The Open Method Of Coordination: Obstinate Or Obsolete?

Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Armstrong

Policy coordination in one form or another has been a feature of EU governance for the past two decades. Developing initially as a mechanism through which to coordinate national economic policies in the shadow of economic and monetary union (EMU), and extending to the coordination of employment policies through the European Employment Strategy, by the 2000s, policy coordination was being heralded as a new form of governance to be deployed to achieve the aims of the Lisbon Strategy of economic and social reform. Indeed, such was the interest in this new form of EU governance, it even acquired its own distinctive nomenclature—the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC).

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
LB ◽  
JHR

In between the writing of this editorial and the publication of this issue of EuConst, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in everyday parlance the ‘Fiscal Compact’, will have been signed by the representatives of the governments of the contracting parties — the member states of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The Fiscal Compact is intended to foster budgetary discipline, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area.


Author(s):  
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol

The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) created in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty was famously incomplete. The decision to create a European single currency was taken without agreeing at the same time on the introduction of traditional accompanying features of some other monetary unions, namely: substantial financial transfers from richer to less developed regions, a credible framework for macroeconomic policy coordination, and European-wide provisions for banking regulation and supervision, to name but a few. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty set out an unfinished, or ‘lopsided union’, with the predominance of monetary union over economic union. The titles of the multiple reports published since 1992, such as the Van Rompuy report of 2012, ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, the Five Presidents’ Report of 2015, ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’, and the Commission’s ‘Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union’ of 2017 highlight this lopsidedness very well.


Author(s):  
Dermot Hodson

This chapter examines the role of the economic and monetary union (EMU) in the European Union’s macroeconomic policy-making. As of 2015, nineteen members of the euro area have exchanged national currencies for the euro and delegated responsibility for monetary policy and financial supervision to the European Central Bank (ECB). EMU is a high-stakes experiment in new modes of EU policy-making insofar as the governance of the euro area relies on alternatives to the traditional Community method, including policy coordination, intensive transgovernmentalism, and delegation to de novo bodies. The chapter first provides an overview of the origins of the EMU before discussing the launch of the single currency and the sovereign debt crisis. It also considers variations on the Community method, taking into account the ECB and the European Stability Mechanism.


1990 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 3-6

Our forecasts, like those of the Treasury published in the Autumn Statement, are based on the assumption that oil prices will fall back next year, as the crisis in the Gulf is resolved. We describe briefly below what might be the consequences, for the world economy and for Britain, if oil prices were to be $45 a barrel for the foreseeable future, as might happen as a result of a long war.In Chapter I our main forecasts assume the continuation of existing economic policies, which we interpret as being consistent with a gradual move towards economic and monetary union. In Chapter III we consider some of the alternative policy options which might be considered if the Labour Party wins the next election.


1997 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 23-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Feldstein

EMU would be an economic liability. A single currency would cause, at most, small trade and investment gains but would raise average cyclical unemployment and possibly raise inflation, perpetuate structural unemployment, and increase the risk of protectionism. EMU is nevertheless being pursued in order to create a political union. Fundamental disagreements among member states about economic policies, foreign and military policies, and the sharing of political power are likely to create future intra-European conflicts. A United Europe would be a formidable participant in the twenty-first century's global balance of power, with uncertain consequences for world stability and peace.


Equilibrium ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-152
Author(s):  
Anna Kozłowska

This article aims to identify the relationship between the phenomenon of home bias and the process of European integration. During the past decades, European integration has evolved from a Common Market and the Customs Union, the Internal Market and Economic, and Monetary Union. Despite the improvements in integration of European markets, their potential is not fully exploited. Countries consumption baskets and inwestment portfolios still contain a predominant share of domestically produced products and domestic assets and national-born workers working in national labour markets. This is commonly known as the phenomenon of home bias.


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