Grounds for justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 189-228
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Evidential Probability ◽  
Radical Scepticism

We must distinguish between the condition of a proposition’s being justified in one’s situation and the metaphysical grounds determining that this condition obtains. While the former is luminous, the latter need not be. It is argued that knowing is a strict full ground for doxastic justification, and being in a position to know is a strict full ground for propositional justification. It follows that facts about one’s evidence that serve as strict partial grounds for knowing are strict partial grounds for doxastic justification, and facts about one’s evidence that serve as strict partial grounds for being in a position to know are strict partial grounds for propositional justification. Even if only partial, such evidential grounds can only be assumed to be available in some, but not all, cases in which one has doxastic justification without knowing, and propositional justification without being in a position to know. A more comprehensive account identifies facts about evidential probabilities as facts that yield strict full grounds for justification. While one’s evidence is the totality of what one is in a position to know, the evidential probability of p equals the probability of p conditional on one’s evidence. The account requires taking the notion of evidential probability as primitive. It uniformly applies to all cases of justification, including the bad cases envisaged by radical scepticism. Degrees of strength of justification are explained in terms of facts about evidential probabilities. Just as their grounds, degrees of strength of justification are not luminous, even if justification is.

The Place of Reasons in Epistemology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Sylvan ◽  
Ernest Sosa
Keyword(s):  
Building Block ◽  
Epistemic Normativity ◽  
Epistemic Reasons ◽  
Middle Ground ◽  
Theoretic Property ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Road ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient

This chapter defends a middle ground between two extremes in the literature on the place of reasons in epistemology. Against members of the “reasons first” movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole grounds of epistemic normativity. We suggest that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is rather the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to ground central epistemic properties, and argue that possession is grounded in competence. But while we here diverge with reasons-firsters, we also distance ourselves from those who deem reasons unimportant. Indeed, we hold that having sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on them yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle.

Propositional and doxastic justification

2021 ◽  
pp. 107-137
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Situation ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification

Drawing on the results of previous chapters, the proposal is made to interpret the complex operator ⌜¬K¬K⌝ as encoding propositional justification and the complex operator ⌜¬K¬K⌝ as encoding doxastic justification—where in each case justification is understood to be justification all things considered. Accordingly, not only propositional but also doxastic justification is construed as a feature of one’s epistemic situation rather than a feature of one’s beliefs. On this view, both types of justification are non-factive. The proposed account is defended against a number of putative counterexamples, the allegation that it confuses epistemic permissibility with epistemic blamelessness, and the charge that it fails to heed plausible reliabilist constraints on justification. At crucial junctures this defence relies on the availability of theorems governing the aforementioned complex operators that were proved in chapter 5.

Competing views

2021 ◽  
pp. 170-188
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Possibility ◽  
Metaphysical Possibility ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Present Account ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Rule Out

The present account, which construes justification as a kind of epistemic possibility of knowing, or of being in a position to know, competes with three recently advanced theories of justification. Of these competitors, the first two construe doxastic justification as the metaphysical possibility of knowing. While they differ in some details, these views share certain problematic features: they fail to yield a corresponding account of propositional justification, have trouble vindicating an intuitive principle of closure for justified belief, and fail to comply with the independently plausible principle that if one has a justified belief, one is in no position to rule out that one has knowledge. The present account does not have these problematic features. According to the third competitor, |φ‎| is propositionally justified in one’s situation just in case it would be abnormal—and so require explanation—if |φ‎| were to be false in the presence of the evidence that one possesses in that situation. This normic theory of justification validates the principle that propositional justification agglomerates over conjunction, and in so doing, violates the constraint that propositions of the form ⌜φ‎ & ¬Kφ‎⌝ never be justified. It likewise contradicts the independently plausible principle that whenever |φ‎| is propositionally justified all things considered, |¬Kφ‎| is not. The present account does not face these problems, since it rejects the relevant agglomeration principle and treats the condition encoded by ⌜¬K¬Kφ‎⌝ as luminous.

scholarly journals On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Turri
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Significant Advance ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Orthodox View

I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S’s having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S’s belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.

Concluding Remarks

2021 ◽  
pp. 264-268
Author(s):  
Sven Rosenkranz
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
Negative Introspection

According to the account of epistemic justification developed in this book, one has propositional justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know p; and one has doxastic justification for p just in case one is in no position to know that one does not know p. The account gives internalists much of what they want from a theory of justification—in particular, a notion of justification according to which propositional justification is non-factive and luminous, underwrites principles of positive and negative introspection, and remains available to the victims of systematic deception. All the while, that notion is explained in terms of other notions that clearly belong to the knowledge-firsters’ toolkit, and coheres with an externalist account of the grounds for justification.

scholarly journals Imagination Cannot Justify Empirical Belief

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Egeland
Keyword(s):  
Standard View ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Counterfactual Conditionals ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right ◽  
Empirical Belief

Abstract A standard view in the epistemology of imagination is that imaginings can either provide justification for modal beliefs about what is possible (and perhaps counterfactual conditionals too), or no justification at all. However, in a couple of recent articles, Kind (2016; Forthcoming) argues that imaginings can justify empirical belief about what the world actually is like. In this article, I respond to her argument, showing that imagination doesn't provide the right sort of information to justify empirical belief. Nevertheless, it can help us take advantage of justification that we already have, thereby enabling us to form new doxastically justified beliefs. More specifically, according to the view I advocate, imagination can contribute to one's satisfaction of the proper basing condition – which turns propositional justification into doxastic justification – but without conferring any new justification that the subject isn't already in possession of upon their beliefs. Very little attention has been devoted to the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification in the literature on imagination, and the view I here argue for takes up a yet-to-be occupied position.

scholarly journals Justificação, coerência e circularidade

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Júlio César Burdzinski
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Propositional Justification ◽  
Fourth Section ◽  
Doxastic Justification ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
The Third ◽  
Non Linear

Este artigo está organizado do seguinte modo: na primeira seção, apresento as raízes histórico-filosóficas dos problemas do conhecimento e da justificação; na segunda, traço a distinção entre verdade e justificação epistêmica; a terceira seção é dedicada ao problema da circularidade, problema tradicionalmente imputado ao coerentismo; na quarta seção, apresento uma noção heterodoxa de justificação, a justificação sistêmica; na quinta, apresento e critico uma outra noção heterodoxa de justificação, a justificação inferencial não-linear; na sexta seção, apresento mais algumas distinções importantes e destaco as formas proposicional e doxástica da justificação; o exame destas formas é desenvolvido subseqüentemente na sétima seção; concluo o artigo com uma reflexão acerca da natureza e dos limites de minha proposta. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Conhecimento. Coerentismo. Circularidade. Justificação epistêmica. Justificação proposicional. Justificação doxástica. ABSTRACT This paper has the following structure: on the first section, I report on the historical and philosophical roots of the problems of knowledge and justification; on the second, I lay out the distinction between truth and epistemic justification; the third section is devoted to the problem of circularity, a problem often attributed to coherentism; on the fourth section, I introduce an unorthodox notion of justification, systemic justification; on the fifth, I present and criticize another unorthodox notion of justification, non-linear inferential justification; on the sixth, I discuss a few other distinctions and focus on the propositional and doxastic forms of justification; the examination of those forms is subsequently developed on the seventh section; I conclude with a reflection on the nature and limits of my proposal. KEY WORDS – Knowledge. Coherentism. Circularity. Epistemic justification. Propositional justification. Doxastic justification.

The Alternatives to War

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison
Keyword(s):  
Just War ◽  
Just War Theory ◽  
Economic Sanctions ◽  
Responsibility To Protect ◽  
Military Action ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
The Face ◽  
Normative Issues ◽  
Better Than

If states are not to go to war, what should they do instead? In The Alternatives to War: From Sanctions to Non-violence, James Pattison considers the case for the alternatives to military action to address mass atrocities and aggression. He covers the normative issues raised by measures ranging from comprehensive economic sanctions, diplomacy, and positive incentives, to criminal prosecutions, non-violent resistance, accepting refugees, and arming rebels. For instance, given the indiscriminateness of many sanctions regimes, are sanctions any better than war? Should states avoid ‘megaphone diplomacy’ and adopt more subtle measures? What, if anything, can non-violent methods such as civilian defence and civilian peacekeeping do in the face of a ruthless opponent? Is it a serious concern that positive incentives can appear to reward aggressors? Overall, Pattison provides a comprehensive account of the ethics of the alternatives to war. In doing so, he argues that the case for war is weaker and the case for many of the alternatives is stronger than commonly thought. The upshot is that, when reacting to mass atrocities and aggression, states are generally required to pursue the alternatives to war rather than military action. Pattison concludes that this has significant implications for pacifism, Just War Theory, and the responsibility to protect doctrine.

Communicatio Idiomatum

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Cross
Keyword(s):  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Divine Attributes ◽  
Son Of God ◽  
Comprehensive Account ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
The Reformation ◽  
Communicatio Idiomatum

This book offers a radical reinterpretation of the sixteenth-century Christological debates between Lutheran and Reformed theologians on the ascription of divine and human predicates to the person of the incarnate Son of God (the communicatio idiomatum). It does so by close attention to the arguments deployed by the protagonists in the discussion, and to the theologians’ metaphysical and semantic assumptions, explicit and implicit. It traces the central contours of the Christological debates, from the discussion between Luther and Zwingli in the 1520s to the Colloquy of Montbéliard in 1586. The book shows that Luther’s Christology is thoroughly Medieval, and that innovations usually associated with Luther—in particular, that Christ’s human nature comes to share in divine attributes—should be ascribed instead to his younger contemporary Johannes Brenz. The discussion is highly sensitive to the differences between the various Luther groups—followers of Brenz, and the different factions aligned in varying ways with Melanchthon—and to the differences between all of these and the Reformed theologians. And by locating the Christological discussions in their immediate Medieval background, the book also provides a comprehensive account of the continuities and discontinuities between the two eras. In these ways, it is shown that the standard interpretations of the Reformation debates on the matter are almost wholly mistaken.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document