The Alternatives to War

Author(s):  
James Pattison

If states are not to go to war, what should they do instead? In The Alternatives to War: From Sanctions to Non-violence, James Pattison considers the case for the alternatives to military action to address mass atrocities and aggression. He covers the normative issues raised by measures ranging from comprehensive economic sanctions, diplomacy, and positive incentives, to criminal prosecutions, non-violent resistance, accepting refugees, and arming rebels. For instance, given the indiscriminateness of many sanctions regimes, are sanctions any better than war? Should states avoid ‘megaphone diplomacy’ and adopt more subtle measures? What, if anything, can non-violent methods such as civilian defence and civilian peacekeeping do in the face of a ruthless opponent? Is it a serious concern that positive incentives can appear to reward aggressors? Overall, Pattison provides a comprehensive account of the ethics of the alternatives to war. In doing so, he argues that the case for war is weaker and the case for many of the alternatives is stronger than commonly thought. The upshot is that, when reacting to mass atrocities and aggression, states are generally required to pursue the alternatives to war rather than military action. Pattison concludes that this has significant implications for pacifism, Just War Theory, and the responsibility to protect doctrine.

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

Recent discussions in Just War Theory have been framed by a polarising debate between “traditionalist” and “revisionist” approaches. This debate has largely overlooked the importance of an applied account of Just War Theory. The main aim of this essay is to defend the importance of this applied account and, in particular, a nonideal account of the ethics of war. I argue that the applied, nonideal morality of war is vital for a plausible and comprehensive account of Just War Theory. A subsidiary aim of the essay is to show that once we appreciate the importance of the applied, nonideal account, it becomes clear that the positions proposed by revisionists and traditionalists are, in fact, much closer than often presumed.


Author(s):  
Jorge Luis Almeida Estrella

The purpose of this article is to question whether the powers of the United Nations Security Council (SC) are subject to any limitation under international law, especially in the context of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) doctrine. And consequently, which organism will be entitled to hold the SC accountable for its actions, and how that organism should do it. The first chapter of this article deals with the possible limitations of the SC, it considers both legal and legitimacy restraints to the broad powers of the SC. Additionally, we will explain how RtoP presents itself as a new challenge to the legitimacy of the SC. Chapter 2 discusses which organisms within the UN system, may be appropriate to hold the SC responsible for its actions. Finally, in Chapter 3, we will review the legal status of RtoP, and explain how the ICJ could use Just War criteria as a valuable tool for a judicial review process of SC decisions based on RtoP.


Author(s):  
James Pattison

This chapter sets the scope for the ensuing analysis. It first introduces the measures, before highlighting the political and theoretical significance of considering the alternatives and delineating the problems caused by the lack of clarity surrounding them. It highlights the need to develop the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, to have a fuller understanding of Just War Theory and the requirements of last resort, and to offer appropriate guidance as geopolitical shifts render the alternatives to war increasingly significant. It also makes clear the scope of the analysis and outlines the measures that the book will focus on. These are the central international alternatives to war that are used to address ongoing or imminent mass atrocities and serious external aggression.


Author(s):  
James Pattison

This chapter delineates the theoretical and practical implications of the preceding analysis. It first summarizes the case for each of the alternatives in turn, before considering the implications for war. In doing so, the chapter highlights the two central themes of the book: (1) there are several normative reasons in favour of the alternatives and (2) there are further objections to war. It argues that, although the preceding analysis appears to strengthen the case for pacifism (since there is more to the alternatives than it often seems), it also poses a challenge to it. The chapter then outlines the implications for the jus ad bellum principle of last resort. It defends an account of ‘Presumptive Last Resort’, which holds that war should be presumed to be the last feasible option. It also outlines five implications for the responsibility to protect doctrine.


Author(s):  
Victor Tadros

This chapter partially defends the significance of intentions to permissibility against critics and explores some different views about their relevance by exploring a range of contexts in just war theory where views about the significance of intentions make a difference in our judgments about the permissibility of military action. It clarifies two components of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and distinguishes different versions of it. It then compares the DDE with some competing explanations of the intuitive difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing, arguing that the DDE is an important component of the right overall view of the permissibility of killing in war.


2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 447-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tamar Meisels

This essay looks at the contemporary just war theory literature on preventive war that has emerged largely in reaction to the US invasion of Iraq. Recent sanctions on Iran and the debate over its nuclear program now suggest the usefulness of a forward looking perspective on preventive strikes, rather than the retroactive analyses offered thus far primarily with reference to Iraq. With Iran closely in mind, I address the various arguments for and against preventive war indicating throughout that the various principled objections to early military action can be overcome in this case. Many of the crucial concrete questions regarding costs and benefits need to be settled in practice, rather than in the realm of political theory. Ultimately, the discussion suggests that Iran is a legitimate candidate for early military action aimed to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. I argue that in principle, subject to credible intelligence information and requirements of proportionality, a unilateral Israeli strike against Iran will be justifiable, both morally and legally, as self-defense.


Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This chapter addresses a remarkably neglected issue in just war theory: the internal legitimacy of humanitarian military intervention, military actions in another state undertaken with the objective of stopping occurring or preventing imminent large-scale violations of basic human rights, without the consent of the state in which the intervention occurs. When such wars cannot be justified as necessary for protecting the rights or advancing the interests of the citizens of the states that undertake them, the question arises as to whether they are legitimate from the standpoint of the state’s own citizens. This chapter argues that the decision to engage in humanitarian wars is so especially serious and problematic (given that the primary duty of the state is to protect the rights and serve the interests of its own citizens), that special institutional processes are needed for authorizing such military action.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-381 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eamon Aloyo

I argue that widely accepted just war theory precepts morally allow and require the assassination of politically powerful individuals under some circumstances instead of waging a just war or implementing any other policy such as non-targeted economic sanctions that would very likely severely harm more innocents. While all just war theory precepts permit just assassinations under certain circumstances, proportionality, necessity, and last resort make just assassinations required whenever they would cause severe harm to the fewest innocents. There are several implications of my argument. First, there are fewer circumstances when wars and other policies that foreseeably but unintentionally harm innocents are just than is commonly thought. Second, the realm of morally permissible violent and non-violent action for powerful individuals is more limited than many presume and politicians are more often morally liable to actions that would mitigate or end objectively unjust serious threats for which they are culpable, although this does not always include lethal force.


Res Publica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Ellis

Abstract On 24 December 2017, the UN Security Council imposed its toughest sanctions yet on North Korea. The measures, intended to thwart nuclear ambitions, are some of the most extensive sanctions imposed in recent times. They place severe restrictions on the export of crude oil and refined petroleum to that state, ban the export of arms, dual use equipment, rocket fuel, natural gas, luxury goods and financial services, ban the import of coal, iron, gold, seafood and textiles from North Korea, and include asset freezes and travel bans for targeted individuals. Economic sanctions raise serious moral issues, not least because if properly enforced they can cause significant harm to their targets. How should we assess their moral permissibility? Several authors have pointed out analogies between economic sanctions and war and then applied the just war principles (just cause, proportionality, etc.) to the problem. This approach has faced little critical scrutiny. I argue that the straightforward application of just war principles to sanctions is misguided. There is a significant difference between war and economic sanctions: war is constituted by bombing, shooting or stabbing but economic sanctions are constituted by refusing to trade. While there is a strong pro tanto duty to not bomb, shoot or stab individuals, there is no comparable pro tanto duty to trade. That does not mean sanctions are always morally permissible, only that the moral issues involved are very different. We have no reason to believe that moral principles developed to govern war are also appropriate for governing sanctions. This approach to the ethics of economic sanctions ought to be abandoned.


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