Intellectual Humility, Proper Pride, and Proper Concern with Others’ Esteem

This chapter provides accounts of four character traits: intellectual modesty and acceptance of intellectual limitations (which together constitute intellectual humility); proper pride in one’s epistemic achievements and proper concern for one’s intellectual reputation. It argues that these are intellectual virtues. The main difference between humility (as comprising of modesty and of acceptance of limitations) on the one hand, and pride and concern for esteem on the other, lies in the nature of social comparisons on which they are based. Humility relies on appraisals of the worth of one’s qualities that might be gauged by comparing oneself to other people and which are driven by a concern for accuracy. The chapter also makes a case that overlapping clusters of attitudes serving knowledge and value expressive functions are the causal bases of these character traits.

Two Concepts of Intellectual Humility

One aim of virtue epistemology is to illuminate the nature and structure of individual virtues like curiosity, open-mindedness, and intellectual humility. Recently, two rather different accounts of intellectual humility have emerged. Robert C. Roberts has argued that intellectual humility should be understood negatively: that it is essentially an absence of certain concerns (e.g., a concern with intellectual status or power). By contrast, Jason Baehr and several co-authors have argued that intellectual humility has a positive character: that it is a matter of being alert to and willing to “own” one’s intellectual limitations, weaknesses, and mistakes. In this chapter, Baehr considers how these accounts stand with respect to each other, both logically and evaluatively. After tracing fundamental similarities between the two, he considers whether they share a common target or whether they attempt to get at two distinct virtues. Finally, he considers the relative merits and formational value of each account.

Vanity, Narcissism, Timidity, and Fatalism

This chapter provides account of four character traits in the intellectual domain: vanity and narcissism; timidity and self-fatalism. It argues that vanity and narcissism are vices of superiority while timidity and self-fatalism are vices of inferiority. They are characterized as opposed to acceptance of limitations and proper concern to be esteemed by others. Vanity is typical of those who show an excessive concern for being held in high esteem by other people. Timidity is instead exemplified by those whose fear to be exposed as intellectually inadequate is so extreme that they shun being noticed by other epistemic agents. Consequently, they exhibit insufficient concern for being held in esteem by their epistemic community. Narcissism is related to intellectual vanity. It involves a failure to accept one’s intellectual limitations due to an infatuation with one’s own intellectual abilities. Fatalism is a strengthening of timidity that consists in a disposition to resign oneself to the alleged intractability of one’s own intellectual limitations. The chapter also defends the view that vanity and narcissism are based on attitudes whose function is social-adjustive, while timidity and self-fatalism have attitudes serving an ego-defensive function as their causal bases.

Robotification & ethical cleansing

Robotics is currently not only a cutting-edge research area, but is potentially disruptive to all domains of our lives—for better and worse. While legislation is struggling to keep pace with the development of these new artifacts, our intellectual limitations and physical laws seem to present the only hard demarcation lines, when it comes to state-of-the-art R&D. To better understand the possible implications, the paper at hand critically investigates underlying processes and structures of robotics in the context of Heidegger’s and Nishitani’s accounts of science and technology. Furthermore, the analysis draws on Bauman’s theory of modernity in an attempt to assess the potential risk of large-scale robot integration. The paper will highlight undergirding mechanisms and severe challenges imposed upon our socio-cultural lifeworlds by massive robotic integration. Admittedly, presenting a mainly melancholic account, it will, however, also explore the possibility of robotics forcing us to reassess our position and to solve problems, which we seem unable to tackle without facing existential crises.

Comparative analysis of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, Jalaliddin Rumi and Henri Bergson’s ideas about intuition and spiritual love

The article analyzes the ideas of the Sufi thinker, poet Jalaladdin Rumi, the prominent Indian philosopher Sri Aurobindo Ghosh, and Henri Bergson about intuition and spiritual love. These thinkers, who lived in different historical eras, who were not familiar with each other’s creativity, expressed a number of similar ideas. These are ideas of spiritual love and intuition. According to Rumi, the idea of a person as God’s slave or servant is significantly lower than the idea of a person as a beloved of God, since it prevents one from seeing the im­age of God in the inner world of a person; the enlightened human soul strives to merge with the world soul. The highest goal of the integral yoga of Aurobindo is the unity of body, soul and spirit, thanks to which a latent spiritual force with a divine nature manifests itself in a person, a person turns into an instrument of action of divine will – Shakti. Rumi sees the meaning of human life in the dis­closure of creative abilities. Bergson defines intuition as the energy of benevo­lence, with the help of which the intellectual limitations of people are over­come. A person, according to Bergson, is a creative being, in whose activity a creative impulse is manifested; in turn, this impulse gives rise to intuition. Comparing the views of three thinkers, we find a pantheistic attitude that makes different worldviews comparable and provides a basis for their comparative study, which was pointed out in the 11th century. outstanding Central Asian en­cyclopedist Abu Rayhan al-Biruni. In our opinion, the ideas of spiritual love and intuition are the bridge that connects Western and Eastern cultures, which are very different from each other.

THOUGHT AS A QUASI-POSSIBILITY

Modal logic determines a lot in modern metaphysics and ontology, which delve deeper and deeper into the realm of the possible, not limited to the analysis of reality. This makes it relevant to study the problems of philosophical argumentation, built on the basis of modal logic. The aim of the work is to prove that thinkability does not necessarily entail a logical possibility. Because of this, many kinds of modal arguments that involve inference from conceivability to possibility can be flawed. Methodology: the author considers the question of the existence of objects impossible from the point of view of classical logical omniscience as a parallel to the idea of the existence of impossible possible worlds by J. Hintikka. The main idea of this article is the assertion that the gap between conceivability and possibility is generated by the intellectual limitations of the epistemic agent. The agent consistently — within the framework of the information available to him, and not in the absolute sense - considers logically possible that which is logically impossible from the point of view of logical omniscience. It turns out that we are able to think not only of something non-existent (to have empty intentions), but even quite capable of thinking the logically impossible. The conceivability of the impossible is somewhat analogous to the conceivability of impossible objects that are constructed by contemporary artists. The paper draws a parallel between the tautological thinkability of such an equation that is not tautological and the thinkability as a theorem of something that is not a theorem (S. Kripke’s modal arguments). As a particular example, the author criticizes the argument of the zombie by D. Chalmers, which is popular in modern philosophy of consciousness. It is shown that the conceivability of a zombie does not exclude the possible inconsistency of a zombie from an absolute point of view. In the second part, various types of the a priori are also considered, the opposition is built between the classical idea of logical omniscience and the agent-based approach using the categories of semantics of possible worlds. The main result of the proposed work is to prove that both formally contradictory and conceptually contradictory can be outside the framework of the epistemic attainability of the final agent. The author introduces a new philosophical category of the quasi-possible.

New Faces of Digital Divide and How to Bridge It

The chapter aims to explore, through the lens of digital divide, the challenges to alleviating socio-economic and intellectual limitations for prosperity of each individual. Cutting-edge research is reviewed to discuss in what way new technologies and access to them really help to develop citizens who are able to contribute in creative and democratic ways to society. While much effort has been done in the past decade to bridge the digital divide by resolving access issues and usage issues, the recent studies seem to indicate that the gap at all levels, nation-wide, community-wide, special groups-wide still exists and even deepens, especially regarding digital inclusion and meeting needs of at-risk population. More systematic research and innovative practical solutions are needed to address all the aspects of digital divide: physical, financial cognitive, content, and political access; also, we have to consider the technological and social resonances of digital technologies in terms of digital literacy and development of critical thinking.

Piety and Wisdom in Socrates

For Socrates, wisdom begins with the recognition of a moral order that identifies human flourishing with the life of virtue. The virtuous individual lives in harmony with a world governed by divine benevolence and characterized by justice. Because virtue is found in people in varying degrees, the social order is not necessarily ordered to wisdom and is, at times, inimical to it. Social life is the venue for a pursuit of wisdom in which rational discourse—as opposed to power and manipulation—structures a search for the good. Rational discourse, however, also reveals human moral and intellectual limitations, such that any claim to know what is good must be held tentatively and kept open to revision. In the face of human ignorance and hostility, loyalty to the good is sustained by piety, or reverence for the good, and by integrity, the refusal to give up one’s own just life.