The First Person in Cognition and Morality

Author(s):  
Béatrice Longuenesse

The book is the revised version of two lectures presented, in the spring 2017, as the Spinoza lectures in the University of Amsterdam. Both lectures explore the contrast and collaboration between two types of standpoint on the world, each of which finds expression in a specific use of the first-person pronoun “I.” One standpoint is the particular standpoint we have on the world insofar as we are spatially and temporally located, biologically unique, socially and culturally determined individuals. The other is the universally communicable standpoint we share or can hope to share with all other human beings, whatever their particular biological, social, or cultural determination. The book explores the degree to which using the first-person pronoun “I” is the expression of one or the other standpoint. The first lecture explores this question in relation to the exercise of our mental capacities in abstract reasoning and knowledge of objective facts about the world. The second lecture explores this question in relation to what we take to be our moral obligations.

Author(s):  
G. A. Cohen

This is the second of three volumes of posthumously collected writings of G. A. Cohen, who was one of the leading, and most progressive, figures in contemporary political philosophy. This volume brings together some of Cohen's most personal philosophical and nonphilosophical essays, many of them previously unpublished. Rich in first-person narration, insight, and humor, these pieces vividly demonstrate why Thomas Nagel described Cohen as a “wonderful raconteur.” The nonphilosophical highlight of the book is Cohen's remarkable account of his first trip to India, which includes unforgettable vignettes of encounters with strangers and reflections on poverty and begging. Other biographical pieces include his valedictory lecture at Oxford, in which he describes his philosophical development and offers his impressions of other philosophers, and “Isaiah's Marx, and Mine,” a tribute to his mentor Isaiah Berlin. Other essays address such topics as the truth in “small-c conservatism,” who can and can't condemn terrorists, and the essence of bullshit. A recurring theme is finding completion in relation to the world of other human beings. Engaging, perceptive, and empathetic, these writings reveal a more personal side of one of the most influential philosophers of our time.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis Sepúlveda Ferriz

Freedom and Justice have always been challenged. Since the most remote times, and in the most varied circumstances of places and people, human beings have tried to clarify and put into practice these two controversial concepts. Freedom and Justice, in effect, are words, but also dreams, desires and practices that, not being imperfect, are less sublime and ambitious. Reflecting on them on the basis of an ethics of development and socioenvironmental sustainability is still a great challenge in our contemporaneity. This book is born from the need that we all have to reflect, understand what our role is in relation to the OTHER, understood as the other as Environment. Doing this from such disparate areas and at the same time as current as Economics, Philosophy and Ecology, is still a great opportunity to discuss complexity, transdisciplinarity and the inclusion of diverse themes, but which all converge in the Human Being and its relationship with the world. Endowing human beings with Freedom and a sense of Justice means RESPONSIBILITY. To be free and to want a better and fairer world is to endow our existence with meaning and meaning. Agency, autonomy, functioning, dignity, rights, are capacities that must be leveraged individually and collectively for authentic development to exist. Development as Freedom is a valid proposal for thinking about a socio-environmental rationality that interferes in the controversial relations between economics, ethics and the environment.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg W. Bertram

AbstractThe concept of second nature promises to provide an explanation of how nature and reason can be reconciled. But the concept is laden with ambiguity. On the one hand, second nature is understood as that which binds together all cognitive activities. On the other hand, second nature is conceived of as a kind of nature that can be changed by cognitive activities. The paper tries to investigate this ambiguity by distinguishing a Kantian conception of second nature from a Hegelian conception. It argues that the idea of a transformation from a being of first nature into a being of second nature that stands at the heart of the Kantian conception is mistaken. The Hegelian conception demonstrates that the transformation in question takes place within second nature itself. Thus, the Hegelian conception allows us to understand the way in which second nature is not structurally isomorphic with first nature: It is a process of ongoing selftransformation that is not primarily determined by how the world is, but rather by commitments out of which human beings are bound to the open future.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Shishir H. Mandalia

Reading plays a vital role in life of a human. Reading provides experience through which the individual may expand his horizons of knowledge, identify, extend and intensify his interest and gains deeper understanding of himself, of other human beings and of the world. The study carried out to assess the reading habits of user of Sardar Patel University, VallabhVidyanagar, Anand, Gujarat. As a research tool; questionnaire was used for the data collection. Collected data were analyzed and tables were used to present the results of findings. Reading especially is a resource for continued education, for the acquisition of new knowledge and skills, for gaining information through media, especially newspapers, books, radio, television, and the computers. In this article investigator attempts to investigate the reading habits of users of the university.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>


2021 ◽  

This digital publication consists of a selection of 56 papers presented at the 16th International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), held at the University of Zaragoza, 2-5 July 2019, the general theme of which was ‘Aftershocks: Globalism and the Future of Democracy’. Sponsored by The Aragonese Association of Sociology, the conference was well-attended – 170 participants from 28 countries met to discuss a wide variety of topics in 29 workshops. The feedback we received from participants confirmed that they had greatly enjoyed the venue of the conference, that they appreciated the warm welcome they had received and the congenial social atmosphere and opportunity to attend workshops on subjects that were not only in their own field of expertise. No one, of course, could have predicted that our world – our work and life as individuals, as communities and as nations – would change so suddenly and radically eighteen months after the conference, with the rapid and devastating spread of the Convid-19 pandemic. The current deepening global crisis along with the challenge of climate change and growing international tensions are a stark reminder of how vulnerable our societies, our civilization, and our species are. The shocks and aftershocks of these crises are felt today in every corner of the world and in every aspect of our global and local economies, and most obviously in the sociopolitical arena. As several of the conference workshops on the multiple crises Europe and the world face today – from the migrant crisis to the rise of populism and deepening inequality between rich and poor – showed – and as the Covid-19 pandemic has so cruelly brought home to us – we simply cannot take the achievements of human civilization for granted and must find ways to meet the fundamental social and political needs of human beings not only in our own neighborhoods, cities and countries, but ultimately in the world as a whole: their living conditions, livelihoods, social services, education and healthcare, human rights and political representation. Several of the workshops, as I mentioned, directly addressed these issues and emphasized the need for building social resilience based on tolerance, solidarity and equity. This too is why, as academics, we should continue to initiate and engage in collective reflection and debate on how to foster and strengthen human communities and human solidarity. Finally, I want to thank the participants and workshop chairs for their contribution to the success of the conference. It was a pleasure for me to work with the university organizing team and with ISSEI’s team in bringing this about, and I am particularly proud that my university and the city of Zaragoza hosted this conference.


2016 ◽  
pp. 225-239
Author(s):  
Chung-ying Cheng

There are two aspects of the hermeneutic: the receptive and the creative. The receptive of the hermeneutic consists in coming to know and acknowledge what has happened, observing what there is as historically effected, foretelling what will happen as a matter of projection of future possibilities, and disclosing / discovering transcendental conditions, fore-structures or horizons of human understanding and interpretation; the creative of the hermeneutic, on the other hand, consists in realizing and demonstrating human sensibilities and human capabilities and needs, conceptualizing what is factual and real based on human cognitive and volitional faculties and experiences, developing values and pursuing regulative ideals of actions, and searching for best possible ways or methods to reach for individual and communal end-goals which will enhance human beings as autonomous entities and moral agents in the world. The receptive is represented by the phenomenological approach to Being and reality whereas the creative is conveyed by an ontology of reflection of human being for self-definition and self-cultivation of human faculties. This amounts to bringing out an existing distinction between ming (what is imparted) and li (the presupposed ground) on the one hand and xing ( human potentiality for being in oneself) and xin (human understanding and interpretation toward action) on the other in the tradition of Confucian metaphysics.Next, I shall focus on Heidegger and Gadamer as taking ontological receptivity (as a matter of fore-structures of Being or Language of human understanding) as the source of meaning of existence and meaningfulness of texts. Th ere are of course creative elements to be identifi ed with forming investigative projects of the Dasein for disclosing truth of the Being, but the main tone is to realize the Being or Language as base structures of our hermeneutic consciousness or hermeneutic space of understanding. Because of spacelimitation, however, I shall leave to another occasion the discussion of the creative formation and positive projection of a transformative cosmological philosophy in the Yijing tradition as represented in my onto-hermeneutics which takes experiences of ≫comprehensive observation≪ (guan) and ≫feeling- refl ection≪ (gan) as two avenues toward human understanding and hermeneutic enterprise of interpretation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 29-70
Author(s):  
Christopher Coker

Human beings began hunting each other after dispatching the competition – the megafauna that once roamed the planet. From prey we became the Alpha predator. War has its origins in hunting, and the other criteria which distinguishes as a species – the use of language, the capacity for sacrifice and altruism; the use of tools and the ability to bind socially with small communities from clans to tribes which also encourages us of course to separate insiders from outsiders.  It owes much to the very human interplay of nature and nurture, and the way in which humans ha e gendered war from the very beginning. Above all, we are still lumbered with the brains of our Stone Age ancestors which is why evolutionary psychologists argue that we are so maladapted to the world in which we live


Author(s):  
George I. Mavrodes

Predestination appears to be a religious or theological version of universal determinism, a version in which the final determining factor is the will or action of God. It is most often associated with the theological tradition of Calvinism, although some theologians outside the Calvinist tradition, or prior to it (for example, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas), profess similar doctrines. The idea of predestination also plays a role in some religions other than Christianity, perhaps most notably in Islam. Sometimes the idea of predestination is formulated in a comparatively restricted way, being applied only to the manner in which the divine grace of salvation is said to be extended to some human beings and not to others. John Calvin, for example, writes: We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death. (Institutes, bk 3, ch. 21, sec. 5) At other times, however, the idea is applied more generally to the whole course of events in the world; whatever happens in the world is determined by the will of God. Philosophically, the most interesting aspects of the doctrine are not essentially linked with salvation. For instance, if God is the first cause of all that happens, how can people be said to have free will? One answer may be that people are free in so far as they act in accordance with their own motives and desires, even if these are determined by God. Another problem is that the doctrine seems to make God ultimately responsible for sin. A possible response here is to distinguish between actively causing something and passively allowing it to happen, and to say that God merely allows people to sin; it is then human agents who actively choose to sin and God is therefore not responsible.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document