Hypothetical Consent and Political Obligation

2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-63
Author(s):  
Chris King ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Hypothetical Consent ◽  
Normative Argument ◽  
As If

Hypothetical Consent Situations are widely employed in normative argument as if they help to justify normative claims or to explain normative facts. Historically, however, there is plenty of suspicion about them. In this light, there is a tendency to prefer theories of political obligation that do not depend upon hypothetical consent to explain political obligations – those that appeal, for instance, a general moral principle (like a natural duty) or to actual consent. This paper makes no full-throated defense of hypothetical consent. But it does try to identify more carefully than is usually done what sorts of cases they represent and to show that at least two concerns about them are unwarranted.

On Using the Concept of Hypothetical Consent

1989 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 793-808
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Lewis
Keyword(s):  
Political Authority ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Subjective Meaning ◽  
Hypothetical Consent ◽  
The Right ◽  
As If

AbstractThis article argues that the concept of hypothetical consent advanced by Hanna Pitkin has little force as a basis for political obligation. It reformulates the meaning of hypothetical consent by emphasizing the subjectivity of consent, and it points out how this subjective meaning expresses the right of actual citizens to dissent. It suggests how subjective hypothetical consent can be used from the perspective of a sovereign as a standard that requires the sovereign to treat citizens as if they had consented, although they have not consented. It concludes by arguing that although this standard may appear to corrode political authority, instead it enhances political authority. It drives the sovereign to relinquish the claim that citizens are obligated to obey, and to treat them so they will have reason to obey.

scholarly journals Political Obligations and Public Goods

Res Publica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isaac Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Political Obligations

AbstractThe principle of fairness is a moral principle which states that individuals are under an obligation to contribute towards beneficial cooperative projects. It has been appealed to in arguing that citizens are obligated to pay for public goods that their government supplies. Yet the principle has faced a number of powerful objections, most notably those of Robert Nozick. In responding to some of these objections, proponents of the principle have placed a number of conditions on its application. However, by doing so, they have reduced the number of public goods that the principle can explain obligations to contribute towards, and consequently limited its relevance to questions of political obligation. I argue here that a more permissive version of the principle, with fewer conditions on its application, will perform equally well in responding to Nozick's objections. This opens up the possibility of a theory of political obligation that relies more heavily on the principle of fairness than has previously been thought possible.

Political Obligation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Philosophical Anarchism

Although it is an ancient and much-discussed problem, political obligation continues to pose challenges to political and legal philosophers. Some of these challenges are conceptual, for they require explanations of what a political obligation is and how it differs from other obligations, duties, or responsibilities. Other challenges concern the practical matters of whether and to what extent political obligations are truly binding on us. In this respect, the foremost challenge is that of anarchism, including the “philosophical anarchism” that has become increasingly influential in recent decades. This chapter aims to meet these challenges by setting out a coherent account of political obligation and providing reason to believe that neither political nor philosophical anarchists have made a satisfactory a priori case against the possibility of a compelling theory of political obligation.

Reformist Consent and Political Obligation

1991 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 676-690 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Plausible Model ◽  
Voluntary Character ◽  
Voluntary Choice ◽  
Consent Theory

It is commonly held that theories of political obligation based on consent, whether express or tacit, cannot account for most people's obligations; that political obligations generally stem from being born into specific societies rather than from voluntary choice. In recent years, consent theorists have turned to ‘reformist’ consent, arguing that consent theory could be rescued if political institutions were reformed to allow the possibility of widespread consent. Various possible reforms are examined and shown to be inadequate. The most obvious mechanism, ‘consent-or-leave’, is disqualified because it is coercive. Other mechanisms would be unable to induce widespread consent while preserving consent's essential voluntary character. I refer to the most plausible model as ‘Hobbes's choice’, though because it must unacceptably limit non-consentors' ability to defend themselves, it too is unsatisfactory.

Partisanship and Political Obligation

Politics ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Ordinary Citizens

Political parties have generally been disregarded in the literature on political obligation. In this article I argue that, regardless of whether ordinary citizens or residents of a polity have any political obligations, partisanship generates its own kind of political obligations. Participating in party politics qua party members, supporters, activists or even mere voters produces benefits that generate corresponding and proportionate political obligations for those who enjoy them. The political obligations of partisans are easier to justify than those of ordinary citizens as the conditions under which the benefits of partisanship can be rendered excludable are easier to obtain.

scholarly journals CONSENT TO UNJUST INSTITUTIONS

Legal Theory ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Bas van der Vossen
Keyword(s):  
Ab Initio ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Political Obligations

Abstract John Rawls wrote that people can voluntarily acquire political obligations to institutions only on the condition that those institutions are at least reasonably just. When an institution is seriously unjust, by contrast, attempts to create political obligation are “void ab initio.” However, Rawls's own explanation for this thought was deeply problematic, as are the standard alternatives. In this paper, I offer an argument for why Rawls's intuition was right and trace its implications for theories of authority and political obligation. These, I claim, are more radical than is often thought.

When Protest and Speech Collide

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Free Speech ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
College Campus ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Public Protest ◽  
The Face ◽  
As If

Even when it is not violent, a disruptive public protest often raises our hackles. Even when it is not illegal, we might wonder whether it is morally justifiable. In particular, one of the ways a protest can be disruptive—interfering with the ability of others to speak or express themselves—might seem especially damning. Such speech-interfering protests are often vilified, as if they fly in the face of the principle of freedom of speech, or even of the Constitution itself. Ought a protest’s interfering with the speech of others to count morally against that protest—is it forbidden by a moral principle of free speech? While it will be morally wrong in many cases, the moral presumption against it, even in the setting of a college campus, is not as overwhelming as is often supposed.

Fair Play and Cooperative Practices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Dagger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Principle ◽  
Fair Play ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Cooperative Enterprises ◽  
Moral Duties ◽  
The Relationship

The moral principle at the foundation of the theory developed in this book is sometimes called the principle of fairness and sometimes the principle of fair play. In this chapter, I argue for the latter term because it more clearly indicates that questions about one person’s moral duties to others typically arise within cooperative enterprises or endeavors, such as games. To support this claim, the chapter begins by distinguishing fair play from broader considerations of fairness, after which I turn to explication of the concept of a cooperative practice. To establish the connection of fair play to moral duties and political obligations, I then examine the relationship among cooperation, justice, and fair play. I conclude that the polity is properly conceived not only as a cooperative practice, but as a cooperative meta-practice—that is, a cooperative practice that enables people to engage in narrower cooperative practices.

Obligation, political

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. John Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Political Roles ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Quality ◽  
The Subject

The problem of political obligation has been one of the central concerns of political philosophy throughout the history of the subject. Political obligations are the moral obligations of citizens to support and comply with the requirements of their political authorities; and the problem of political obligation is that of understanding why (or if) citizens in various kinds of states are bound by such obligations. Most theorists conservatively assume that typical citizens in reasonably just states are in fact bound by these obligations. They take the problem to be that of advancing an account of the ground(s) or justification(s) of political obligation that is consistent with affirming widespread obligations. Other theorists, however, anarchists prominent among them, do not accept the conservative assumption, leaving open the possibility that the best theory of political obligation may entail that few, if any, citizens in actual states have political obligations. Much of the modern debate about political obligation consists of attempts either to defend or to move beyond the alleged defects of voluntarist theories. Voluntarists maintain that only our own voluntary acts (such as freely consenting to the authority of our governments) can bind us to obedience. Because actual political societies appear not to be voluntary associations, however, voluntarism seems unable to satisfy conservative theoretical ambitions. Some individualists turn as a result to nonvoluntarist theories of political obligation, attempting to ground obligations in the receipt by citizens of the benefits governments supply or in the moral quality of their political institutions. Others reject individualism altogether, defending communitarian theories that base our political obligations in our social and political roles or identities. Individualist anarchists reject instead the conservative ambitions of such theories, embracing a voluntarism which entails that most citizens simply have no political obligations.

Resistance in the Age of Trump

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Candice Delmas
Keyword(s):  
Hate Crimes ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
The Law ◽  
Political Association

This chapter uses the book’s previous arguments to inquire into American citizens’ and officials’ present political obligations under President Donald Trump. Citizens are bound by the natural duty of justice, the principle of fairness, the Samaritan duty, and political association to resist the various injustices threatened or enacted by Trump’s administration, including by protesting, educating themselves, disobeying the law, intervening in cases of hate crimes, acting in solidarity, and donating cash and time to movements. The chapter then presents the recent debate over whether to serve under Trump, and argues that civil servants (officials and bureaucrats) have a political obligation to minimize damage from within, that is based on the duty of justice and the principle of fairness. Finally, it argues that resistance from within, given its anti-democratic appearance, should generate feelings of ambivalence among civil servants.

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