scholarly journals Varietals of Control’s Exercise

2021 ◽  
pp. 46-56
Author(s):  
Joshua Shepherd

This chapter first offers a clear explication of control’s exercise. It then briefly discusses control over omissions, before turning to a discussion of different varietals of control. So, in particular, voluntary control is central to several debates in philosophy. No acceptable account exists. This chapter extends the account of control to offer an explication of voluntary control. It then discusses this account in light of Alfred Mele’s recent work on direct control. Finally, this chapter offers an explication of a notion that is important to many who think and write about free will. This is the notion of what is “up to” an agent. The explication turns on the notion of voluntary control.

2021 ◽  
pp. 002224292110575
Author(s):  
Daniel Fernandes ◽  
Nailya Ordabayeva ◽  
Kyuhong Han ◽  
Jihye Jung ◽  
Vikas Mittal

This article examines the effect of political identity on customers’ satisfaction with the products and services they consume. Recent work suggests that conservatives are less likely to complain than liberals. Building on that work, the present research examines how political identity shapes customer satisfaction which has broad implications for customers and firms. Nine studies combine different methodologies, primary and secondary data, real and hypothetical behavior, different product categories, and diverse participant populations to show that conservatives (vs. liberals) are more satisfied with the products and services they consume. This happens because conservatives (vs. liberals) are more likely to believe in free will (i.e., that people have agency over their decisions) and therefore to trust their decisions. We document the broad and tangible downstream consequences of this effect for customers’ repurchase and recommendation intentions and firms’ sales. The association of political identity and customer satisfaction is attenuated when belief in free will is externally weakened, choice is limited, or the consumption experience is overwhelmingly positive.


Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele

Libertarianism about free will is the conjunction of a negative thesis and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that free will is incompatible with determinism. The positive thesis is that there are actions that are or involve exercises of free will—free actions, for short. While remaining neutral of the negative thesis, this book develops a detailed version of the positive thesis that represents paradigmatically free actions as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes and pays special attention to decisions caused in this way. The bulk of the book is a defense of this thesis against popular objections to theses of its kind. This defense includes solutions to problems about luck and control that are widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility. Various key concepts are clarified, including complete control, direct control, and its being up to an agent what is decided; and it is argued that free will may be accommodated without invoking agent-causation. The seven chapters on free will are preceded by an introductory chapter and three chapters on central issues in the philosophy of action that bear on standard treatments of free will—deciding to act, agents’ abilities, and commitments of a causal theory of action explanation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Catalina Mourgues ◽  
Alyson M Negreira ◽  
Brittany Quagan ◽  
Nur Evin Mercan ◽  
Halsey Niles ◽  
...  

Abstract Voluntary control over voice-hearing experiences is one of the most consistent predictors of functioning among voice-hearers. However, control over voice-hearing experiences is likely to be more nuanced and variable than may be appreciated through coarse clinician-rated measures, which provide little information about how control is conceptualized and developed. We aimed to identify key factors in the evolution of control over voice-hearing experiences in treatment-seeking (N = 7) and non-treatment-seeking (N = 8) voice-hearers. Treatment-seeking voice-hearers were drawn from local chapters of the Connecticut Hearing Voices Network, and non-treatment-seeking voice-hearers were recruited from local spiritually oriented organizations. Both groups participated in a clinical assessment, and a semi-structured interview meant to explore the types of control exhibited and how it is fostered. Using Grounded Theory, we identified that participants from both groups exerted direct and indirect control over their voice-hearing experiences. Participants that developed a spiritual explanatory framework were more likely to exert direct control over the voice-hearing experiences than those that developed a pathologizing framework. Importantly, despite clear differences in explanatory framework and distress because of their experiences, both groups underwent similar trajectories to develop control and acceptance over their voice-hearing experiences. Understanding these factors will be critical in transforming control over voice-hearing experiences from a phenomenological observation to an actionable route for clinical intervention.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Levy ◽  
Michael McKenna

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 64-72
Author(s):  
Natalia Terletska

From the position of meta-anthropology, at the article are analyzed the values of being: the value of the archetypes of good, freedom, love, unity of freedom and love, as well as the value of such an existential as the meaning of human existence.The value of the sense of being is analized in a research from such points of view as: life not only for the sake of self-preservation and minimization of suffering, but also for the development, holistic harmonious realization by a humanity of such qualities that make a person capable not only for the consumering of the benefits of civilization, but also becoming a creator of culture, seeking for the harmony of spiritual, soul and physical needs, the ability to express empathy and to overcome the existential problems of despair and fear of death, remaining a human creator, maintaining traditional human values and existentials, such as love and freedom.The value of the archetypes of good, freedom, love and the criteria of good and evil are analyzed in the field of such existentially important concepts as free will and the human right for the traditional and sacred values.The study focuses on the important theme of the loss of criteria of good and evil, which, as a rule, is proposed by transhumanism, having a basis for this in the philosophy of the postmodern era, as well as the search for ways out of the existential, spiritual, soul and moral-ethical crisis in order to preserve the human values.The theoretical basis of the study was the work of philosophers of different periods, studies of psychologists and psychoanalysts, including contemporary, recent work of domestic researchers in meta-anthropology, as well as recent work of foreign representatives of transhumanism.There is made a conclusion that the preserving the existantials of the culture in human existence is impossible without maintaining the traditional criteria of good and evil in the context of sacred transcendental values.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 59-65
Author(s):  
Natalia Terletska

From the point of view of metaanthropology, the article analyzes the values of human being: the value of security, power, freedom, love, unity of freedom and love, as well as the value of such existentials as the sense & meaningfullness of human being & exsistance.The value of the sense of human being & exsistance is analized in a research from such points of view as: life not only for the sake of self-preservation and minimization of suffering, but also for the development, holistic harmonious realization by a humanity of such qualities that make a person capable not only for the consumering of the benefits of civilization, but also becoming a creator of culture, seeking the harmony of spiritual, soul and physical needs, the ability to express empathy and to overcome the existential problems of despair and fear of death, remaining a human creator, maintaining traditional human values and existentials, such as love and freedom.The value of the meaning of human life is analyzed in the realm of such existential concepts as free will and human right to have traditional values.The study focuses on the important theme of the loss of meaningful existentials, which, as a rule, is proposed by transhumanism, having a basis for this in the philosophy of the postmodern era, as well as the search for ways out of the existential, spiritual, soul and moral-ethical crisis in order to preserve the human values. The theoretical basis of the study was the work of philosophers of different periods, studies of psychologists and psychoanalysts, including contemporary, recent work of domestic researchers in meta-anthropology, as well as recent work of foreign representatives of transhumanism.There is made a conclusion that the unification of the values of freedom and love in a person’s life is impossible without preserving the traditional existentials of culture, in particular, such as spirituality, empathy, the capacity for compassion and feelings, which make sense of a human existence & being.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Vargas

AbstractI consider some themes and issues arising in recent work on moral responsibility, focusing on three recent books—Carlos Moya's Moral Responsibility, Al Mele's Free Will and Luck, and John Martin Fischer's My Way. I argue that these texts collectively suggest some difficulties with the way in which many issues are currently framed in the free will debates, including disputes about what constitutes compatibilism and incompatibilism and the relevance of intuitions and ordinary language for describing the metaphysics of free will and moral responsibility. I also argue that each of the accounts raise more particular puzzles: it is unclear to what extent Moya's account is properly an account of free will; Mele's account raises questions about the significance of luck for compatibilist theories; and Fischer's account of the value of responsibility as self-expression raises questions about the normative significance of moral responsibility.


2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-460
Author(s):  
ERIK J. WIELENBERG

AbstractI advance a challenge to the coherence of Alvin Plantinga's brand of theism that focuses on Plantinga's celebrated free-will defence. This challenge draws on (but goes beyond) some ideas advanced by Wes Morriston. The central claim of my challenge is that Plantinga's free-will defence, together with certain claims that are plausible and/or to which Plantinga is committed, both requires and rules out the claim that it is possible that God is capable of engaging in moral goodness. I then critically evaluate an interesting strategy for responding to my challenge inspired by some recent work by Kevin Timpe, arguing that the response ultimately fails. The upshot of the article is that Plantinga's brand of theism is internally inconsistent; furthermore, because the claims that are in tension with the free-will defence are ones that many theists are likely to find attractive, many theists are not able to appeal to Plantinga's free-will defence in responding to the logical problem of evil.


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