Right and good

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Larmore
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Henry Sidgwick ◽  
The Right ◽  
Modern Era ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
At Will ◽  
Do So

‘Right’ and ‘good’ are the two basic terms of moral evaluation. In general, something is ‘right’ if it is morally obligatory, whereas it is morally ‘good’ if it is worth having or doing and enhances the life of those who possess it. Acts are often held to be morally right or wrong in respect of the action performed, but morally good or bad in virtue of their motive: it is right to help a person in distress, but good to do so from a sense of duty or sympathy, since no one can supposedly be obliged to do something (such as acting with a certain motive) which cannot be done at will. Henry Sidgwick distinguished between two basic conceptions of morality. The ‘attractive’ conception, favoured by the ancient Greeks, views the good as fundamental, and grounds the claims of morality in the self-perfection to which we naturally aspire. The ‘imperative’ conception, preferred in the modern era, views the right as fundamental, and holds that we are subject to certain obligations whatever our wants or desires.

Consequentialism, Virtue, and Character

2020 ◽  
pp. 462-473
Author(s):  
Julia Driver
Keyword(s):  
Virtue Ethics ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Virtuous Person ◽  
Right Action ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay argues that consequentialist theories can both accommodate virtue evaluation, and, indeed, the most plausible versions must do so, and that consequentialist theories can also be structured as forms of virtue ethics. Different strategies available to the consequentialist are presented and criticized, including indirect strategies which argue that the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform. The best way for the consequentialist to approach virtue is as another form of moral evaluation understood in consequentialist terms which is distinct from consequentialist act evaluation; that is, evaluating action is only one part of an overarching consequentialist account of moral evaluation, and the theory can also be applied to dispositions, motives, intentions, etc.

Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy

1957 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. A. Rees
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
The Other ◽  
General Study ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Material Gain ◽  
The Right ◽  
Real Self ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Ways Of Life ◽  
Do So

Among the topics this paper will discuss, the leading one is that of the moral psychology of the Laws; it will not, however, attempt a general study of this, but will confine itself to the question whether that work presupposes any particular division of the soul into parts. The problem seems to have been on the whole neglected by scholars. Apelt in his Platon-Index says briefly that the soul is there treated as tripartite, which is certainly not true without qualification. Neither England's commentary nor Ritter's affords much help. The latter does, indeed, touch on the question in Volume II of his Platon; he there states that the Laws treats the soul as tripartite, and supports this by referring to I. 644C and IX. 863B, but neither passage proves his point, the second actually suggesting that it requires some modification, as will be argued below. The best treatment known to me is the discussion of the second of these passages by L. Gernet in his translation (with commentary) of Book IX, but it requires some expansion and supplementation.It will be well to begin by recapitulating briefly the main points in the moral psychology of the Republic. The soul is there divided into three parts or (better) elements, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive, and this division has two aspects: (a) an analysis is thus provided which can be used in the interpretation and appraisal of all action whatever, the soul being in the right state and the agent's actions right in consequence when the rational element controls the appetitive through the agency of the spirited; (b) at the same time each of the three elements represents a drive towards one of three goals, the rational towards knowledge, the spirited towards honour and public distinction, and the appetitive towards pleasure (interpreted as bodily pleasure), or towards material gain as a means to the attainment of pleasure. Secondly, each of these three drives may predominate in any individual soul (though it is commonest for the last to do so, and least common for the first), and the three are therefore to be correlated with three ways of life, that of the thinker, that of the soldier or man in public life, and that of the merchant or other person engaged in a money-making enterprise, and further these ways of life are specially characteristic of different races. Thirdly, the three elements in the soul and the three types of character are correlated by Plato with the three classes in his ideal state, the rulers, the auxiliaries and the artisans. Fourthly, the distinction of three elements in the soul is made the basis for interpreting the four virtues, wisdom being the virtue of the rational element and courage of the spirited (ideally under the control of the rational), while justice consists in the maintenance of the proper relation between the three elements, the rational controlling the appetitive through the agency of the spirited, and temperance in the willing acquiescence of the appetites in the rule of reason. On the larger canvas of state organisation, the three classes will have as their specially characteristic virtues wisdom, courage and temperance respectively, while the state as a whole will be just if the correct relation between the three classes is maintained and the reason of the rulers preserves its control with the help of the auxiliaries. Fifthly, the tripartition of the soul is applied in Book IX to the discussion of pleasure, pleasures being graded as higher or lower according to the element in the soul which enjoys them; indeed, Plato argues that the pleasures of the rational element are not simply superior to those of the other two but more real as well.Finally, Book X suggests at least that the rational element is the real self, that it alone is immortal, and that the other two exist merely in virtue of our temporary attachment to a body.

Where Are the History Books for Palestinian Children?

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosemary Sayigh
Keyword(s):  
Native Americans ◽  
The Self ◽  
Educational Systems ◽  
Refugee Camps ◽  
Culturally Relevant Education ◽  
Palestinian Children ◽  
The Right ◽  
Authentic Curriculum ◽  
History Books ◽  
Relevant Education

Colonialism deprives colonised peoples of the self-determined histories needed for continued struggle. Scattered since 1948 across diverse educational systems, Palestinians have been unable to control their education or construct an authentic curriculum. This paper covers varied schooling in the Palestinian diaspora. I set this state of ‘splitting through education’ as contradictory to international declarations of the right of colonised peoples to culturally relevant education. Such education would include histories that explain their situation, and depict past resistances. I argue for the production of histories of Palestine for Palestinian children, especially those in refugee camps as well as in Israel and Jerusalem, where curricula are controlled by the settler-coloniser. Black and Native Americans have dealt with exclusion from history in ways that offer models for Palestinians.

Heinrich von Kleist and the Right to War

Romanticism ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254
Author(s):  
Jan Mieszkowski
Keyword(s):  
Heinrich Von Kleist ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do So

This essay explores the conceptualization of warfare in Romanticism. The focus is on two plays by Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea and Prince Friedrich von Homburg. I begin by discussing Carl von Clausewitz's influential understanding of conflict and the problems that arise when he attempts to explain the interdependence of warring parties. I go on to argue that in Kleist's dramas war is a competition between different languages of authority. When no coherent paradigm of agency emerges from this contest, the right to wage war is revealed to be anything but a guarantee that one knows how to do so.

In the Labyrinth

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew McNeillie
Keyword(s):  
The Right ◽  
First Time ◽  
Do So

It is now widely acknowledged, and far beyond Ireland, that Tim Robinson’s two volumes jointly known as Stones of Aran (‘Pilgrimage’ and ‘Labyrinth’) are modern classics, exemplary in every way of how to write about place and to do so with a formal, literary accomplishment that more than earns the right to nod at Ruskin’s own classic. In 2012, Robinson went back to Árainn, the largest of the three islands, for the first time in nearly ten years. He did so at the urging of Andrew McNeillie, with whom he spent two and a half days revisiting old haunts. This chapter makes account of the occasion and uses, in the process, a unique document provided by Robinson as an experiment in annotating his work. This prompts McNeillie to investigate some of his own annotations and footnotes to Aran.

The Anti-Inflammatory Basis of Equality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant J. Rozeboom
Keyword(s):  
Social Practice ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Anti Inflammatory ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Do So

We are moral equals, but in virtue of what? The most plausible answers to this question have pointed to our higher agential capacities, but we vary in the degrees to which we possess those capacities. How could they ground our equal moral standing, then? This chapter argues that they do so only indirectly. Our moral equality is most directly grounded in a social practice of equality, a practice that serves the purpose of mitigating our tendencies toward control and domination that interpreters of Rousseau call “inflamed amour-propre.” We qualify as participants in this practice of equality by possessing certain agential capacities, but it is our participation in the practice, and not the capacities themselves, that makes us moral equals. Thus, in contrast with recent accounts that simply posit a threshold above which capacity-variations are ignored, this chapter proposes moving from a capacity-based to a practice-based view of moral equality.

Kantian Perspectives on Private Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Naive Theory ◽  
Private Rights ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Moral Structure ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter articulates the Kantian approach to private law. It begins by explaining the aims and ambitions of Kantian legal philosophy more generally and, in particular, introducing the Kantian idea that a particular form of thought is appropriate to a particular domain of inquiry or conduct. The chapter situates the Kantian view within a broad natural law tradition. For the part of that tradition that Immanuel Kant develops, the moral structure of natural law is animated by a conception of personal interaction that is so familiar as to be almost invisible. Despite its centrality to both morality and law, in the absence of legal institutions, this natural law is inadequate to its own principles. It requires legal institutions to render it fully determinate in its application consistent with everyone’s independence. It also requires public institutions of adjudication. The chapter further looks at Kant’s “division” of private rights, distinguishing first between the innate right that everyone has simply in virtue of being human and acquired rights that require an affirmative act to establish them. It then goes through the Kantian division of the titles of private right, situating them in relation to the distinction between persons and things. Finally, the chapter articulates the Kantian account of what might be called the naïve theory of remedies—that is, that the remedy is an imperfect continuation of the right that was violated.

scholarly journals Sacrificing Oneself or Another: The Difference Between Prescriptive and Normative Judgments in Moral Evaluation

2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989606
Author(s):  
Štěpán Bahník ◽  
Emir Efendic ◽  
Marek A. Vranka
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Question Wording ◽  
Judgment Type ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Sacrifice ◽  
Normative Judgments

When asked whether to sacrifice oneself or another person to save others, one might think that people would consider sacrificing themselves rather than someone else as the right and appropriate course of action—thus showing an other-serving bias. So far however, most studies found instances of a self-serving bias—people say they would rather sacrifice others. In three experiments using trolley-like dilemmas, we tested whether an other-serving bias might appear as a function of judgment type. That is, participants were asked to make a prescriptive judgment (whether the described action should or should not be done) or a normative judgment (whether the action is right or wrong). We found that participants exhibited an other-serving bias only when asked whether self- or other-sacrifice is wrong. That is, when the judgment was normative and in a negative frame (in contrast to the positive frame asking whether the sacrifice is right). Otherwise, participants tended to exhibit a self-serving bias; that is, they approved sacrificing others more. The results underscore the importance of question wording and suggest that some effects on moral judgment might depend on the type of judgment.

scholarly journals After Hajj: Muslim Pilgrims Refashioning Themselves

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
Kholoud Al-Ajarma
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
Religious Behavior ◽  
Transformative Experience ◽  
The Everyday ◽  
Community Expectations ◽  
Religious Dimensions ◽  
Personal Level ◽  
The Right ◽  
Self Formation ◽  
Do So

The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj) is one of the five pillars of Islam and a duty which Muslims must perform—once in a lifetime—if they are physically and financially able to do so. In Morocco, from where thousands of pilgrims travel to Mecca every year, the Hajj often represents the culmination of years of preparation and planning, both spiritual and logistical. Pilgrims often describe their journey to Mecca as a transformative experience. Upon successfully completing the pilgrimage and returning home, pilgrims must negotiate their new status—and the expectations that come with it—within the mundane and complex reality of everyday life. There are many ambivalences and tensions to be dealt with, including managing the community expectations of piety and moral behavior. On a personal level, pilgrims struggle between staying on the right path, faithful to their pilgrimage experience, and straying from that path as a result of human imperfection and the inability to sustain the ideals inspired by pilgrimage. By ethnographically studying the everyday lives of Moroccans after their return from Mecca, this article seeks to answer the questions: how do pilgrims encounter a variety of competing expectations and demands following their pilgrimage and how are their efforts received by members of their community? How do they shape their social and religious behavior as returned pilgrims? How do they deal with the tensions between the ideals of Hajj and the realities of daily life? In short, this article scrutinizes the religious, social and personal ramifications for pilgrims after the completion of Hajj and return to their community. My research illustrates that pilgrimage contributes to a process of self-formation among pilgrims, with religious and non-religious dimensions, which continues long after Hajj is over and which operates within, and interacts with, specific social contexts.

scholarly journals Agency and the Successive Structure of Time-Consciousness

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camden Alexander McKenna
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Structure ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
The Self ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Epistemic Status ◽  
Mental Attitude ◽  
Time Consciousness ◽  
Possibility Space ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Sort

AbstractI argue for constraining the nomological possibility space of temporal experiences and endorsing the Succession Requirement for agents. The Succession Requirement holds that the basic structure of temporal experience must be successive for agentive subjects, at least in worlds that are law-like in the same way as ours. I aim to establish the Succession Requirement by showing non-successively experiencing agents are not possible for three main reasons, namely that they (1) fail to stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the outcomes of their actions, (2) exhibit the wrong sort of epistemic status for agency, and (3) lack the requisite agentive mental attitude of intentionality. I conclude that agency is incompatible with non-successive experience and therefore we should view the successive temporal structure of experience as a necessary condition for agency. I also suggest that the Succession Requirement may actually extend beyond my main focus on agency, offering preliminary considerations in favor of seeing successive experience as a precondition for selfhood as well. The consequences of the Succession Requirement are wide-ranging, and I discuss various implications for our understanding of agency, the self, time consciousness, and theology, among other things.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document