosophical View ◽  
Observational Knowledge

This chapter explores a problem that joint action raises for an influential philosophical view of the nature of intentional action. According to this view, an agent is intentionally -ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that she is -ing. It is here argued, however, that this view faces serious problems when extended to make sense of the possibility of an intentional action performed by several agents together. Since a general theory of intentional action should be applicable to both singular and joint intentional action, this suggests that practical and non-observational knowledge is not essential to intentional action as such.

Practical Knowledge

2019 ◽  
pp. 155-200
Author(s):  
John Schwenkler
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Strict Requirement ◽  
Observational Knowledge

This chapter discusses the argument of Sections 44-48 of G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention. It begins by situating her appeal to the concept of practical knowledge in relation to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Following this, the chapter shows how several elements in Aquinas’ account are drawn on by Anscombe in her argument that an agent’s self-knowledge of her act is “the cause of what it understands”. It is argued that Anscombe meant to characterize an agent’s practical knowledge as both formal and efficient cause of its object. Finally, the chapter considers whether Anscombe succeeds in defending her thesis that intentional action is necessarily known without observation. Here it is argued, first, that knowledge of one’s act is not a strict requirement of doing something intentionally, and second, that the role of observation in an agent’s self-knowledge is different from that of evidence in observational knowledge of the world.

scholarly journals Anscombe and Davidson on Practical Knowledge. A Reply to Hunter

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olav Gjelsvik
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Donald Davidson ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Observational Knowledge

David Hunter has recently argued (in this journal) that Donald Davidson and Elizabeth Anscombe were in basic agreement about practical knowledge. In this reply, it is my contention that Hunter’s fascinating claim may not be satisfactorily warranted. To throw light on why, a more careful consideration of the role of the notion of practical knowledge in Anscombe’s approach to intentional action is undertaken. The result indicates a possible need to distinguish between what is called ‘practical knowledge’ and ‘(non-observational) knowledge of what one is doing’, and shows that Hunter’s claim concerning the closeness of Anscombe to Davidson only has plausibility for knowledge of what one is doing. Contrary to an interesting suggestion by Hunter, the paper argues that it is hard to see how Davidson’s position can benefit substantially from making use of the notion of knowledge of what one is doing.

Conclusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
German Idealism ◽  
Human Action ◽  
The World ◽  
Fundamental Tension

The concluding chapter draws on the story of Rosenzweig’s near conversion to Christianity and return to Judaism to explain why, for Kant and his heirs, what is at issue in reason’s conflict with itself is our ability to affirm both the value of the world and of human action in the world. The chapter explains why Rosenzweig came to view the conflict of reason as the manifestation of a more fundamental tension between one’s selfhood and one’s worldliness, which could only be dissolved by understanding human action in the world as the means by which God is both cognized and partly realized. To make Rosenzweig’s ideas more accessible, the chapter compares them with contemporary interpretations of Kant’s views on the nature of practical knowledge and (intentional) action. It also shows how the book’s take on the issues that shaped the contours of post-Kantian German Idealism can help us see that the conflict of reason can be regarded as the underlying concern that recent competing interpretations of this period share.

scholarly journals Estimación del gasto energético de los caprinos en la Península de Santa Elena

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-76
Author(s):  
Debbye Chávez ◽  
Julio Villacres Matías
Keyword(s):  
Weight Gain ◽  
Energy Expenditure ◽  
Metabolizable Energy ◽  
Descriptive Statistics ◽  
Energy Requirements ◽  
Maintenance Energy ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Good Production ◽  
Santa Elena ◽  
The Way

El presente estudio guarda estrecha relación con la alimentación de caprinos, las ganancias de peso y su producción; sabiendo que, para que un animal logre buenos rendimientos productivos se hace necesaria una alimentación que cubra necesidades energéticas de mantenimiento, luego de crecimiento y ganancia de peso o de producción; se determinó el recorrido en unidades de desplazamiento; luego, por medio de fórmulas de medición energética trasformar esto a energía metabolizable que es una unidad fácilmente relacionable con las necesidades energéticas de mantenimiento y de producción, siendo 60 cabras de diferentes razas las que se consideraron en este estudio, donde se registró su peso, y edad antes de que formen parte del ensayo. Con la ayuda de podómetros calibrados para usarlos en cabras, se determinó el recorrido habitual. Los podómetros fueron colocados en uno de sus miembros posteriores a la altura de la rodilla, y retirados 24h después, registrando su desplazamiento y actividades en busca del alimento. Utilizando Excel se procedió a la tabulación y organización de los datos, que fueron sometidos a estadística descriptiva y análisis de la información, como resultado se evidenció 5Km de recorridos por animal, con edades entre 2,5 años de promedios, de igual forma las razas de cabras más frecuentes fueron, en primer lugar la Criolla y en segundo la Nubia; ambas razas de animales no se diferenciaron en el recorrido y peso, lo que permitió utilizar una forma universal de estimación del gasto energético (0,49 kcal/kg /km) pudiéndose determinar que fueron 87,69Kcal involucradas en 24h de actividad. ABSTRACT This study is closely related to feeding goats, weight gain and production; knowing that, for an animal to achieve good production yields a feed that covers maintenance energy requirements is necessary , after growth and weight gain or production a route was determined in units of displacement; then by using formulas of energetic measurement transform these to metabolizable energy which is a easily relatable unit with the energetic requirements of maintenance and production, 60 goats from different races were considered in this study, in which their weight and ages were recorded before forming part of the test. With the help of pedometers calibrated for use in goats, the usual route is determined. Pedometers were placed in one of his post-kneemembers, and retired after 24h, recording their movement and activities in search of food. Using Excel proceeded to the tabulation and organization of data, which were subjected to descriptive statistics and analysis of information, as a result of tours 5Km animal showed, aged 2.5 years average, similarly races more frequent goats were first Creole and secondly the Nubia; both breeds of animals did not differ in the way and weight, enabling use a universal way to estimate energy expenditure (0.49 kcal / kg / km) being able to determine which were involved in 24h 87,69Kcal activity.

Mind and World in Aristotle's De Anima

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Kelsey
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Specific Function ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Philosophical Account ◽  
The World ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Original Reading ◽  
The Way

Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work De Anima, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that 'the soul in a way is all beings'. This new perspective on the De Anima throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio (logos), or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed.

Wild Mull

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Littlewood ◽  
Martin Jones
Keyword(s):  
Natural History ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
Diverse Species ◽  
Human World ◽  
The Way

High above the mountaintops on the Isle of Mull, a huge bird is soaring. Its all-encompassing gaze records people in its Hebridean territory far below, but they are of no interest. The eagle is about its business: concentrating on the deer and fidgety hares out grazing in the morning sun, the urgent push of thermals beneath its wings, a threatening weather front way out at sea, and the restless chick back in its eyrie. This is Mull in its glory. This is what the excited, watching people have travelled so far to witness. They train their binoculars and admire, perhaps envy, the eagle with its vast freedom, knowing that such a self-willed being is part of another world – almost. This book guides the reader through that world. With superb illustrations and illuminating text, we are led to the wild side of Mull. Every facet of the island’s natural history is considered, its diverse species and many stories – past, present and future. Along the way we are reminded that wildness is not somehow separate from the human world but influenced, and shared, by nature and people together. Here is the tale of a precious and unique place, a seaborne landscape that displays an uncommon biodiversity and rare wildlife experiences, although today it also faces its greatest challenges. Most of all, this book is testimony to the power of wild places and the duty we have to learn from and protect them.

Practical Knowledge

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hunter
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Bodily Sensation ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
Philosophical Questions

A person typically knows what she is doing when she does something intentionally, and she usually knows this without having to observe herself. This so-called practical knowledge raises many philosophical questions. Does intentional action require practical knowledge and, if so, what is the strength of this requirement? What is it about intentional action that requires it, since a person can be doing something unintentionally without knowing about it? What is the source or ground of this knowledge? How is it related to observation, bodily sensation, and proprioception? How is a person’s practical knowledge connected to the reasons she has for acting and to practical reasoning more generally? In what sense, if any, is a person’s practical knowledge the “cause” of what it understands, as Anscombe famously claimed? While the notion of practical knowledge was central to the theory of action in the middle decades of the 20th century, it lost this place in the 1960s. But the last ten years has seen a renewed interest in the notion. This article aims to chart both the early debates and the recent discussions of practical knowledge. While it organizes the literature according to certain questions and topics, other ways to organize the literature are possible and nearly all of the texts would fit equally well under several headings.

Shelter Cats: From Admission to Adoption—Ethical and Welfare Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-67
Author(s):  
Sara Fragoso
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Population Control ◽  
Local Communities ◽  
Emotional Factors ◽  
Societal Values ◽  
Knowing That ◽  
The Right ◽  
Near Future ◽  
The Way

Abstract Despite the growing popularity of cats as pets, many cats end up housed for long periods of time in shelters. These shelters are increasingly under the spotlight by local communities in the way in which they deal with problematic issues, for they may be seen as an example or as target of criticism. In regards to cat (re)homing there are several relevant welfare and ethical issues. Shelters should have a proactive and well-defined strategy to improve welfare and reduce the number of sheltered cats. Those with the authority to make decisions should consider the available resources and hold in perspective the viewpoints of others, especially that of the cat. The challenge is to avoid judgments based on our own quality of life standards which may lead to decisions based on emotional factors to manage the situation. Is it moral for humans to poses the power to determine a cat’s fate? Despite not having an answer for what is the right solution, the way to proceed should be clearly defined. If there is a strategy and a plan, there is an opportunity to readjust and improve. What are the main reasons for all these problems? Most of the related questions don’t have direct answers. However, instead of reacting in order to solve the problem, we should proactively focus on prevention, mainly through population control and education, knowing that what seems good and right at that moment might be considered wrong and obsolete in a near future, in the light of the development of scientific knowledge and societal values.

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