Magistrates who Made and Applied the Law

Author(s):  
Frederik Vervaet

During most of the Roman Republican era—traditionally dated from 509 to 27 BC—the magistrates of the people and the plebs demonstrably played an essential role in both the production and the application of Roman law, especially in terms of statute laws and edicts. Although the senate had a tremendous voice, no legislation would have been possible without the proactive involvement of a series of key magistrates of people and plebs. When it comes to the application of the law under the Roman Republic, there was much scope for the so-called minor magistracies, whose involvement in the routine application of the law was probably disproportionate to their attestation in the sources. Importantly, this survey of magistrates who made and applied the law in the Roman Republic never loses sight of the overall socio-institutional background and key historical developments and changes.

Author(s):  
Michael C. Alexander

The anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s early De Inventione place great emphasis on the Judicial type of oratory that takes place in the Roman courts. By teaching their readers how to speak in this context through comments and examples, the two texts also provide a unique insight into the law, legal systems and personnel in the early first century BCE. This chapter focuses on the information they provide about the people involved in the Roman courts: the jurists, the advocates, and the jurors.


Author(s):  
Cristina Rosillo-López

We are familiar with the notion that the Roman political world of the Late Republic included lofty speeches and sessions of the Senate, but also need to remember that another important aspect of Late Republican politics revolved around senators talking among themselves, chatting in the corner. The present book intends to analyse senatorial political conversations and illuminate the oral aspects of Roman politics. It argues that Roman senators and their entourages met in person to have conversations in which they discussed politics, circulated political information, and negotiated strategies; this extra-institutional sphere had a relevant impact both on politics and institutions, as well as determining how the Roman Republic functioned. The main point of this book is to offer a new perspective on Roman politics through the proxy of conversations and meetings. Orality has represented an important component in analysis of Roman institutions: oratory before the people in assemblies and contiones, addresses and discussions in the Senate, speeches in the law courts. Orality was also crucial in rumours and public opinion. The present research posits that, in Rome, oral was the default mode of communication in politics, especially outside institutions. Only when they could not reach each other in person did Roman senators and their peers resort to letters. The book suggests that the study of politics should not be restricted to the senatorial group, but that other persons should be considered as important actors with their own agency (albeit in different degrees), such as freedmen and elite women.


Africa ◽  
1966 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
I. Schapera

Opening ParagraphLike many other peoples, the Tswana of Bechuanaland Protectorate often cite proverbs and similar sayings to specify rules of conduct. In this paper I discuss a number of those generally used in the context of litigation; some are statements of general principles, akin to the ‘maxims’ of Roman law, others relate more particularly to judicial procedure. Many were actually quoted at trials witnessed by myself or recorded by clerks of tribal courts, the rest were mentioned incidentally by informants when discussing points of Tswana law. The great majority are classed by the people themselves as ‘proverbs’ (diane, sing. seane), and some of these (though not all) are included in the collections of Tswana proverbs published by Plaatje and Seboni; others were introduced simply by some such phrase as Molao ware, ‘The law says’, or Kamokgwa waSetswana, ‘According to Tswana custom’. Since I am not here concerned with their linguistic aspects, I do not attempt to distinguish recognized proverbs from other kinds of maxim.


The history of insolvency law can be traced back to ancient Roman law. Around 450 BC, the Law of the Twelve Tables (Leges Duodecim Tabularum) empowered creditors under certain circumstances to enchain the defaulted debtor or even to put an end to his life. This quite rigorous approach was not changed before the time of the Middle Roman Republic when the creditor was confined to taking possession of—quite progressively ‘only’—his debtor’s property.


Author(s):  
S. I. Gridin

The article deals with the issues of administrative proceedings in Roman law. Its beginning was laid in the 5th century BC by the laws of ХII tables. They briefly deal with the issues of legal proceedings, which at that time was called court agreement. Free citizens gathered at the forum (city square), where the plaintiff presented claims to the defendant. In Roman law, the rule was established to make claims through claims, which the magistrate (praetor) had to support. The judges were elected by the people. Gradually, the praetors changed the formulas of claims, which contributed to the development of Roman law. Often they proceeded not from the law, but from the circumstances of the case, therefore they could instruct the judge to consider the case “in good faith.” Gradually, various forms of claims were formed, which contributed to the improvement of administrative proceedings. In Roman law, many concepts were laid that have remained in modern legal proceedings. This is the election and turnover of judges, the necessary defense, the writ of execution and the persons who monitored their execution; jurisdiction; corruption; search procedure; jurisdiction; privilege; appeal against court decisions; requirement for witnesses; consideration of cases by the police; torts; limitation of actions; and some others. This makes the study of Roman justice relevant.


1989 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 59-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Evans-Grubbs

On I April A.D. 326 the Emperor Constantine issued a strongly worded edict (CTh IX. 24. 1) violently attacking the practice of abduction marriage or bride theft. Addressed ‘to the people’ (‘ad populum’), the law demands the punishment of all persons involved in such cases, including even the girl herself and her parents, if they had later agreed to the marriage of their daughter with her abductor. This edict marks the first explicit recognition in Roman law of marriage by abduction, although it is clear from other literary sources that the phenomenon was not new to the age of Constantine.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 285
Author(s):  
Karol Kuźmicz

<p class="Standard"><span lang="EN-GB">The academic character of the article is connected with the attempt to answer the question asked in the title: Utopia without the law – is it possible? The theoretical arguments provided by the author lead to an affirmative answer to this question and allow for formulating the following thesis: there is no utopia without the law. The law is not only present in utopias, both positive and negative ones (anti-utopias and dystopias) but also, to a great extent, determines their existence and functioning. As a result, it links utopian thinking to reality. Any answer to this question is possible and justifiable in the academic discourse. According to the author of this article not only the law is present in the utopia but the law in the utopia must exist. The essence of the law in utopias is justice, but there is not justice in utopias without wisdom. The Bible, Roman law and philosophical and legal reflection were the sources of an approach to law for the creators of utopia. Referring to the views of such thinkers as: Plato, Immanuel Kant, Rudolf von Ihering, Gustav Radbruch, Karl R. Popper, Bronisław Baczko, the author states that the law is an integral part of both worlds: the utopian world and real world. So, there is not utopia without the law as an idea of jusctice, implemented into the social life of the people who are intelligent beings.</span></p>


Liquidity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-200
Author(s):  
Muchtar Riva’i ◽  
Darwin Erhandy

The establishment of the KPPU is to control the implementation of the Act. No. 5/1999 on Concerning the Ban on Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition in Indonesia. Various duties and authority of the KPPU contained in Article 35 and Article 36 of the Act. But in reality, KPPU does not have executorial rights so that the various decisions of the commission often could not be implemented. Therefore internally strengthening of institutional existence by way of amending the Law Commission is very appropriate to be used by the government and parliament agenda. Externally, stakeholder participation is something very urgent and that the KPPU’s strategic optimally capable of performing their duties according to its motto: “Healthy competition Welfare of the people”.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-48
Author(s):  
Warren Swain

Intoxication as a ground to set aside a contract is not something that has proved to be easy for the law to regulate. This is perhaps not very surprising. Intoxication is a temporary condition of varying degrees of magnitude. Its presence does however raise questions of contractual autonomy and individual responsibility. Alcohol consumption is a common social activity and perceptions of intoxication and especially alcoholism have changed over time. Roman law is surprisingly quiet on the subject. In modern times the rules about intoxicated contracting in Scottish and English law is very similar. Rather more interestingly the law in these two jurisdictions has reached the current position in slightly different ways. This history can be traced through English Equity, the works of the Scottish Institutional writers, the rise of the Will Theory, and all leavened with a dose of judicial pragmatism.


2002 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-100
Author(s):  
Raffaele Caterina

“A system of private ownership must provide for something more sophisticated than absolute ownership of the property by one person. A property owner needs to be able to do more than own it during his lifetime and pass it on to someone else on his death.”1 Those who own things with a long life quite naturally feel the urge to deal in segments of time. Most of the owner's ambitions in respect of time can be met by the law of contract. But contract does not offer a complete solution, since contracts create only personal rights. Certain of the owner's legitimate wishes can be achieved only if the law allows them to be given effect in rem—that is, as proprietary rights. Legal systems have responded differently to the need for proprietary rights limited in time. Roman law created usufruct and other iura in re aliena; English law created different legal estates. Every system has faced similar problems. One issue has been the extent to which the holder of a limited interest should be restricted in his or her use and enjoyment in order to protect the holders of other interests in the same thing. A common core of principles regulates the relationship between those who hold temporary interests and the reversioners. For instance, every system forbids holder of the possessory interest to damage the thing arbitrarily. But other rules are more controversial. This study focuses upon the rules which do not forbid, but compel, certain courses of action.


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