Contractual Constitutions

Author(s):  
Albert Weale

Arendt pointed out that social contract theory identified some elementary truths of democratic politics. What might be those elementary truths? The first is the need for public goods; the second the role of a two-level theory; and the third is the essential role of government in providing the conditions for social cooperation. Democratic contracts need to respect the requirements of political equality. However, this still leaves us with the problem of knowing what could be agreed among agents reciprocally situated. The empirical method suggests that we need to look to social conditions that embody the circumstances of impartiality. One such set of conditions is found in common property resource regimes, where power is roughly equal. Such regime exhibit various forms of equality, but they also suggest the need for participation as well as monitoring and sanctions. Large-scale societies need to incorporate conditions of open representation and effective deliberation if they are to exhibit the circumstances of impartiality. International contracts are best understood if the Grotian norms of traditional international relations are regarded as equivalent to the individualistic minimum of a domestic order, which needs a social contract to deal with externalities and provide international public goods. It is plausible to think that, in an interdependent world, mutual advantage may exhibit the logic of a universalization to humanity as an end in itself.

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 444-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somsook Boonyabancha ◽  
Thomas Kerr

Somsook Boonyabancha, former director of CODI (the Community Organizations Development Institute in Thailand) and now an advisor to the CODI board and chairperson of the Baan Mankong Program Committee, reflects on the evolution of CODI, the management of its fund, and the community-driven activities it has supported since 1992. The paper explains how substantial and large-scale changes can be brought about in the lives of the poor by supporting a community-driven process that opens space for negotiation and collaboration with government and other partners on housing and other aspects of community development. It describes the transitions that have had to be managed, as both the community networks and the support institution have navigated various challenges and opportunities. A centrepiece of this co-production is the Baan Mankong Program, which represents a dramatic change in the role of government – from a provider of housing to facilitator of community-driven local housing co-production.


1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles A Holt ◽  
Susan K Laury

This paper describes a simple public goods game, implemented with playing cards in a classroom setup. Students choose whether to contribute to the provision of a public good in a situation where it is privately optimal not to contribute, but socially optimal to contribute fully. This exercise motivates discussion of altruism, strategies for private fund-raising, and the role of government in resolving the public good problem.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Milan Školník

Corruption is a phenomenon that affects societies. It lowers trust in public institutions, lowers trust among people, undermines economic development, undermines democracy, and has implications for political participation. This article contributes to current debates on the impact of corruption by looking at other possible consequences of corruption. Specifically, this article looks at the impact of the perception of corruption on the approval of public protest meetings and demonstrations because, if corruption leads to these non-institutionalized forms of political participation, this may lead to security problems or a direct outbreak of violence. This study analyses this relationship by using seven post-communist countries that have undergone specific developments in terms of corruption. These developments were largely due to large-scale privatizations, politicized state administration, and the linking of politicians to the private sector. This research was conducted with individual-level data. The module ‘The Role of Government V’ from the International Social Survey Programme was used. Descriptive charts have revealed that in six out of the seven countries, most respondents considered politicians to be very corrupt. Around 80% of respondents in all seven countries approve of the organization of public protest meetings. Around 70% of respondents in all seven countries approve of demonstrations. Regression analysis revealed that there is a relationship between the perception of corruption among politicians and the approval of protest activities. Specifically, the more politicians are corrupt, the more people approve of holding public protest meetings and demonstrations.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (11) ◽  
pp. 1156-1170
Author(s):  
Enrico Colombatto ◽  
Valerio Tavormina

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether altruism justifies ad hoc legislation with reference to three different contexts. One is defined by the libertarian notion of liberty; a second framework corresponds to the egalitarian vision; and a third one originates from social-contract theory. Design/methodology/approach The authors review two stylized visions of liberty, and consider to what extent the current legal systems comply with one of these visions. Moreover, the authors analyse the implications of the contractarian approach. Findings It is shown that current legislation is rather ambiguous and sometimes even contradictory. By and large, the common-law view tends to favour the libertarian approach, while the civil-law visions are closer to what one might expect from social-contract theory. In these cases, however, it seems that the letter of the law is often questioned by the academic community as well as by the judiciary, and decisions eventually follow the judges’ discretionary power. Originality/value This analysis of altruism combines the economic and legal perspectives. Although altruism is always considered an important part of social capital and worthy of privileged treatment, it is shown that policymaking is frequently inconsistent and sometimes contradictory.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Weinzierl

After decades of centralized control of economic activity in space, NASA and US policymakers have begun to cede the direction of human activities in space to commercial companies. NASA garnered more than 0.7 percent of GDP in the mid-1960s, but is only around 0.1 percent of GDP today. Meanwhile, space has become big business, with $300 billion in annual revenue. The shift from public to private priorities in space is especially significant because a widely shared goal among commercial space's leaders is the achievement of a large-scale, largely self-sufficient, developed space economy. Jeff Bezos, has stated that the mission of his firm Blue Origin is “millions of people living and working in space.” Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX, has laid out plans to build a city of a million people on Mars within the next century. Both Neil deGrasse Tyson and Peter Diamandis have been given credit for stating that Earth's first trillionaire will be an asteroid-miner. Such visions are clearly not going to become reality in the near future. But detailed roadmaps to them are being produced and recent progress in the required technologies has been dramatic. If such space-economy visions are even partially realized, the implications for society will be enormous. Though economists should treat the prospect of a developed space economy with healthy skepticism, it would be irresponsible to treat it as science fiction. In this article, I provide an analytical framework—based on classic economic analysis of the role of government in market economies—for understanding and managing the development of the space economy.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-770 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMY E. LERMAN ◽  
MEREDITH L. SADIN ◽  
SAMUEL TRACHTMAN

Partisanship is a primary predictor of attitudes toward public policy. However, we do not yet know whether party similarly plays a role in shaping public policy behavior, such as whether to apply for government benefits or take advantage of public services. While existing research has identified numerous factors that increase policy uptake, the role of politics has been almost entirely overlooked. In this paper, we examine the case of the Affordable Care Act to assess whether policy uptake is not only about information and incentives; but also about politics. Using longitudinal data, we find that Republicans have been less likely than Democrats to enroll in an insurance plan through state or federal exchanges, all else equal. Employing a large-scale field experiment, we then show that de-emphasizing the role of government (and highlighting the market's role) can close this partisan gap.


Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 1307-1335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley

This paper explores the role of civic culture in expanding fiscal capacity by developing a model based on reciprocal obligations: citizens pay their taxes and the state provides public goods. Civic culture evolves over time according to the relative payoff of civic‐minded and materialist citizens. A strong civic culture manifests itself as high tax revenues sustained by high levels of voluntary tax compliance and provision of public goods. This captures the idea of government as a reciprocal social contract between the state and its citizens. The paper highlights the role of political institutions and common interests in the emergence of civic culture.


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