Empirical and Rational Psychology

Author(s):  
Ian Proops

This chapter examines the conceptions of rational and empirical psychology developed in the writings of Kant’s predecessors and in his own pre-critical writings. The views of the following figures are examined in detail: Wolff, Gottsched, Baumgarten, Meier, and the Kant of the ‘L1’ metaphysics lectures. Once this background has been surveyed, the chapter goes on to explore: Kant’s conception of a distinctively pure rational psychology; his science of self-consciousness; and his two contrasting understandings of how rational psychology might be pursued. The chapter argues that Kant’s target in the Paralogisms chapter is an idealized ‘pure’ rational psychology, an aspiring a priori ‘science’ of the soul, whose closest antecedents in the tradition are the views of Baumgarten, on the one hand, and his own views in the ‘L1’ metaphysics lectures, on the other.

2009 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-147
Author(s):  
Marie Allard ◽  
Camille Bronsard ◽  
Gilles McDougall

ABSTRACT While the meaningful theorems of neo-classical theory of the producer are well known, the neo-keynesian counterparts are not. Therefore, this paper will present those new meaningful theorems and their relations with neo-classical theory. On the one hand, this paper is of interest to the theoretician who would want to use the properties of comparative statics of the producer with quantitative rationing. On the other hand, since a neo-keynesian structural form is presented, the econometrician will be interested in imposing the meaningful theorems of this theory as a priori restrictions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30
Author(s):  
Nenad Miscevic ◽  

What is the role of toleration in the present-day crisis, marked by the inflow of refugees and increase in populism? The seriousness of the crises demands efforts of active toleration, acceptance, and integration of refugees and the like. Active toleration brings with itself a series of very demanding duties, divided into immediate ones involving immediate Samaritan aid to people at our doors and the long-term ones involving their acculturation and possibilities of decent life for them. A cosmopolitan attitude can contribute a lot. In the context of a refugee crisis, cosmopolitanism is not disappearing but showing its non-traditional, more Samaritan face turned not to distant strangers, as the classical one, but towards strangers at our doors.We have conjectured that this work of active toleration can diminish the need for the passive one: the well-integrated immigrant is no longer seen as a strange, exotic person with an incomprehensible and unacceptable attitude, but as one of us so that her attitudes become less irritating and provocative. The social-psychological approach that sees integration as involving both the preservation of central aspects of the original identity and the copy-pasting of the new one over it offers an interesting rationale for the conjecture: once integrated, the former newcomer is perceived as one of ‘us’ and her views stop being exotic, incomprehensible and a priori unacceptable. Given the amount of need for toleration, and difficulties and paradoxes connected with its passive variety, the conjecture, if true, might be a piece of good news.Finally, we have briefly touched the question of deeper causes of the crisis. Once one turns to this question, the traditional cosmopolitan issues come back to the forefront: the deep poverty and unjust distribution on the one hand, and conflicts and wars on the other. Cosmopolitans have a duty to face these issues, and this is where active global toleration leads in our times.


It has always appeared a paradox in mathematics, that by em­ploying what are called imaginary or impossible quantities, and sub­jecting them to the same algebraic operations as those which are performed on quantities that are real and possible, the results ob­tained should always prove perfectly correct. The author inferring from this fact, that the operations of algebra are of a more compre­hensive nature than its definitions and fundamental principles, was led to inquire what extension might be given to these definitions and principles, so as to render them strictly applicable to quantities of every description, whether real or imaginary. This deficiency, he conceives, may be supplied by having recourse to certain geometrical considerations. By taking into account the directions as well as the lengths of lines drawn in a given plane, from a given point, the ad­dition of such lines may admit of being performed in the same man­ner as the composition of motions in dynamics; and four such lines may be regarded as proportional, both in length and direction, when they are proportionals in length, and, when also the fourth is inclined to the third at the same angle that the second is to the first. From this principle he deduces, that if a line drawn in any given di­rection be assumed as a positive quantity, and consequently its op­posite a negative quantity, a line drawn at right angles to the posi­tive or negative direction will be represented by the square root of a negative quantity ; and a line drawn in an oblique direction will be represented by the sum of two quantities, the one either positive or negative, and the other the square root of a negative quantity. On this subject, the author published a treatise in April 1828; since which period several objections have been made to this hypothesis. The purpose of the present paper is to answer these objections. The first of these is, that impossible roots should be considered merely as the indications of some impossible condition, which the pro­position that has given rise to them involves; and that they have in fact no real or absolute existence. To this it is replied by the author, that although such a statement may be true in some cases, it is by no means necessarily so in all; and that these quantities re­semble in this respect fractional and negative roots, which, whenever they are excluded by the nature of the question, are indeed signs of impossibility, but yet in other cases are admitted to be real and significant quantities. We have therefore no stronger reasons, à priori , for denying the real existence of what are called impossible roots, because they are in some cases the signs of impossibility, than we should have for refusing that character to fractional or negative roots on similar grounds.


2000 ◽  
Vol 21 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 86-103
Author(s):  
Dieter Wandschneider

AbstractThe Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modem thinking until the present time, has become obsolete. It shall be shown that Hegel's objective-idealistic conception of nature discloses, in comparison to that of Descartes, new perspectives for the comprehension of nature and that this, in turn, results in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature.If the argumentation concerning philosophy of nature is intended to catch up with the concrete Being-of-nature and to meet it in its concretion, then this is impossible for the finite spirit in a strictly a priori sense — this is the thesis supported here which is not at all close to Hegel. As the argumentation rather has to consider the conditions of realization concerning the Being-of-nature, too, it is compelled to take up empirical elements — concerning the organism, for instance, system-theoretical aspects, physical and chemical features of the nervous system, etc. With that, on the one hand, empirical-scientific premises are assumed (e.g. the lawlikeness of nature), which on the other hand become (now close to Hegel) possibly able to be founded in the frame of a Hegelian-idealistic conception. In this sense, a double strategy of empirical-scientific concretization and objective-idealistic foundation is followed up, which represents the methodical basic principle of the developed considerations.In the course of the undertaking, the main aspects of the whole Hegelian design concerning the philosophy of nature are considered — space and time, mass and motion, force and law of nature, the organism, the problem of evolution, psychic being — as well as Hegel's basic thesis concerning the philosophy of nature, that therein a tendency towards coherence and idealization manifests itself in the sense of a (categorically) gradually rising succession of nature: from the separateness of space to the ideality of sensation. In the sense of the double strategy of concretization and foundation it is shown that on the one hand possibilities of philosophical penetration concerning actual empirical-scientific results are opened, and on the other hand — in tum — a re-interpretation of Hegel's theorem on the basis of physical, evolution-theoretical and system-theoretical argumentation also becomes possible. In this mutual crossing-over and elucidation of empirical and Hegelian argumentation not only do perspectives of a new comprehension of nature become visible, but also, at the same time — as an essential consequence of this methodical principle — thoughts on the possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Kamnev ◽  
◽  
Vladimir Bystrov

The paper discusses science fiction literature in its relation to some aspects of the socio-anthropological problem, such as the representation of the Other. Given the diversity of sci-fi genres, a researcher always deals either with the direct representation of the Other (a creature different from an existing human being), or with its indirect, mediated form when the Other, in the original sense of this term, is revealed to the reader or viewer through the optics of some Other World. The article describes two modes of representing the Other by sci-fi literature, conventionally designated as scientist and anti-anthropic. The scientist rep-resentation constructs exclusively-rational premises for the relationship with the Other. Edmund Hus-serl’s concept of truth, which is the same for humans, non-humans, angels, and gods, can be considered as its historical and philosophical correlate. The anti-anthropic representation, which is more attractive to sci-fi authors, has its origins in the experience of the “disenchantment” of the world characteristic of mod-ern man, especially in the tragic feeling of incommensurability of a finite human existence and the infinity of the cosmic abysses. The historical and philosophical correlate of this anti-anthropic representation can be found in Kant’s teaching of a priori cognition forms, which may be different for other thinking beings. The model of an attitude to the Other therefore cannot be based on rational foundations. As a literary ex-ample where these two ways of representing the Other are found, we propose the analysis of The Martian Chronicles by Ray Bradbury, which, on the one hand, offers the fictional extrapolation of the colonization of North America and the inevitable contacts with its indigenous population. On the other hand, The Martian Chronicles depicts a powerful and technologically advanced Martian civilization, which disap-pears for some unknown reason, or ceases to contact the settlers. The combination of these two ways of representing the Other allows Bradbury to effectively romanticize and mystify the unique historical experience of colonization, thus modifying the Frontier myth.


2010 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Helton Adverse

This paper’s aim is to elucidate the meaning of the paradoxical expression “ontology of the present”, utilized by Foucault in his latest works. To achieve this goal, I adopted a twofold strategy: on the one hand, it was useful to recall that this was not the first time Foucault used a deranging expression. In the 1960’s, in the period he developed his “archeology of knowledge”, we can find in some of his major works the husserlian term “historical a priori”. On the other hand, I had to analyze some aspects of his interpretation of the modernity that we can find in his last articles, interviews and lessons in the Collège de France. In these occasions, Kant’s philosophy was the main theoretical influence.


2019 ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Hoda El Shakry

Literary critic and novelist Muḥammad Barrāda’s (b.1938) experimental 1987 Luʿbat al-Nisyān [the Game of Forgetting] is considered the Arabic postmodernist novel par excellence. The “nuṣ riwāʾī” [novelistic text] oscillates between historical, narrative, and meta-narrative time, as well as between diegetic and meta-textual narrators. Rather than aligning its authorial decentering and rhizomatic narrative structure with the collapsing of theological discourse as a totalizing force, this chapter reads Luʿbat al-Nisyān through Qurʾanic narratology and intertextuality. It situates the novel, on the one hand, in relation to Barrāda’s extensive critical writings on literary experimentation [tajrīb] and translation of Mikhail Bakhtin. On the other, it theorizes the work through narrative and formal modes and inflected by the Qurʾan—such as iltifāt, or rhetorical code-switching. Moreover, Luʿbat al-Nisyān’s use of multiple narrative perspectives and genealogies critically interrogates the hermeneutical practices surrounding the documentation, verification, and transmission of the apostolic tradition of hadith.


1977 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Amélia Cabral ◽  
Jorge Afonso Garcia

The study and analysis of the various factors influencing insurance risks constitutes an intricate and usually quite extensive problem. We have to consider on the one hand the nature and heterogeneity of the elements we have been able to measure, and on the other the problem of deciding—without knowing exactly what results to expect—on the types of analysis to carry out and the form in which to present the results.These difficulties, essentially stemming from the fact that we cannot easily define “a priori” a measure of influence, can be overcome only by using highly sophisticated mathematical models. The researcher must define his objectives clearly if he is to avoid spending too much of his time in exploring such models.Either for these reasons or for lack of our experience in this field we were led to the study of three models, presenting entirely different characteristics though based on the analysis and behaviour of mean value fluctuations, measured by their variances or by the least-squares method.Our first model, described in II. 1, associates the notion of influence with the notion of variance. It analyses in detail the alteration of the mean values variance, when what we refer to as a “margination” is executed in the parameter space, taking each of the parameters in turn. We start off by having n distinct parameters, reducing them by one with each step.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-151
Author(s):  
Anthony Brueckner

In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would like to comment on a couple of aspects of Barel’s article. First, I have my own take, different from Barel’s, on the question of whether we can sketch an a priori anti-skeptical argument proceeding from perceptual anti-individualism. Second, I discuss the question whether Barel’s “Rationalistic” anti-skeptical argument is successful.


1898 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 129-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul F. Perdrizet

The Imperial Ottoman Museum has recently acquired a very valuable and interesting gold ring (Fig. 1) which was found in 1894 or 1895 in a tomb at Lampsacus. The Museum authorities subsequently undertook further excavations in the necropolis of which this tomb formed part, and it is a matter for great regret that no detailed report of the results was drawn up; we are therefore forced to content ourselves with the somewhat meagre information given by the late Baltazzi-Bey to M. Salomon Reinach, according to which the necropolis yielded fragments of red-figured pottery and specimens of silver autonomous coins of Lampsacus. Both these details are of importance in fixing the date of the ring; for on the one hand silver coins of this class belong almost exclusively to the fourth century, and on the other, the manufacture of painted vases was not continued after that date. When we add that the evidence of coins and inscriptions proves that this was the most flourishing period in the history of Lampsacus, we have strong a priori reason for assigning the ring to this century, while a consideration of the style of the intaglio may help us to fix the date within narrower limits.


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