Electoral Systems in Context

Author(s):  
Nathan Allen

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld

Throughout its history, India has employed first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules for nearly all of its legislative elections. Though India uses a relatively common set of electoral rules, three features of India’s FPTP electoral system stand out. First, India’s election constituencies exhibit persistent malapportionment, even after a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries. Second, India mandates representation for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups—and, more recently, women at the local level—by setting aside, or “reserving,” seats in which only members of certain groups may compete for office. Third, political parties often form pre-election alliances in which multiple parties agree not to field candidates against one another. As a result of frequent pre-election alliances, India’s party system exhibits a number of characteristics rarely found in countries using FPTP rules.


2018 ◽  
pp. 228-238
Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as an independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages, and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.


Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart

The electoral system of Israel is an “extreme” example of proportional representation because of its use of a single nationwide district. This feature has been a constant since 1949, while secondary features, such as legal thresholds and the proportional seat-allocation formula, have changed and had an impact on degrees of proportionality. The party system is highly fragmented, as expected in extreme proportional systems. By applying the Seat Product Model to indices of election outcomes, it is possible to determine whether Israel’s system is more or less fragmented and proportional than expected for its institutional design. This chapter reports that the long-term average outputs are about as expected, but they have fluctuated over time. Some of these fluctuations reflect changes in the secondary features of the system, while others are the results of political factors independent of the institutions.


Author(s):  
Agustí Bosch

This chapter examines the Spanish electoral system, meaning—first and foremost—the one used to elect the lower house (Congreso de los Diputados). After a brief description of its components, the chapter assesses how its scarce proportionality has traditionally led Spanish politics towards a two-party system. The chapter also assesses some other of its alleged outcomes (such as the malapportionment, the weight of the regional parties, or the robustness of democracy) and its prospects for the future. Finally, the chapter also examines the ‘other’ Spanish electoral systems—that is, the ones used to elect the Senate, the local councils, the regional parliaments, and the Spanish seats in the European Parliament.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110594
Author(s):  
Danica Fink-Hafner ◽  
Meta Novak

In Slovenia, political parties have been the key actors in opting for a proportional electoral system and constitutional choice of a parliamentary system, both of which are believed to help to develop a consensual type of democracy. However, a vicious circle involving a fragmented party system and a proportional electoral system has not only led to polarisation within the party system, but has also contributed to problems of democratic governability and legitimacy. The destabilisation of the party system since 2011 has not only caused a crisis of political legitimacy and accountability, but has also contributed to a recent trend of de-democratisation. At the moment, there does not appear to be a realistic alternative to the existing electoral rules in the near future, in spite of recurring calls by an anti-communist party (Slovenian Democratic Party) to introduce a majoritarian system.


Author(s):  
Erik S. Herron

For electoral systems to exert expected effects on voters, candidates, and parties, institutions should be durable and consistent. If political actors believe that the rules are likely to change, they may pursue strategies and tactics that seem to be at odds with the electoral system’s underlying incentive structure. This chapter evaluates how changing electoral rules in a transitional, post-Soviet society has affected political outcomes. Ukraine serves as an important case for scholars of electoral systems to illustrate consequences of institutional instability. The specific rules that Ukraine has used, coupled with a tendency to alter electoral systems after one or two elections, has promoted an inchoate and volatile party system and short-term strategic planning by politicians.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurdistan Saeed ◽  
Chawan Salah

This study deals with the electoral systems applied in Iraq after 2003 for the Iraqi Parliament elections. The issue's importance lies in the fact that elections are the legitimate means adopted by modern political systems based on the separation of powers. Therefore, after changing the political system in Iraq in 2003 from a one-party system to a democratic parliamentary system, the permanent constitution of 2005 granted the right to political participation for citizens. Including the right to participate in elections through nomination or candidacy for the Iraqi Council of Representatives, this study examines the electoral systems applied after 2003 and the reasons for the instability of the Iraqi parliament elections on a specific law. The study dealt with the types of electoral systems by focusing on the concept and emergence of elections and the most critical electoral systems adopted by political systems. Furthermore, the electoral systems applied after 2003 in the Iraqi parliament elections by focusing on the electoral laws or their amendments that preceded each electoral cycle since 2003 until now. The study concluded that the electoral system in Iraq was not legally stable; several amendments have been made to the laws regulating the elections for the House of Representatives. So the two elections did not repeat under one law because of political parties' criticism leveled at it. Moreover, the attempt by the large parliamentary blocs, through their control of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, to legislate laws that limit the victory of the blocs and small parties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 158-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johanna Schäwel ◽  
Regine Frener ◽  
Sabine Trepte

Social media allow political parties to conduct political behavioral targeting in order to address and persuade specific groups of users and potential voters. This has been criticized: Most social media users do not know about these microtargeting strategies, and the majority of people who are aware of targeted political advertising say that it is not acceptable. This intrusion on personal privacy is viewed as problematic by users and activists alike. The overarching goal of this article is to elaborate on social media users’ privacy perceptions and potential regulating behaviors in the face of political microtargeting. This work is theoretical in nature. We first review theoretical and empirical research in the field of political microtargeting and online privacy. We then analyze how privacy is experienced by social media users during political microtargeting. Building on our theoretical analysis, we finally suggest clear-cut propositions for how political microtargeting can be researched while considering users’ privacy needs on the one hand and relevant political outcomes on the other.


Author(s):  
Matthijs Bogaards

This chapter focuses on electoral systems and institutional design in new democracies. It first compares Maurice Duverger’s electoral laws with those of Giovanni Sartori before discussing the main insights from the literature on electoral systems in established democracies as well as evidence from new democracies. It then considers the impact of the electoral law on the type of party system and its role as intermediary between society and government in plural societies. It also examines the party system as independent variable, along with dependent variables such as the number of political parties, social cleavages and presidentialism. Finally, it discusses consociational democracy and how electoral system design can be used in managing ethnic conflicts.


Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart

The electoral system of Israel is an “extreme” example of proportional representation because of its use of a single nationwide district. This feature has been a constant since 1949, while secondary features, such as legal thresholds and the proportional seat-allocation formula, have changed and had an impact on degrees of proportionality. The party system is highly fragmented, as expected in extreme proportional systems. By applying the Seat Product Model to indices of election outcomes, it is possible to determine whether Israel’s system is more or less fragmented and proportional than expected for its institutional design. This chapter reports that the long-term average outputs are about as expected, but they have fluctuated over time. Some of these fluctuations reflect changes in the secondary features of the system, while others are the results of political factors independent of the institutions.


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