Settlement Achievement

2021 ◽  
pp. 27-60
Author(s):  
Levy O’Flynn.
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
General Public ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Public Values ◽  
The Public ◽  
Peace Agreements ◽  
Normative Constraints

This chapter focuses on the first of two principal rationales supporting the use of peace referendums, namely settlement achievement. The chapter starts by locating the argument of the book in the public reason tradition, and specifically in the work of John Rawls. The chapter identifies how public values often feature in crucial, if generally under-appreciated, ways in peace agreements—not just as lofty aspirations but as powerful normative constraints on the content of particular constitutional clauses. The chapter then defends the claim that non-elites may be as, or even more, adept than some classes of elites (such as governmental, ethnic, or secessionist leaders) at deliberating about those values. We accept that constitutional settlements often contain a great deal of institutional detail; and we also accept that elites are usually better placed to deliberate about that detail. Yet we explain why the comparative advantage may rest with non-elites when it comes to deliberating about general public values. All of this is contingent on robust deliberative institutional supports being in place, both through the course of the referendum campaign and at the final vote.

Religion in the EU: Using Modified Public Reason to Define European Human Rights

2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (11) ◽  
pp. 1439-1468 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian M. Awe
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Public ◽  
Common Value ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
Dialectical Process ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrines ◽  
The Eu

At the current stage of its evolution, the European Union (“Union” or “EU”) has reached a juncture where many leaders and scholars believe that greater integration is both desirable and necessary. Presumably, a primary method by which greater solidarity and integration can be achieved within the EU is through the public inclusion of common value-laden concepts – as defined through a dialectical process – present within comprehensive doctrines such as religion. To date, however, an effective and inclusive means for utilizing religion in this manner has yet to be formulated. In response, this article takes two prominent paradigms – Jurgen Habermas' intersubjective discourse theory and John Rawls' liberalism – to approach the problem and draws from them a new solution that, while tied to their theoretical underpinnings, is nonetheless a novel approach to achieving greater integration within the Union. Under this new framework, the process of legislatively defining human rights allows the morality common to European comprehensive doctrines – including official and unofficial religions – to bolster the Union's solidarity, legitimacy, and democracy both procedurally and substantively.

What Scope for Ethics in the Public Sphere? Principled Autonomy and the Antinomy of Practical Reason

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-498
Author(s):  
Maureen Junker-Kenny
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Practical Reason ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Human Agency ◽  
Jürgen Habermas ◽  
The Public ◽  
Jurgen Habermas ◽  
The Public Sphere

Concepts of ‘public reason’ vary according to the underlying understandings of theoretical and practical reason; they make a difference to what can be argued for in the public sphere as justified expectations to oneself and fellow-citizens. What is the significance for the scope of ethics when two neo-Kantian theorists of public reason, John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, propose a reduced reading of the ‘antinomy’ highlighted in Kant’s analysis of practical reason? The desire for meaning, unrelinquishable for humans, is frustrated when moral initiatives are met with hostility. Kant resolves the antinomy between morality and happiness by invoking the concept of a creator God whose concern that our anticipatory moral actions should not fail encourages the hope on which human agency relies. Defining the scope of ethics by the unconditional character of reason ( Vernunft) rules out the minimisation of ethics to what can safely be expected to be delivered.

Public Reason, Private Virtue, and Political Philosophy: Religious Approaches to the Progressive Income Tax

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-199
Author(s):  
Michael A. Livingston
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Religious Texts ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
The Public ◽  
Policy Debates ◽  
Religious Perspectives ◽  
Partial Exclusion

The use of religious texts in public policy debates has been the cause of significant controversy. Believing Christians, Jews, and others naturally suggest that their faith should play a role in real-world policy discussions. But others suggest that such arguments may be dangerous and, in any event, lack persuasive power to those not part of the same religious tradition. The public reason theory, frequently associated with John Rawls, states that religious arguments are permissible only when supported by evidence that would be accessible to those who do not share the same underlying religious beliefs. While religious arguments are most commonly associated with abortion, homosexuality, and other social issues, they have also been applied to tax policy. Conservatives have cited the Biblical tithe as evidence in support of a flat, low-rate tax. Liberals have cited Biblical injunctions to practice social justice and protect the poor in favor of progressive, redistributive tax systems. These arguments vary in different religious traditions, but they share a sense that traditional religious texts remain relevan to the contemporary debate. The tax experience suggests the dangers of religious perspectives are frequently exaggerated. Religious arguments frequently contradict each other and only rarely do they make an appeal to direct, irrefutable divine guidance. A larger problem is that religious guidance is often inexact in nature, and religious people may have a tendency to become overly emotional in presenting them. A degree of modesty making such arguments, rather than a full or partial exclusion, appears the best solution.

Introduction

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-38
Author(s):  
J. Benjamin Hurlbut
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Embryo Research ◽  
American Democracy ◽  
The Public ◽  
Scientific Authority ◽  
Central Argument ◽  
Human Embryo Research

The introduction introduces the topic and central argument of the book: that at the heart of the human embryo research debates was the question of how the public should reason together about a domain of science and technology that touches upon the most fundamental dimensions of human life. It introduces the methodological approach and coproductionist theoretical framework of the study. It introduces the idea of the “constitutional position of science” in American democracy, and illustrates the unacknowledged but constitutional position of scientific authority in John Rawls' idea of public reason.

scholarly journals Sprawiedliwość polityczna a neutralność. Kilka uwag o rozumnej naturze liberalizmu politycznego Johna Rawlsa i Charlesa Larmore’a

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 188-219
Author(s):  
Rafał Prostak
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Political Community ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Political Values ◽  
The Public ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Moral Position ◽  
Political Decisions

Two fundamental features of a liberal political community are usually identified in contemporary deliberations: (1) there is an inevitable pluralism of visions of good and worthy life, blended into a wide range of religious, philosophical and ethical positions; (2) those who are in power are under an obligation to set public matters in such a way as to avoid discrimination of any class of the ruled. In respect of (1) and (2), it is presumed that the process of enacting, implementing and executing public law shall be separated from any perfectionist moral position, because being impartial when making political decisions is a prerequisite for non-discriminatory politics. This kind of politics looks for proper, convincing and comprehensible reasons to establish a new legal standard of behaviour in the ‘public reason’ – a set of moral statements and political values commonly shared in an open, pluralistic and tolerant society, which does not provide decisive answers to any questions about the meaning of life and does not bring us closer to discover its ideal. This article tries to reproduce the main notions and ideas of leading, contemporary liberal philosophers – John Rawls and Charles Larmore – that deal with the very nature of impartiality of a liberal state and the ability of policymakers to be impartial. It also presents the critical views of Stephen Macedo and Nicholas Wolterstorff, who question the possibility of building a neutral state.

scholarly journals The Formalization of Islamic Sharia in Public Sphere: A Case Study of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Hatim Gazali
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
New Order ◽  
The Public ◽  
Democratic Nation

Following the stepped down of the New Order, the movements of establishing Islamic sharia in Indonesia has increased. Some of the organizations which promote Islamic sharia on their movements are Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). This paper observes the movements of HTI by using the perspective of public reason, especially the theories of John Rawls and Abdullah An-Naim. The results show that HTI should use more democratic methods in delivering its notion. As Indonesia is a democratic nation, creating the appropriate form of discussion and conversation would be an effective way in introducing Islamic sharia to the public. Later, the decision of accepting or rejecting the idea is in the hands of the public. Keywords:Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Islamic sharia, and public reason 

Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Charney
Keyword(s):  
Civil Society ◽  
Public Sphere ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Associational Life ◽  
The Public ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
Domain I

Theorists of democracy emphasize the importance of a public sphere, distinct from the apparatus of the state, where citizens can freely associate, deliberate, and engage in collective will formation. Discourse ethicists and deliberative democrats locate the public sphere within civil society and the manifold associations that comprise it. For Seyla Benhabib, the public sphere is constituted by the anonymous “public conversation” of civil society. By contrast, John Rawls has a much more limited conception of the public sphere. For Rawls, public reason, which establishes norms for democratic discourse, applies to a limited domain. I defend Rawls's view against the charge that it depends upon an untenable distinction between the public and nonpublic spheres. I argue that Rawls's more limited “liberal” conception better guarantees the heterogeneity of associational life in civil society. I then argue that Rawls violates his own principles by partially collapsing the public-nonpublic distinction with potentially illiberal consequences.

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